
##4000950 FIRST OF A SERIES The Stain of War on Culture <p> " MA SA LAA CH'OOL ? " ARE YOU HAPPY IN YOUR HEART ? " SA LIN CH'OOL . " YES , I AM HAPPY IN MY HEART . <p> War does n't just disappear with the signing of a peace treaty and the onslaught of reconstruction efforts . 0To understand the true cost of any armed conflict , we must first consider the lingering effects of war one , five , ten , or twenty years from its official end . <p> THE MULTICOLORED VILLAGES of Chicaja and Maribach adorn the verdant Guatemalan hillsides that overlook the merging of the Chicaja and Cahabon rivers . Even before I arrived and met the thirty families that lived there , the exquisite greeting used by the Q'eqchi ' people captivated me . Language is like a mirror : a reflection of culture and lifestyle formed by the nuances of syntax and semantics . " Words only cover the experience of living , " author Barbara Kingsolver wrote , and the pure poetry of the few Q'eqchi ' phrases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the people I would soon meet . <p> As the bustling cobblestone streets of Cahabon faded into the distance , we were moved to silence as we walked . Lush jungle trees formed a thick canopy above the footpath that was woven even tighter by the proliferation of tropical foliage and airplants growing in every imaginable crevice . Being familiar with the edible and medicinal qualities of plants native to my northern latitude , I was struck with the wealth of invaluable resources this diverse rainforest could surely provide its residents . We wound deeper into the low mountains , crossing the streams and rivers that divided the landscape until we came to the modest thatched roof hut of our hosts , twenty-four-year-old Candelaria , her husband Ramon , and their four young children . <p> My husband and I traveled to Chicaja and Maribach in 2001 to meet with Julia Weidmann , an international human rights witness with the Guatemalan Accompaniment Project . Guatemala 's civil war was perhaps the longest and most unspeakable war of modern times . Many events contributed to the start of the war , among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be sold out from under them to insatiable multinational companies . For thirty-seven long years villages were pitted against each other -- the indigenous people were terrorized by their neighbors who themselves were threatened into participating in a conflict that , in many ways , had little relevance to the sustenance of their way of life . The war 's impact became increasingly personal for the villagers : shattering families , forcing children into early adulthood , and sending unknown numbers of refugees away from their lands forever . The war officially ended in 1996 but the wounds of a decades-long war do n't heal with the mere signing of a paper . Atrocities continue even today , hence the need for international witnesses . <p> Early in our visit we noticed that the population of the twin villages was significantly skewed towards the younger ages -- there were very few elders . Candelaria described how she had become a chaq'na , or little mother , at age seven when her parents were massacred in the war , leaving her as the primary caregiver for her young siblings . She @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families north into Mexico and the United States . For many surviving older adults the spilling of so much innocent blood on their native lands had forever altered them . When the war finally ended they did n't return to that haunted place as those who had been younger during the most intense fighting did . <p> We quickly learned that the steamy jungle mid afternoons were fit for little more than seeking shelter inside the hut and performing low-energy chores such as shucking corn and playing with the babies . We practiced our Q'eqchi ' with Candelaria , and she asked us to teach her some Spanish words and phrases . We laughed together as we tried to make our tongues produce the foreign cadence of unfamiliar languages . Candelaria 's youngest child Aura toddled around the inside of our circle and cooed at our efforts . <p> " You like my baby ? " Candelaria asked Weidmann . <p> " Yes , how could I not like her ? " Weidman 's response was genuine . <p> " You can take her home with you . " Candelaria 's @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ n't sure she had understood the message . She leaned forward to clarify . <p> " Home to America . " <p> An expression of surprise rushed across Weidmann 's face . " I could n't raise her . I ca n't speak Q'eqchi ' well enough to teach her her own language . " <p> " I do n't want her to learn Q'eqchi ' . I want her to speak Spanish . " <p> Our hearts were heavy as the aim of her request became clear to us . Candelaria wanted a better life for her child , not the difficult life the village entailed . And speaking Spanish was a key that opened up many opportunities in the mountain towns and allowed individuals to stand up for their rights . <p> The Q'eqchi ' communities were quickly eroding and becoming more isolated with each passing year . And each year it became more essential for the indigenous population to learn Spanish . Yet with the death of any language also comes the passing of a culture . And the thought of removing this beautiful way of life from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . <p> Our days in Chicaja and Maribach were shaped by the vibrant colors of the Mayan culture . The women wore traditional woven skirts with patterns depicting the life-sustaining corn plant and Mayan gods . Women and men alike used a narrow sling of fabric over their heads to transport everything from ebony-haired babies to canvas bags full of black beans . A few women still wove colorful strips of fabric using traditional backstrap looms . Spicy red chilies were spread across sheets of corrugated metal to wrinkle in the sun until they were dry enough to store . <p> These tidbits whetted our appetites for deeper cultural teachings from our hosts . We asked the men , " What plants in the forest can the people harvest for food and medicine ? " They shook their heads in response . " What plants should be avoided ? " Again they indicated that they did n't know which plants . Weidmann , who had been living as a member of the village for nine months at that time , asked for permission to interview community members . When several of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the lullabies that you sing to your babies ? " They looked at one another with uncertain glances . " Do you tell your children the nursery rhymes and tales that your families passed down to you ? " They could n't name any . The Guatemalan civil war had not only decimated the few generations that had endured it but it had irreversibly interrupted the entire history of a culture and a way of life . It would take more than a peace agreement to stop the events that had already been set in motion . <p> Our interview with the village women continued . Weidmann gently asked what the reasons were for fighting the war . The war clearly had a greater impact on this community than any other single factor . The women turned towards each other and talked together in mumbled phrases and blank looks . They adjusted the babies at their breasts and seemed to wait for someone other than themselves to give an answer . Finally one spoke up and said , " We do n't know . " In that moment I felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same time , my heart was filled with respect for these strong Mayan people holding fast and beginning anew despite an outside world that seems resolved to tear them apart . Certainly much of their history as a people had been taken from them but the ancestral strength and determination that runs through their veins can never be destroyed . Like the great Mayan temples of Tikal that still tower above the jungle in the north , the modern-day Mayan people will likewise endure . <p> Two years later I met with Weidmann again near her San Francisco home to reflect on our experiences in Maribach and Chicaja . Why does war most heavily affect the poor ? Is it possible to separate language from culture ? Can a culture once lost be restored ? How does life persist in spite of intense suffering ? <p> Surrounded by the lush gardens in Golden Gate Park we read to one another from Michael J. Caduto 's book , Earth Tales from Around the World . In the introduction Caduto wrote , " stories are the heart and soul of many cultures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe in " As we read to one another from the book of ancient tales we came to understand that stories also serve as a means to help us make sense of life 's senseless situations . The following story , " The First Bats , " as retold by Caduto , is from the Jakaltec-Maya ( Guatemala and Mexico ) . It 's a tale of the first mice , their discontent with a terrestrial existence , and how , as individuals , they either maintained their status or evolved and changed . <p> " It is time , " said the Creator . The mice began to chatter . <p> " Anyone who can jump across this ravine and land safely on the other side will be given wings and the power of flight . " <p> One at a time , the mice ran to the edge of the chasm and leaped into the air . Many fell short and remained mice thereafter . Those who reached the other side grew thin wings of skin . Their tails fell off and the tiny claws grew long and curved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dark caves in the mountains . <p> When all of the mice had jumped , the Creator spoke to them one last time . " Now it is done . Those of you who are still mice will eat seeds and nuts . You can make warm nests and finish them with a soft lining . You can nest in the trees or wherever you find a good space for a home . From this day forth , the rest of you will now be known as Sotz ' , the bats . The mouse 's night will be your day . Some of you will eat mosquitoes , others will eat fruit and still others will drink blood . No longer will you live in cozy nests . By your sharp claws you will cling upside down from the roofs of the caverns , nchach'en . " <p> The mouse , Tx'ow , saw that Sotz ' , the bats , too , were not entirely pleased with their lives . That is how mice came to be content with the gifts they received when first created . <p> For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is far from over . Each community member will make a myriad of individual decisions that will ultimately affect the whole : they will determine which language or languages to learn and speak , they will embrace or separate from the dominant Latin culture , and they will arrive at the best land management decisions to protect their farmlands . These decisions belong to individuals but they will meld together to create a distinct flavor and form the backbone of the modern-day Mayan community . As we discovered in " The First Bats , " regardless of a community 's gifts there will also be feelings of discontent . But in spite of the choices that are made and the obstacles that present themselves , the extraordinary people of Maribach and Chicaja model a spirit of indescribable hope and determination -- qualities that the rest of the world can only aspire to possess . <p> PHOTO ( BLACK &; WHITE ) <p> By Michelle Bargo <p> <p> When not living abroad , Michelle Bargo resides in Cincinnati , Ohio . She is a freelance writer with a master 's degree in @ @ @ @ @ @ 
##4002772 Section : Comments Today 's Insurgents in Iraq Are Tomorrow 's Terrorists <p> When the United States started sending guns and money to the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s , it had a clearly defined Cold War purpose : helping expel the Soviet army , which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 . And so it made sense that once the Afghan jihad forced a Soviet withdrawal a decade later , Washington would lose interest in the rebels . For the international mujahideen drawn to the Afghan conflict , however , the fight was just beginning . They opened new fronts in the name of global jihad and became the spearhead of Islamist terrorism . The seriousness of the blowback became clear to the United States with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center : all of the attack 's participants either had served in Afghanistan or were linked to a Brooklyn-based fund-raising organ for the Afghan jihad that was later revealed to be al Qaeda 's de facto U.S. headquarters . The blowback , evident in other countries as well , continued to increase in intensity throughout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 2001 . <p> The current war in Iraq will generate a ferocious blowback of its own , which -- as a recent classified CIA assessment predicts-could be longer and more powerful than that from Afghanistan . Foreign volunteers fighting U.S. troops in Iraq today will find new targets around the world after the war ends . Yet the Bush administration , consumed with managing countless crises in Iraq , has devoted little time to preparing for such long-term consequences . Lieutenant General James Conway , the director of operations on the Joint Staff , admitted as much when he said in June that blowback " is a concern , but there 's not much we can do about it at this point in time . " Judging from the experience of Afghanistan , such thinking is both mistaken and dangerously complacent . COMING HOME TO ROOST <p> The foreign volunteers in Afghanistan saw the Soviet defeat as a victory for Islam against a superpower that had invaded a Muslim country . Estimates of the number of foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan begin in the low thousands ; some spent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amounted to a jihad vacation . The jihadists gained legitimacy and prestige from their triumph both within the militant community and among ordinary Muslims , as well as the confidence to carry their jihad to other countries where they believed Muslims required assistance . When veterans of the guerrilla campaign returned home with their experience , ideology , and weapons , they destabilized once-tranquil countries and inflamed already unstable ones . <p> Algeria had seen relatively little terrorism for decades , but returning mujahideen founded the Armed Islamic Group ( known by its French initials , GIA ) . GIA murdered thousands of Algerian civilians during the 1990s as it attempted to depose the government and replace it with an Islamist regime , a goal inspired by the mujahideen 's success in Afghanistan . The GIA campaign of violence became especially pronounced after the Algerian army mounted a coup in 1992 to preempt an election that Islamists were poised to win . <p> In Egypt , after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 prompted a government crackdown , hundreds of extremists left the country to train and fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the Soviets to lead a terror campaign that killed more than a thousand people between 1990 and 1997 . Closely tied to these militants was the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman , " the Blind Sheikh , " whose preaching , according to the 9/11 Commission , had inspired Sadat 's assassins . Abdel Rahman 's career demonstrates the internationalization of Islamist extremism after Afghanistan . The cleric visited Pakistan to lend his support to the Afghan jihad and encouraged two of his sons to fight in the war . He also provided spiritual direction for the Egyptian terrorist organization Jamaat al-Islamiyya and supported its renewed attacks on the Egyptian government in the 1990s . He arrived in the United States in 1990 -- at the time , the country was regarded as a sympathetic environment for Islamist militants -- where he began to encourage attacks on New York City landmarks . Convicted in 1995 in connection with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center , Abdel Rahman is serving a life sentence in the United States . But his influence has continued to be felt : a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Luxor that left 58 tourists dead and almost crippled Egypt 's vital tourism industry was an effort by Jamaat al-Islamiyya to force his release . <p> The best-known alumnus of the Afghan jihad is Osama bin Laden , under whose leadership the " Afghan Arabs " prosecuted their war beyond the Middle East into the United States , Africa , Europe , and Southeast Asia . After the Soviet defeat , bin Laden established a presence in Sudan to build up his fledgling al Qaeda organization . Around the same time , Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia . The U.S. military presence in " the land of the two holy places " became al Qaeda 's core grievance , and the United States became bin Laden 's primary target . Al Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 , nearly sank the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000 , and attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 . Bin Laden expanded his reach into Southeast Asia with the assistance of other terrorists who had fought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hambali , who is the central link between al Qaeda and the Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah , and Ali Gufron , known as Mukhlas , a leading planner of the 2002 Bail bombing that killed more than 200 people . ON-THE-JOB TRAINING <p> The Afghan experience was important for the foreign " holy warriors " for several reasons . First , they gained battlefield experience . Second , they rubbed shoulders with like-minded militants from around the Muslim world , creating a truly global network . Third , as the Soviet war wound down , they established a myriad of new jihadist organizations , from al Qaeda to the Algerian GIA to the Filipino group Abu Sayyaf . <p> However , despite their grandiose rhetoric , the few thousand foreigners who fought in Afghanistan had only a negligible impact on the outcome of that war . Bin Laden 's Afghan Arabs began fighting the Soviet army only in 1986 , six years after the Soviet invasion . It was the Afghans , drawing on the wealth of their American and Saudi sponsors , who defeated the Soviet Union . By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far more potent than the Afghan Arabs ever were . <p> Several factors could make blowback from the Iraq war even more dangerous than the fallout from Afghanistan . Foreign fighters started to arrive in Iraq even before Saddam 's regime fell . They have conducted most of the suicide bombings -- including some that have delivered strategic successes such as the withdrawal of the UN and most international aid organizations -- and the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi , another alumnus of the Afghan war , is perhaps the most effective insurgent commander in the field . Fighters in Iraq are more battle hardened than the Afghan Arabs , who fought demoralized Soviet army conscripts . They are testing themselves against arguably the best army in history , acquiring skills in their battles against coalition forces that will be far more useful for future terrorist operations than those their counterparts learned during the 1980s . Mastering how to make improvised explosive devices or how to conduct suicide operations is more relevant to urban terrorism than the conventional guerrilla tactics used against the Red Army . U.S. military commanders say that techniques @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . <p> Finally , foreign involvement in the Iraqi conflict will likely lead some Iraqi nationals to become international terrorists . The Afghans were glad to have Arab money but were culturally , religiously , and psychologically removed from the Afghan Arabs ; they neither joined al Qaeda nor identified with the Arabs ' radical theology . Iraqis , however , are closer culturally to the foreigners fighting in Iraq , and many will volunteer to continue other jihads even after U.S. troops depart . IN BAGHDAD AND IN BOSTON <p> President George W. Bush and others have suggested that it is better for the United States to fight the terrorists in Baghdad than in Boston . It is a comforting notion , but it is wrong on two counts . First , it posits a finite number of terrorists who can be lured to one place and killed . But the Iraq war has expanded the terrorists ' ranks : the year 2003 saw the highest incidence of significant terrorist attacks in two decades , and then , in 2004 , astonishingly , that number tripled . ( Secretary of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror . " An exponentially rising number of terrorist attacks is one metric that seems relevant . ) Second , the Bush administration has not addressed the question of what the foreign fighters will do when the war in Iraq ends . It would be naive to expect them to return to civilian life in their home countries . More likely , they will become the new shock troops of the international jihadist movement . <p> For these reasons , U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East , as well as the United States itself , are vulnerable to blowback . Disturbingly , some European governments are already seeing some of their citizens and resident aliens answer the call to fight in Iraq . In February , the Los Angeles Times reported that U.S. troops in Iraq had detained three French militants -- and that police in Paris had arrested ten associates who were planning to join them . In June , authorities in Spain arrested 16 men , mostly Moroccans , on charges of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States indicted a Dutch resident , Iraqi-born Wesam al-Delaema , for conspiring to bomb U.S. convoys in Fallujah . These incidents presage danger not only for European countries , but also for the United States , since European nationals benefit from the Visa Waiver Program , which affords them relatively easy access to the United States . <p> But it is Saudi Arabia that will bear the brunt of the blowback . Several studies attest to the significant role Saudi nationals have played in the conflict . Of the 154 Arab fighters killed in Iraq between September 2004 and March 2005 , 61 percent were from Saudi Arabia . Another report concluded that of the 235 suicide bombers named on Web sites since mid-2004 as having perpetrated attacks in Iraq , more than 50 percent were Saudi nationals . Today , the Saudi government is exporting its jihadist problem instead of dealing with it , just as the Egyptians did during the Afghan war . A SWITCH IN TIME <p> American success in Iraq would deny today 's jihadists the symbolic victory that they seek . But with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dealing with the jihadists in Iraq now-by limiting the numbers entering the fight and breaking the mechanism that would otherwise generate blowback after the war . <p> The foreign jihadists in Iraq need to be separated from the local insurgents through the political process . Success in that mission will require Iraq 's Sunni Arabs to remain consistently engaged in the political process . Shiite and Kurdish leaders will have to back down from their efforts to create semiautonomous states in the north and the south . But the prospects for these developments appear dim at the moment , and reaching a durable agreement may increasingly be beyond U.S. influence . <p> To raise the odds of success , the United States must deliver more security to central Iraq . This means securing Iraq 's borders , especially with Syria , to block the flow of foreign fighters into the country . The repeated U.S. military operations in western Iraq since May have shown that at present there are insufficient forces to disrupt insurgent supply lines running along the Euphrates River to the Syrian border . Accomplishing this objective would require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-trained Iraqi troops . For the moment , neither of those options seems viable , and so additional U.S. soldiers should be rotated out of Iraq 's cities and into the western deserts and border towns , transitioning the control of certain urban areas to the Iraqi military and police . <p> Foreign governments must also silence calls to jihad and deny radicals sanctuary once this war ends . After the Soviet defeat , jihadists too often found refuge in places as varied as Brooklyn and Khartoum , where radical clerics offered religious justifications for continuing jihad . To date , some governments have not taken the necessary steps to clamp down on the new generation of jihadists . Although the Saudis largely silenced their radical clerics following the terrorist attacks in Riyadh in May 2003 , 26 clerics were still permitted late in 2004 to call for jihad against U.S. troops in Iraq . The United States must press the Saudi government to end these appeals and restrict its nationals from entering Iraq . In the long run , measures against radical preaching are in Riyadh 's best interest , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be as painful for Saudi Arabia as the blowback from Afghanistan was for Egypt and Algeria during the 1990s . <p> Finally , the U.S. intelligence community , in conjunction with foreign intelligence services , should work on creating a database that identifies and tracks foreign fighters , their known associates , and their spiritual mentors . If such a database had been created during the Afghan war , the United States would have been far better prepared for al Qaeda 's subsequent terror campaign . <p> President Jimmy Carter 's national security adviser , Zbigniew Brzezinski , once asked of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan : " What is most important to the history of the world ? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire ? Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War ? " Today , the Bush administration is implicitly arguing a similar point : that the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state is a project of overriding importance for the United States and the world , which in due course will eclipse memories of the insurgency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war in Iraq is already breeding a new generation of terrorists . The lesson of the decade of terror that followed the Afghan war was that underestimating the importance of blowback has severe consequences . Repeating the mistake in regard to Iraq could lead to even deadlier outcomes . <p> By Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds <p> <p> Peter Bergen is a Schwartz Fellow of the New America Foundation and the author of Holy War , Inc. : inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden <p> Alec Reynolds is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University 's School of Advanced International Studies . <p> 
##4002773 Section : Comments Washington Battles the World <p> As historic documents go , the statement issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on June 30 was low-key even by American standards of informality . No flowery language , no fountain-penned signatures , no Great Seal of the United States -- only 331 words on a single page . But the simplicity of the presentation belied the importance of the content , which was Washington 's attempt to settle a crucial problem of twenty-first-century global governance : Who controls the Internet ? <p> Any network requires some centralized control in order to function . The global phone system , for example , is administered by the world 's oldest international treaty organization , the International Telecommunication Union , founded in 1865 and now a part of the UN family . The Internet is different . It is coordinated by a private-sector nonprofit organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ( ICANN ) , which was set up by the United States in 1998 to take over the activities performed for 30 years , amazingly , by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over who controls the Internet has simmered in insular technology-policy circles for years and more recently has crept into formal diplomatic talks . Many governments feel that , like the phone network , the Internet should be administered under a multilateral treaty . ICANN , in their view , is an instrument of American hegemony over cyberspace : its private-sector approach favors the United States , Washington retains oversight authority , and its Governmental Advisory Committee , composed of delegates from other nations , has no real powers . <p> This discontent finally boiled over at the UN 'S World Summit on the Information Society , the first phase of which was held in Geneva in December 2003 ( the second phase is set for November in Tunis ) . Brazil and South Africa have criticized the current arrangement , and China has called for the creation of a new international treaty organization . France wants an intergovernmental approach , but one involving only an elite group of democratic nations . Cuba and Syria have taken advantage of the controversy to poke a finger in Washington 's eye , and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , calling the existing system of Internet governance a form of neocolonialism . <p> How did such a welcomed technology become the source of such discord ? Everyone understands that the Internet is crucial for the functioning of modern economies , societies , and even governments , and everyone has an interest in seeing that it is secure and reliable . But at the same time , many governments are bothered that such a vital resource exists outside their control and , even worse , that it is under the thumb of an already dominant United States . Washington 's answer to these concerns-the Commerce Department 's four terse paragraphs , released at the end of June , announcing that the United States plans to retain control of the Internet indefinitely-was intended as a sort of Monroe Doctrine for our times . It was received abroad with just the anger one would expect , setting the stage for further controversy . MASTERS OF THEIR DOMAIN NAMES <p> One of the most cherished myths of cyberspace is that the Internet is totally decentralized and inherently uncontrollable . Like all myths , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heavy dose of wishful thinking . It is true that compared with the century-old telephone system , the Internet is a paragon of deregulation and decentralization . In four critical areas , however , it requires oversight and coordination in order to operate smoothly . Together , these areas constitute the " domain name system " of addresses , with which users navigate the Internet and send e-mail . <p> First , there are domain names , such as www.foreignaffairs.org . Somebody must decide who will operate the database of generic names ending with suffixes such as " . com , " " . net , " " . info , " and others ( a privilege that promises handsome profits ) . Also , someone must appoint the operators of two-letter country-code suffixes ( such as " . cn , " for China ) . <p> Second , there are Internet Protocol numbers , the up-to-12-digit codes , invisible to users , that every machine on the network needs to have in order to be recognized by other machines . Due to a technical decision made when the network was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with mainframe computers-the system was set up to accommodate only around four billion potential Internet Protocol numbers , far fewer than are now necessary . Until the Internet is upgraded , accordingly , Internet Protocol numbers must be allocated sparingly-and carefully , since accidentally duplicating them creates mayhem for routing Internet traffic . <p> Third are what are called root servers . Some form of control is needed in the actual machines that make the domain name system work . When users visit Web sites or send e-mail , big computers known as root servers match the domain names with their corresponding Internet Protocol numbers in a matter of milliseconds . The database is the world 's most important Rolodex . Yet due to a technical hiccup that occurred when the network was young , there can be only 13 root servers , some of which provide data to mirror sites around the world . As a result , somebody must decide who will operate the root servers and where those operators will be based . Because the system evolved informally , the root servers ' administrators are diverse , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. military , and private companies . Today , all told , ten root servers are operated from the United States and one each from Amsterdam , Stockholm , and Tokyo . <p> Fourth and finally , there are technical standards that must be formally established and coordinated to ensure the Internet 's interoperability . They entail more than just the addressing system and involve everything from how routers send traffic to parameters so that video flows smoothly . Ultimately , the standards let the Internet evolve . <p> If all this sounds outrageously technical , that is because it is . And it is the reason why , even after the Internet had become a mass-market medium , most diplomats and foreign policy experts remained largely unaware of these issues . But although the management of the names , numbers , root servers , and standards that constitute the Internet 's infrastructure -- what techies call " Internet governance " -- seems nerdy , it can have an important impact on mainstream policy issues . For instance , countries that place restrictions on the types of domain names that can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of registrants of addresses with generic suites such as " . com " and " . net " are made publicly available online , which jeopardizes people 's privacy . Telecom operators need access to Internet Protocol numbers to deploy services , making them a major asset for companies and an economic interest of countries . Technical standards can be designed either to foster openness or to permit censorship and surveillance . In short , the Internet , before it is physically constructed from routers and cables , is made up of values . And the domain name system is the central chokepoint where control of the Internet can be exercised . <p> For most of its history , the Internet has been administered by Woodstock-era American engineers and academics . As a result , the network has embodied the philosophy of that community : a political and economic liberalism led to openness on a technical level . The open infrastructure ( with nonproprietary standards that let any network connect to any other , hence the " inter-net " ) has fostered free expression , low-cost access , and innovation . @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made the Internet nonbureaucratic , particularly compared with state-run monopoly telecom carriers . And the fact that the Internet 's networks carry streams of data rather than mainly voice calls has kept it outside of the purview of traditional telecom regulators . <p> To be sure , the Internet 's openness begets big headaches : it is difficult to track spammers , and the system is tremendously vulnerable to hacking . But the open network is like the open society -- crime thrives , but so does creativity . We take for granted that the Internet we enjoy today continue to have these characteristics , but this is hardly certain . It all depends on who controls the domain name system and what priorities they choose to set . THE TANGLED WEB THEY WOVE <p> Until 1998 , the Internet was overseen almost exclusively by one man : Jon Postel , a computer science professor at the University of Southern California . As a graduate student in the 1960s , he was among the handful of engineers who built the Internet . For the next 30 years , he managed it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Projects Agency , which funded the Internet 's initial development . <p> Postel made seemingly technical decisions such as who should get to operate a country-code domain . Although it may seem odd that national address suffixes ( such as " . uk , " for the United Kingdom ) were allocated to private individuals rather than government bodies , such was the case . In its early days , the Internet was so new and strange that there was usually no appropriate national organization to hand a suffix to . Besides , governments , and particularly their monopoly telecom carriers , more often hindered communications development than helped it . By the mid-1990s , however , it became clear to the small coterie of officials in the United States and elsewhere who were aware of the matter that the Internet could no longer be administered by a single individual . But who or what would replace him ? <p> After a bitter series of negotiations among the business community , governments , and nongovernmental organizations worldwide , the Clinton administration helped broker a compromise and established ICANN in 1998 . @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Internet to flourish , it seemed appropriate that the new organization be based in the private sector . This would make it more responsive , more flexible , and less prone to bureaucratic and political squabbling . The negotiations were so tense that Postel suffered a heart attack as they were ending and never lived to see the birth of the successor organization he was instrumental in creating . <p> ICANN was an experiment , a bottom-up , multi-stakeholder approach toward managing a global resource on a nongovernmental basis . Indeed , in its early days it was often touted as a model for other issues that require the unified action of numerous groups from government , industry , and civil society , such as treating communicable diseases or handling climate change . ICANN 'S private-sector status , moreover , has helped keep the Internet free from political interference . When in 2002 members of the Federal Communications Commission were asked by their counterparts at Chinas Ministry of Information industry why Taiwan had been allocated its own two-letter domain ( " . tw " ) , the commissioners could pass the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ <p> Yet from the start , ICANN was plagued by controversy . Critics charged that it lacked transparency , accountability , and legitimacy . Civil-society groups felt it was in the pocket of the domain name registration businesses it was designed to regulate . Businesses felt it was overly governmental . And foreign governments felt powerless before it . As many developing countries woke to the Internet 's importance , it struck them as outrageous that the Internet was essentially run by a nonprofit corporation whose 15-person board of directors was accountable to the attorney general of the state of California and under the authority of the U.S. government . Even the U.S. Congress criticized it , hauling the group into tense hearings regularly . Haft a decade after it was founded with such optimism , the organization was mockingly referred to in tech-policy circles as " ICAN N'T . " <p> All this came to a head in 2003 , during the preparatory meetings for the World Summit on the Information Society . Washington had been able to deflect criticism of ICANN in bilateral discussions but proved unable to block @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials mildly supportive of ICANN were replaced by senior representatives from foreign ministries , officials less familiar with the details of Internet governance but more experienced in challenging U.S. power . Watching the United States go to war in Iraq despite global opposition , these diplomats saw ICANN as yet another example of American unilateralism . What would prevent Washington , they argued , from one day choosing , say , to knock Iran off the Internet by simply deleting its two-letter moniker , " . ir , " from the domain name system ? Surely the Internet ought to be managed by the international community rather than a single nation . <p> Governments worldwide sought to dilute the United States ' control by calling for a new arrangement , and in November 2004 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a 40-person working group to address questions of Internet governance . Washington had planned to grant ICANN autonomy from its oversight in 2006 . But the more other countries clamored for power , the more the United States reconsidered its policy of relinquishing control . Ultimately , it came down to national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Internet 's continuing to function as it had , decided it was not prepared to risk any changes . So , as the UN working group was preparing to release its report ( which , unsurprisingly , favored transferring authority over the Internet to the UN ) , the U.S. government made a preemptive strike . In the brief Commerce Department statement , Washington announced its decision : the United States would retain its authority over ICANN , period . THE OPEN NETWORK AND ITS ENEMIES <p> Power , before it comes from arms or wealth , emanates from ideas . The Internet has emerged as a piece of critical information infrastructure for every nation . Developed countries increasingly rely on it for their economic livelihood and basic communications ; developing nations recognize it as a way of linking people together , enabling commercial relationships , and generating the transparency and civic dialogue that undergird democratic governance . Information technology can also strengthen the hand of authoritarian regimes , but there seems little doubt that in its current form the Internet 's general influence is progressive rather than regressive . @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the group 's work has ensured that the network operates smoothly so that these benefits can be realized . As the overseer of the domain name system , the United States has taken a liberal approach in keeping with its liberal values . There is no guarantee that an intergovernmental system would continue on such a course , and so even committed internationalists ought to be wary of changing how the system is run . <p> This is especially so since the very countries that most restrict the Internet within their borders are the ones calling loudest for greater control . As other countries sharpen their diplomatic knives for the final round of the summit in Tunis in November , the dispute is echoing an earlier battle at UNESCO in the 1980s over the so-called New World Information and Communication Order , which led the United States and the United Kingdom to pull out of the organization . Then , it was the Soviet Union , its satellites , and the developing world that called for controlling media activities and funding the development of media resources in developing countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the Internet , as well as financial aid to overcome the digital divide . <p> Washington 's new position shrewdly mixes a few carrots in along with the big stick . It formally acknowledges that countries have " sovereignty concerns " about their national two-letter address domains-a mealy-mouthed nod toward granting countries control over them , which is only appropriate . Although this will invite problems , such as with Taiwan 's " . tw , " these can be sidestepped -- just as the allocation of telephone " country codes " to territories does not confer diplomatic recognition , neither does the allocation of country domains need to . Washington also supports the continued discussion of broader Internet governance issues in multiple forums , which could restrain the creation of a cumbersome and monolithic Global Internet Policy Council ( which was among the UN working group 's proposals ) . It may also keep politicians from trespassing on ICANN 'S more purely technical areas , which could harm the network . <p> Nevertheless , although the new U.S. position may be the least bad alternative in the short term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ term . For the moment , there is little other governments can do to rebel . Unless they feel their concerns are being addressed , however , they are likely to try to set up a parallel naming and addressing system to compete with ICANN-sanctioned domains . Technology abhors homogeneity ; differing technical standards are the norm rather than the exception . The ongoing scuffle over the creation of Galileo , Europe 's challenge to Washington 's Global Positioning System , is one example ; the battle over third-generation mobile-phone standards is another . The danger , however , is that two different addressing systems on the Internet may not interoperate perfectly . If it wants to preserve and extend the benefits the Internet currently brings , Washington will have to come up with some way of sharing control with other countries without jeopardizing the network 's stability or discouraging free speech and technical innovation . <p> Ultimately , what is playing out is a clash of perspectives . The U.S. government saw the creation of ICANN as the voluntary relinquishing of a critical source of power in the digital age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to maintain its hegemony by placing Internet governance in the U.S. private sector . Foreign critics think a shift to multilateral intergovernmental control would mark a step toward enlightened global democracy ; Washington thinks it would constitute a step back in time , toward state-regulated telecommunications . Whether and how these perspectives are bridged will determine the future of a global resource that nearly all of us have come to take for granted . <p> By Kenneth Nell Cukier <p> <p> Kenneth Neil Cukier covers technology and regulatory issues for The Economist . <p> 
##4002774 Section : Comments Yielding to Balkan Reality <p> Amid the unraveling of Yugoslavia that began in the early 1990s , the United States and its European allies have staunchly defended multiethnic society in the Balkans . The military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo , the ongoing peacekeeping missions there , the hundreds of millions of dollars given annually in economic aid-these sacrifices have been made to preserve the individual states that once constituted a federal Yugoslavia and to prevent bloodshed among the numerous ethnic groups that populate them . Now , however , the time has come to let pragmatism triumph over principle -- and move derisively toward independence for Kosovo . <p> The most important piece of unfinished business in the Balkans is the final status of Kosovo , the southern province of Serbia , which has been under international trusteeship since NATO 'S intervention in 1999 . Anxious to scale back its obligations in the region and confronted with growing impatience among Kosovo 's population , the international community is finally gearing up for negotiations over Kosovo 's political future , as provided for under UN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo is an ancestral homeland and the site of many important Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries , insist that the area remain under Serbian sovereignty . Broader opposition to separating Kosovo from Serbia stems from concern about the potential precedent that would be set by redrawing boundaries along ethnic lines and the likely impact this move would have on the integrity of the borders of Macedonia , Montenegro , and Bosnia . <p> Nevertheless , harsh realities on the ground make independence for Kosovo the only viable option . In the current state of limbo , relations between the Albanian majority , which is mostly Muslim , and the Serbian minority , which is mostly Orthodox Christian , have reached the boiling point . The Albanian leadership in Pristina , which governs Kosovo in an uneasy partnership with UN authorities , wants nothing to do with Belgrade . Kosovo has already left Serbia 's orbit . And throughout the area , walls of hostility divide ordinary Albanians and Serbs . In spirit as well as fact , multiethnic society is nowhere to be found . <p> Pretending otherwise and denying or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is therefore the greater of two evils . The formal separation of Kosovo from Serbia instead offers the best hope for rebuilding moderation and tolerance among ethnic Albanians , making it far more likely that they will eventually live in peace with Serbs , Roma , and the other minority groups among them . A HOUSE DIVIDED <p> Driving from central Serbia into Kosovo already feels like crossing a national boundary , and a militarized one at that : Serbian border guards , then a no man 's land , then a border control staffed by Kosovo police as well as UN and NATO personnel . In the no man 's land , drivers change their license plates ; cars with Serbian tags will sometimes be attacked in Kosovo , and those with Kosovar plates are equally at risk in Serbia . <p> In Kosovo , signs abound that the area has been poisoned by intercommunal violence . NATO troops , armed UN guards , and members of the Kosovo Police Service are ubiquitous , keeping the palpable ethnic tensions in check . Serbs live in fortified enclaves , their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war , two of Kosovo 's largest cities , Pristina and Prizren , were home to tens of thousands of Serbs . They are now virtually Serb-free . A few smaller towns , such as Orahovac , have maintained their multiethnic character , but the Serbs there live in isolated ghettos , set off from Albanian neighborhoods by a block or two of burned-out homes . Serbs rarely venture into the Albanian section of town , fearful of abuse or worse . <p> Roughly 90 percent of Kosovo 's population of some two million is ethnic Albanian , and most of the rest of the population is Serbian . This ethnic imbalance was long in the making , a result primarily of successive Serbian exoduses to the north during the Ottoman era and , more recently , higher birthrates among Albanians . Since World War II , political power has shifted back and forth between the two communities . In Tito 's Yugoslavia , Kosovo 's Albanians enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy . Beginning in the late 1980s , Serbia 's nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic tightened Belgrade 's grip , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . Milosevic responded to armed Albanian resistance with a campaign of ethnic cleansing that began in 1998 , kilting at least l0,000 Albanians and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes . <p> After NATO 's intervention and the eventual withdrawal of Serbian forces , ethnic Albanians exacted their revenge . During the war and the retribution that followed , at least a thousand Serbs were killed , while tens of thousands fled ; their ransacked homes , stores , and churches still mar the landscape . To this day , Albanians continue to dish back the ethnic discrimination they suffered during the 1990s . In many Serbian enclaves , no one holds a steady job ; the communities rely on handouts from aid organizations and from Belgrade . As one Serbian resident of Orahovac told me in July , " We do n't call this life , we call it an imitation of life . " <p> Although outbreaks of actual ethnic violence are now uncommon , Serbs remain on guard . In March 2004 , Albanians rioted across Kosovo , leading to widespread attacks on Serbs , forcing thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in repairing intercommunal ties . This past August , two Serbs were killed in a drive-by shooting . <p> The communities are so polarized that simple dialogue is hard to find . In a conversation with Serbian residents in Lipljan , one of the few multiethnic towns left near Pristina , a participant invited passing Albanians to join the discussion . One after another scurried away . " Most Albanians are no longer willing to have contact with us , " a Serb commented . In Prizren , about 35 miles southwest of Lipljan , one of the few remaining Serbs there explained that she still meets with Albanian friends behind closed doors . " But in public , they pretend not to recognize me , " she lamented , " as it is not good for Albanians to be seen with Serbs . " <p> By any measure , the political conditions in Kosovo fall well short of the standards that the international community has set as preconditions for moving to final-status negotiations . Serbs do not enjoy freedom of movement , one of the main reasons that only a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The process of decentralization meant to empower local communities has proved stillborn . Political and legal institutions have yet to mature , stymied by infighting among political parties , crime and corruption , and patronage systems deeply embedded in the clannish structure of Albanian society . Poverty is pervasive , with unemployment topping 5o percent even among ethnic Albanians . An inadequate power supply makes for daily blackouts , and Kosovo 's uncertain political stares leaves it unable to attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure . <p> The case for independence , however , rests not on Kosovo 's readiness , but on the lack of realistic alternatives . Ethnic Albanians are now in command , and they are adamant about breaking away from Serbia . As Kosovo 's prime minister , Bajram Kosumi , made clear in his office in Pristina , " The people of Kosovo will decide their own future . . If Kosovo does not become independent , there will be serious consequences . " Kosovo 's Albanians have reached their limits ; the atrocities and injustices of the past , combined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but impossible to envisage the continuation of Serbian sovereignty . Unfortunately , continued sovereignty is exactly what the Serbian government has in mind . BLIND ALLEYS <p> " Less than independence , more than autonomy , " Serbia 's president , Boris Tadic , explained in a meeting in Belgrade . Under his formula , Kosovo would largely manage its own affairs but remain nominally a part of Serbia and forgo diplomatic representation abroad . " The independence of Kosovo is unacceptable for me , and for all of Serbia , " he insisted . Tadic and his advisers fear that an independent Kosovo would imperil not only the Serbs living there , but also the course of democracy in Serbia itself . " Independence will drive a stake through the heart of Serbian democracy , " one of Tadic 's top aides said . The president agreed , noting that " if independence is imposed on Serbia , we will once more become a black hole of the Balkans . The Radicals extreme nationalists will be elected . And they will stay in power for a generation . " <p> @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostage to Serbia 's inability to trust itself to behave responsibly . The United States and its European partners were too timid in confronting Serbian nationalism throughout most of the 1990s , and much blood was shed as a result . The international community should not make the same mistake today . Serbia 's darker instincts need to be extinguished , not accommodated . <p> It is true that extreme nationalists might come to power in Serbia in the wake of Kosovo 's independence . But if Belgrade becomes more belligerent , turns its back on the war crimes tribunal operating in The Hague , and veers away from integration into Europe , Serbs will only find their country more isolated and impoverished . By making clear that the nationalist agenda has been leading the country down a blind alley , Serbia 's loss of sovereignty over Kosovo could well result in the strengthening of Serbian centrists . <p> Rather than threatening doomsday scenarios if Kosovo becomes independent , Serbia 's leaders should be doing just the opposite : talking about life after separation and preparing the public accordingly . Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic , has publicly endorsed letting Kosovo go . Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Tadic , both of whom have the nationalist credentials necessary to call for moderation and compromise , have failed to rise to the occasion . <p> Instead , the Serbian government has encouraged Kosovar Serbs to boycott elections in the province and distance themselves from Pristina , only intensifying the Serbian minority 's political isolation . Belgrade has played down Serbia 's culpability in the ethnic violence of the 1990s , tolerating nationalist myths and strengthening popular belief in the inviolability of Serbia 's territorial claims . Belgrade is correct to worry about how Kosovar Serbs would fare after independence , but its behavior has done little either to strengthen its case for keeping Kosovo in the fold or to ready its citizens for the impending loss of their southern province . MAKING THE INEVITABLE TOLERABLE <p> As it eases Kosovo away from Serbian sovereignty , the international community should make independence contingent on three conditions . First , Pristina must make substantial progress on putting in place the essentials of a functioning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law , clamp down on corruption and crime , and redress widespread poverty and unemployment . <p> Second , Pristina must do much more to ensure the well-being of those Serbs who choose to stay put . Many Serbs intend to quit Kosovo if it becomes independent simply as a matter of principle . To encourage them to remain , ethnic Albanian leaders will need to capitalize on the prospect of independence to promote tolerance and protect minority rights . Reviving multiethnicity will become easier as Kosovo formally moves beyond Belgrade 's reach , enabling Albanian moderates to neutralize militant voices . As Ruzhdi Saramati , a former brigade commander in the Kosovo Liberation Army , put it in a meeting in Prizren , " Independence will help end extremist elements within the Albanian community . " <p> As part of its effort to safeguard minority rights , Pristina should also agree to put Christian sites throughout Kosovo under international supervision . Well over a hundred churches and monasteries have been destroyed or damaged since 1999 , many of them during the 2004 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guarded by NATO troops and barbed wire . To ensure that they remain secure and accessible , these sites should be given international protection for the indefinite future . <p> Third -- and most controversial -- the international community should reconsider its blanket opposition to the partition of Kosovo , indicating instead that it is prepared to accept partition provided that Pristina and Belgrade both consent . From the Ibar River north to the boundary with Serbia proper , Kosovo is populated almost exclusively by Serbs . The area is about 15 percent of Kosovo 's territory and contains about one-third of its Serbs . Pristina makes no pretense of governing the region , which in most respects remains functionally a part of Serbia . <p> Granting northern Kosovo to Serbia while the rest of the province becomes independent would relieve Pristina of the futile task of trying to assert control over a region that , come what may , intends to maintain its links to Belgrade . In Mitrovica , the areas main city , Albanian and Serbian communities already reside on opposite sides of the Ibar , making it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other parts of Kosovo . As long as Pristina is disabused of any hope of swapping northern Kosovo for Albanian enclaves in southern Serbia , partition would also represent a compromise of sorts , enabling Belgrade to claim that it has not been left empty-handed . As one of President Tadic 's advisers stated , " If we are looking for a compromise solution , partition seems to be the easy way out . " <p> Many in the international community insist that the partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines would send a dangerous signal , condoning ethnic segregation and fueling fragmentation elsewhere in the Balkans . This argument is not without merit . It would have been best if the peoples of the former Yugoslavia had been able to live together amicably in a unitary state . The breakup of Yugoslavia certainly violated the civic values on which multiethnic society rests -- as would the independence and partition of Kosovo . But when the best outcome proves impossible to achieve , the imperatives of stability ultimately require compromising the principle of multiethnicity . Just as these imperatives provide a compelling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it be necessary for Kosovo itself to be partitioned in order to bring peace to the region . <p> Furthermore , Kosovo 's situation is unique : its independence , and even its partition , is unlikely to trigger further unraveling in the Balkans . With or without the territory north of the Ibar , Kosovo 's independence promises to stabilize Macedonia by forestalling the radicalization of its ethnic Albanians and neutralizing Albanian extremists throughout the region . Even if it does not , it is Macedonia 's treatment of its Albanian minority that will do more to stabilize ( or destabilize ) the country than developments elsewhere . And although ethnic tensions continue to bedevil Bosnia , its future , like Montenegro 's , will be little affected by Kosovo 's ultimate political status or boundaries . <p> It is well worth keeping the option of Kosovo 's partition on the table , therefore , especially if doing so would provide Belgrade with sufficient inducement to make a deal . The international community should also be prepared to sweeten the pot by offering Serbia more economic assistance , relief from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pathway to membership in NATO and the European Union . <p> Securing Kosovo 's independence will ultimately require the approval of the UN Security Council . Russia and China , both of which struggle with separatist movements at home , are unlikely to relish an outcome that effectively embraces secession along ethnic lines . But neither country has compelling interests in the Balkans . Russia 's affinity for its Slavic brethren in Serbia is of minimal political consequence , and both Moscow and Beijing are intent on maintaining good relations with the United States and Europe . It is difficult to imagine that either Russia or China would make serious trouble over the future of a small tract of land that has no oil , no nuclear weapons , and a GDP of less than $3 billion . <p> The peaceful separation of Kosovo from Serbia will require sustained and adept diplomacy from the international community , courageous leadership from Belgrade , and tolerance and good governance from Kosovar Albanians -- all commodities that have been in dangerously short supply . Nonetheless , Kosovo 's independence is the best hope for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Balkans , defeating the remnants of extreme nationalism in Serbia , and laying the foundations for a Balkan politics that focuses on the opportunities of the future rather than the wrongs of the past . <p> PHOTO ( BLACK &; WHITE ) : Mopping up : NATO peacekeepers in the ruins of a Serbian monastery , Kosovo , August 8 , 2005 <p> By Charles A. Kupchan <p> <p> Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations . His most recent book is The End of the American Era : U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century . <p> 
##4002775 Section : Reviews &; Responses Review Essay Who Says Democracies Do n't Fight ? PREFORMATTED TABLE <p> Seldom if ever has the hostility between academics and the U.S. president been so pronounced . Of course , political scientists always seem to complain about the occupant of the White House , and Republicans fare worse than Democrats : Herbert Hoover was called callous , Dwight Eisenhower a dunce , Richard Nixon evil , Ronald Reagan dangerous , and George H.W. Bush out of touch . But professors have consigned George W. Bush to a special circle of their presidential hell . And the White House seems to return the sentiment . <p> According to the academics , Bush 's chief transgressions have had to do with foreign policy , especially the Iraq war -- a mess that could have been avoided if only the president and his advisers had paid more attention to those who devote their lives to studying international relations . <p> The irony of this argument is that few other presidents -- certainly none since Woodrow Wilson , a former president of the American Political Science @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tied their foreign policies more explicitly to the work of social science . The defining act of Bush 's presidency was grounded in a theory that the political scientist Jack Levy once declared was " as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations , " namely , that democracies do not fight one another . <p> The theory , which originated in the work of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant and was refined in the 1970s and 1980s by several researchers working independently , has , since the 1990s , been one of the hottest research areas in international relations . Although some skeptics remain and no one agrees about why exactly it works , most academics now share the belief that democracies have indeed made a separate peace . What is more , much research suggests that they are also unusually likely to sign and honor international agreements and to become economically interdependent . <p> The administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton made frequent appeals to the theory in public , and it seems to have informed their support for democratization in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration , however , has gone much further in its faith in the idea , betting the farm that the theory holds and will help Washington achieve a peaceful , stable , and prosperous Muslim world as , over time , Iraq 's neighbors , following Iraq 's example , democratize . The United States ' real motives for attacking Iraq may have been complex , but " regime change " -the replacement of Saddam Hussein 's gruesome tyranny with a democracy-was central to Washington 's rhetoric by the time it began bombing Baghdad in March 2003 . <p> Why has a president who set his defining policy around one of political science 's crown jewels come in for so much venom from the same academics who endorse the idea ? After all , a host of peer-reviewed journal articles have implicitly supported the president 's claim that a democratic Iraq would not threaten the United States or Israel , develop weapons of mass destruction , or sponsor terrorism . Are professors simply perpetual critics who refuse to take responsibility for the consequences of their ideas ? Or does Bush hatred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to break with its predecessors and alter the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East was admirable . But the White House got its science wrong , or at least not completely right : the democratic peace theory does not dictate that the United States can or should remake Iraq into a democracy . In Electing to Fight : Why Emerging Democracies Go to War , the veteran political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make two critical points . Not only is turning authoritarian countries into democracies extremely difficult , much more so than the administration seems to have anticipated . The Middle East could also become a much more dangerous place if Washington and the rest of the world settle for a merely semi-democratic regime in Baghdad . Such an Iraq , Mansfield and Snyder imply , would be uncommonly likely to start wars -- a bull in the Middle Eastern china shop . Unfortunately , such an Iraq may also be just what we are likely to end up with . ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES <p> At first glance , the realists ' critique of the Iraq war is easier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indeed , realism -- which holds that a country 's type of government has no systematic effects on its foreign policy -- is enjoying a revival in Washington these days , precisely because of the war . According to the realists , the best way to have dealt with Saddam would have been not to overthrow him but to use coercive bargaining : to have threatened him with annihilation , for example , if he ever used nuclear weapons . <p> Even the democratic peace theory , however , does not necessarily prescribe the use of force to transform despotisms such as Iraq into democracies . Indeed , by itself , the argument that democracies do not fight one another does not have any practical implications for the foreign policymaker . It needs an additional or minor premise , such as " the United States can make Iraq into a democracy at an acceptable cost . " And it is precisely this minor premise about which the academy has been skeptical . No scholarly consensus exists on how countries become democratic , and the literature is equally murky on the costs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be free . <p> This last part of the puzzle is even more complicated than it first appears . Enter Mansfield and Snyder , who have been contributing to the democratic peace debate for a decade . Their thesis , first published in 1995 , is that although mature democracies do not fight one another , democratizing states -- those in transition from authoritarianism to democracy-do , and are even more prone to war than authoritarian regimes . Now , in Electing to Fight , the authors have refined their argument . As they outline in the book , not only are " incomplete democratizing " states -- those that develop democratic institutions in the wrong order -- unlikely ever to complete the transition to democracy ; they are also especially bellicose . <p> According to Mansfield and Snyder , in countries that have recently started to hold free elections but that lack the proper mechanisms for accountability ( institutions such as an independent judiciary , civilian control of the military , and protections for opposition parties and the press ) , politicians have incentives to pursue policies that make it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such places , politicians know they can mobilize support by demanding territory or other spoils from foreign countries and by nurturing grievances against outsiders . As a result , they push for extraordinarily belligerent policies . Even states that develop democratic institutions in the right order -- adopting the rule of law before holding elections-are very aggressive in the early years of their transitions , although they are less so than the first group and more likely to eventually turn into full democracies . <p> Of course , politicians in mature democracies are also often tempted to use nationalism and xenophobic rhetoric to buttress their domestic power . In such cases , however , they are usually restrained by institutionalized mechanisms of accountability . Knowing that if they lead the country into a military defeat or quagmire they may be punished at the next election , politicians in such states are less likely to advocate a risky war . In democratizing states , by contrast , politicians know that they are insulated from the impact of bad policies : if a war goes badly , for example , they can declare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ press , and so on . Politicians in such states also tend to fear their militaries , which often crave foreign enemies and will overthrow civilian governments that do not share their goals . Combined , these factors can make the temptation to attack another state irresistible . <p> Mansfield and Snyder present both quantitative and case-study support for their theory . Using rigorous statistical methods , the authors show that since 1815 , democratizing states have indeed been more prone to start wars than either democracies or authoritarian regimes . Categorizing transitions according to whether they ended in full democracies ( as in the U.S. case ) or in partial ones ( as in Germany in 1871-1918 or Pakistan throughout its history ) , the authors find that in the early years of democratic transitions , partial democracies -- especially those that get their institutions in the wrong order -- are indeed significantly more likely to initiate wars . Mansfield and Snyder then provide several succinct stories of democratizing states that did in fact go to war , such as the France of Napoleon III ( 1852-70 ) , Serbia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 2000 , and Pakistan from 1947 to the present . In most of these cases , the authors find what they expect : in these democratizing states , domestic political competition was intense . Politicians , wing for power , appeased domestic hard-liners by resorting to nationalistic appeals that vilified foreigners , and these policies often led to wars that were not in the countries ' strategic interests . <p> Although their argument would have been strengthened by a few comparative studies of democratizing states avoiding war and of flail democracies and authoritarian states starting wars , Mansfield and Snyder are persuasive . In part this is because they carefully circumscribe their claims . They acknowledge that some cases are " false positives , " that is , wars started by states that have wrongly been classified as democratizing , such as the Iran-Iraq War , started by Iraq in 1980 . They also answer the most likely objections to their argument . Some skeptics , for example , might counter that Mansfield and Snyder get the causality reversed : it is war or the threat of it that prevents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratizing states become involved in more wars simply because their internal instability tempts foreign states to attack them -- in other words , that democratizers are more sinned against than sinning . Analyzing data from 1816 through 1992 , Mansfield and Snyder put paid to these alternative explanations . Bad domestic institutions usually precede wars , rather than vice versa , and democratizing states usually do the attacking . <p> Where does Electing to Fight leave realism , the dominant theory of international conflict ? The quantitative data support the realist claims that major powers are more likely to go to war than minor ones and that the more equal are the great powers , the more likely are wars among them . But democratization makes war more likely even after one takes these factors into account . Furthermore , the case studies suggest that democratizing states very often lose more than they gain from the wars they begin , which implies that they do not respond to international incentives as rationally as realism would expect . That said , notwithstanding its preference for viewing states from the inside , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sense that it assumes that politicians and other actors are rationally self-interested . Their self-interest simply involves building and maintaining domestic power as well as external security -- and sometimes trading some of the latter in order to gain the former . <p> The authors ' conclusions for foreign policy are straightforward . The United States and other international actors should continue to promote democracy , but they must strive to help democratizing states implement reforms in the correct order . In particular , popular elections ought not to precede the building of institutions that will check the baleful incentives for politicians to call for war . Mansfield and Snyder are unsparing toward well-intentioned organizations that have pressured authoritarian governments to rush to elections in the past -- often with disastrous consequences . As the authors show , for example , it was organizations such as the World Bank and the National Democratic Institute that pushed Burundi and Rwanda to increase popular sovereignty in the early 1990s -- pressure that , as Mansfield and Snyder argue , helped set off a chain of events that led to genocide . Acknowledging their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies ) and Fareed Zakaria , Mansfield and Snyder have written a deeply conservative book . Sounding like Edmund Burke on the French Revolution but substituting statistics and measured prose for rhetorical power , the authors counsel against abruptly empowering people , since premature elections may well usher in domestic upheavals that thrust the state outward against its neighbors . BACK IN BAGHDAD <p> This brings the conversation back to Iraq , and in particular the notion that the United States can turn it into a democracy at an acceptable cost . in effect , Mansfield and Snyder have raised the estimate of these costs by pointing out one other reason this effort may fail -- a reason that few seem to have thought of . Forget for a moment the harrowing possibility of a Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish civil war in Iraq . Set aside the prospect of a Shiite-dominated state aligning itself with Iran , Syria , and Lebanon 's Hezbollah . What if , following the departure of U.S. troops , Iraq holds together but as an incomplete democratizer , with broad suffrage but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its own citizens better than the Baathist regime did . Its treatment of its neighbors , however , might be just as bad . <p> Although Saddam was an unusually bellicose and reckless tyrant , attacking Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 and engaging in foolish brinkmanship with the United States , as Mansfield and Snyder imply , a democratic Iraq may be no less bellicose and reckless . In the near future , intensely competitive elites there -- secularists , leftists , moderates , and both Shiite and Sunni Islamists-could compete for popularity by stirring up nationalism against one or more of Iraq 's neighbors . And Iraq lives in a dangerous neighborhood . Already , Iraqi Shiite parties have been critical of Sunni-dominated Jordan ; Iraqi Sunni parties , of Shiite-dominated Iran ; and Iraqi Kurdish parties , of Turkey . <p> One hopes that the White House contemplated this scenario prior to March 2003 . Whether it did or not , the possibility must be considered now , by U.S. civilian and military leaders , academics , and U.S. allies who agree with those academics . If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young , incompletely democratized states , the stakes of Iraq 's transition are higher than most have supposed . They are high enough , in fact , that those who called so loudly in the 1990s for an end to UN sanctions because Iraqis were dying but who are silent about the Iraqis who are dying now ought to reconsider their proud aloofness from the war . An aggressive Iraq , prone to attack Kuwait , Iran , Saudi Arabia , Syria , or Israel , is in no one 's interest . The odds may be long that Iraq will ever turn into a mature democracy of the sort envisaged by the Bush administration . But those odds are lengthened by the refusal of those states in Europe and the Middle East that could make a difference actually to do so . <p> By John M. Owen <p> <p> John M. Owen IV is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and the author of Liberal Peace , Liberal War : American Politics and International Security . <p> 