# Zotero Database Security Report

## 1. Risk of Database Damage or Corruption

Based on a thorough review of the Python scripts in the `zurch/` directory, the risk of causing damage or corruption to the Zotero SQLite database is **very low**.

The primary reason for this is that the tool consistently opens the database in **read-only mode**. This is enforced in the `database.py` and `database_improved.py` files through the use of the `mode=ro` URI parameter when establishing a connection with `sqlite3.connect()`:

```python
# In database.py and database_improved.py
sqlite3.connect(f'file:{self.db_path}?mode=ro', uri=True)
```

This is a specific feature of SQLite that prevents any write operations on the database file, effectively making it impossible for the tool to alter the database schema or content.

## 2. Analysis of Database Commands

I have analyzed all the SQL queries present in the codebase, particularly in the `queries.py` file. All executed queries are `SELECT` statements, which are read-only operations. There are **no `INSERT`, `UPDATE`, `DELETE`, `DROP`, `ALTER`, or any other data or schema modification commands** present in any of the scripts.

The tool is designed exclusively to retrieve and display information from the Zotero database.

## 3. Recommendations for Enhanced Security

While the current implementation is already quite secure due to the read-only database connection, the following measures could further enhance the tool's safety and mitigate any potential risks:

### a. Filesystem Interaction

The tool interacts with the filesystem when using the `-g` or `--getbyid` flags to copy attachment files. The `export.py` script also writes files. The current implementation in `handlers.py` and `export.py` includes some safety checks, but these could be hardened.

- **Current State**: The `export.py` script has a `is_safe_path` function to prevent writing to system directories. The `handlers.py` script for grabbing attachments has basic error handling.
- **Recommendation**:
    1.  **Strict Path Validation**: Before writing any file (exports or attachments), ensure that the target directory is within a user-owned directory (e.g., home directory) or the current working directory, and not a system or application directory. The existing `is_safe_path` is a good start.
    2.  **Filename Sanitization**: The `sanitize_filename` function in `handlers.py` is a good security measure. Ensure it is used for all file outputs, including exports, to prevent path traversal attacks or other filesystem issues.
    3.  **User Confirmation for Overwrites**: The tool currently prevents overwriting files. This is a good safety feature and should be maintained.

### b. Dependency Management

The tool relies on external libraries specified in `pyproject.toml`.

- **Current State**: Dependencies are managed by `uv`.
- **Recommendation**:
    1.  **Pin Dependencies**: Ensure that all dependencies in `pyproject.toml` are pinned to specific versions to prevent the introduction of malicious code through a compromised dependency.
    2.  **Regularly Audit Dependencies**: Use tools like `pip-audit` or GitHub's Dependabot to scan for known vulnerabilities in the dependencies.

### c. Code and Query Hardening

- **Current State**: The code uses parameterized queries, which is the correct way to prevent SQL injection attacks.
- **Recommendation**:
    1.  **Input Validation**: Continue to validate and sanitize all user inputs, not just for SQL queries but for any function that interacts with the system, such as file paths or search terms. The `config_wizard.py` has good examples of input validation.
    2.  **Principle of Least Privilege**: The read-only database connection is an excellent example of this principle. Maintain this approach throughout the code.

## Conclusion

The `zurch` tool, in its current state, is safe to use and poses a **negligible risk** to the integrity of the Zotero database. The use of read-only connections is the most critical safety feature. The recommendations above are primarily for hardening the tool against more general security vulnerabilities related to file system interaction and dependency management, rather than direct database corruption.
