# R14 Red Team Validation Report

**Date**: 2026-03-15
**Package**: trust-plane
**Test Suite**: 1473 passed, 2 skipped, 0 failures
**Verdict**: CONVERGED

---

## Executive Summary

Round 14 (R14) red teaming applied 16 fixes across 3 rounds of agent deployment, achieving convergence with zero CRITICAL, zero HIGH findings across all four red team agents (security-reviewer, testing-specialist, deep-analyst, value-auditor).

---

## Fix Tally

### Round 1 (7 fixes from prior context)

| ID  | Severity | Fix                                                                         | File                |
| --- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- |
| C-1 | CRITICAL | Added missing model imports to PostgreSQL store (NameError on all reads)    | `store/postgres.py` |
| C-2 | CRITICAL | `hmac.compare_digest()` for archive hash verification (timing side-channel) | `archive.py`        |
| H-1 | HIGH     | `safe_read_text()` for dashboard token loading (symlink protection)         | `dashboard.py`      |
| H-2 | HIGH     | Explicit `limit=100_000` on all SIEM export list calls (unbounded query)    | `siem.py`           |
| H-3 | HIGH     | `math.isfinite()` + positive check on `max_age_hours` (NaN/Inf bypass)      | `identity.py`       |
| H-4 | HIGH     | HTTPS validation on `issuer_url` in `IdentityProvider.__post_init__`        | `identity.py`       |
| H-5 | HIGH     | Algorithm-first key resolution in `_resolve_key()` (algorithm confusion)    | `identity.py`       |

### Round 2 (4 fixes)

| ID  | Severity | Fix                                                               | File                |
| --- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- |
| F4  | HIGH     | TLS socket leak prevention on handshake failure                   | `siem.py`           |
| F6  | HIGH     | RBAC mtime-based cache invalidation for cross-process consistency | `rbac.py`           |
| F10 | MEDIUM   | CEF header newline/CR injection prevention                        | `siem.py`           |
| F12 | MEDIUM   | PostgreSQL `PoolTimeout` handling in `_safe_connection()`         | `store/postgres.py` |

### Round 3 (5 fixes)

| ID    | Severity | Fix                                                                       | File          |
| ----- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- |
| EH-1  | MEDIUM   | `ArchiveError` re-parented to `TrustPlaneError`                           | `archive.py`  |
| EH-2  | MEDIUM   | `TLSSyslogError` re-parented to `TrustPlaneError`                         | `siem.py`     |
| EH-3  | MEDIUM   | `ConstraintViolationError` re-parented to `TrustPlaneError`               | `project.py`  |
| EH-4  | MEDIUM   | `LockTimeoutError` dual inheritance: `TrustPlaneError, TimeoutError`      | `_locking.py` |
| TT-1  | MEDIUM   | Mock-heavy tests moved from integration/ to unit/ (NO MOCKING compliance) | tests/        |
| DOC-1 | HIGH     | HashiCorp Vault algorithm: "Ed25519" corrected to "ECDSA P-256"           | `CLAUDE.md`   |
| DOC-2 | HIGH     | CLI command reference reconciled with actual `cli.py` commands            | `CLAUDE.md`   |
| DOC-3 | MEDIUM   | Azure Key Vault algorithm: "Ed25519" corrected to "ECDSA P-256"           | `CLAUDE.md`   |

---

## Agent Convergence Evidence

### Security Reviewer (Round 3)

- **CRITICAL**: 0
- **HIGH**: 0
- **MEDIUM**: 0
- **LOW**: 2 (TLS handler silent drop, dynamic placeholder visual pattern)
- **Checks passed**: All 11 security patterns, exception hierarchy, SQL injection prevention, path traversal prevention, symlink protection, atomic writes, numeric validation, bounded collections, hmac.compare_digest, key zeroization, frozen dataclasses, from_dict validation, XSS prevention, authentication/authorization, CEF injection prevention, TLS socket leak prevention, PostgreSQL exception wrapping, concurrent safety, no eval/exec
- **Verdict**: CONVERGED

### Testing Specialist (Round 3)

- **CRITICAL**: 0
- **MEDIUM**: 1 (constant patching in `test_sqlite_migrations.py` -- acceptable gray area)
- **LOW**: 1 (fault injection in `test_concurrency.py` -- explicitly acceptable)
- **Test count**: Unit 194, Integration 1213+1skip, E2E 66+1skip = 1473 passed, 2 skipped
- **NO MOCKING compliance**: Verified clean in integration/ and e2e/
- **Verdict**: CONVERGED

### Deep Analyst (Round 3)

- **CRITICAL**: 0
- **HIGH**: 0
- **MINOR**: 4 (filesystem filter-before-limit, RuntimeError for programming errors, RBAC silent OSError catch, internally-generated IDs skip validate_id)
- **Exception hierarchy**: 22 classes verified, all trace to TrustPlaneError
- **Store security contract**: All 6 requirements satisfied by all 3 backends
- **Verdict**: CONVERGED

### Value Auditor (Round 3)

- **HIGH**: 2 (HashiCorp Vault algorithm mislabel, CLI doc drift) -- FIXED in Round 3
- **MEDIUM**: 4 (delegate subcommands, tenants status, integration structure, undocumented commands) -- FIXED in Round 3
- **Exception hierarchy documentation**: 100% match (22/22 classes)
- **Enterprise readiness**: 7.5/10 before fixes, estimated 9.0/10 after fixes
- **Verdict**: CONVERGED (after fixes applied)

---

## Test Distribution

| Tier                               | Tests    | Skipped |
| ---------------------------------- | -------- | ------- |
| Unit (`tests/unit/`)               | 194      | 0       |
| Integration (`tests/integration/`) | 1213     | 1       |
| E2E (`tests/e2e/`)                 | 66       | 1       |
| **Total**                          | **1473** | **2**   |

---

## Security Pattern Verification (All 11 Patterns)

| #   | Pattern                                        | Status   | Evidence                                                                   |
| --- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1   | `validate_id()` path traversal prevention      | VERIFIED | All store backends, RBAC, archive, delegation, holds                       |
| 2   | `O_NOFOLLOW` via safe_read_json/safe_read_text | VERIFIED | All JSON reads, key loading, config, bundle                                |
| 3   | `atomic_write()` for record writes             | VERIFIED | Filesystem store, RBAC, identity config, dashboard token                   |
| 4   | `safe_read_json()` for JSON deserialization    | VERIFIED | No `json.loads(path.read_text())` in production code                       |
| 5   | `math.isfinite()` on numeric constraints       | VERIFIED | Financial, temporal, decision confidence, OIDC max_age                     |
| 6   | Bounded collections (`deque(maxlen=)`)         | VERIFIED | Proxy call_log, shadow tool_calls, snapshot files, list limits             |
| 7   | Monotonic escalation only                      | VERIFIED | Verification ordering, hold resolution checks                              |
| 8   | `hmac.compare_digest()` for hash comparison    | VERIFIED | 6 locations (archive, dashboard, delegation, project, bundle, conformance) |
| 9   | Key material zeroization                       | VERIFIED | `del private_key` after register_key()                                     |
| 10  | `frozen=True` on security-critical dataclasses | VERIFIED | RolePermission                                                             |
| 11  | `from_dict()` validates all fields             | VERIFIED | All record types check required fields                                     |

---

## Store Security Contract (6 Requirements)

| Requirement          | FileSystem        | SQLite              | PostgreSQL                           |
| -------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
| ATOMIC_WRITES        | atomic_write()    | SQLite transactions | PostgreSQL transactions              |
| INPUT_VALIDATION     | validate_id()     | validate_id()       | validate_id()                        |
| BOUNDED_RESULTS      | limit parameter   | LIMIT ? clause      | LIMIT %s clause                      |
| PERMISSION_ISOLATION | Directory scoping | Single DB file      | Single conninfo                      |
| CONCURRENT_SAFETY    | file_lock()       | WAL + busy_timeout  | MVCC + connection pool               |
| NO_SILENT_FAILURES   | Named exceptions  | Named exceptions    | StoreConnectionError/StoreQueryError |

---

## Exception Hierarchy (22 Classes, Fully Consistent)

All custom exceptions trace to `TrustPlaneError`. No standalone `Exception` subclasses remain.

```
TrustPlaneError
  TrustPlaneStoreError
    RecordNotFoundError
    SchemaTooNewError
    SchemaMigrationError
    StoreConnectionError
    StoreQueryError
    StoreTransactionError
  TrustDecryptionError
  KeyManagerError
    KeyNotFoundError
    KeyExpiredError
    SigningError
    VerificationError
  IdentityError
    TokenVerificationError
    JWKSError
  RBACError
  ConstraintViolationError
  ArchiveError
  TLSSyslogError
  LockTimeoutError (+ TimeoutError dual inheritance)
```

---

## Cumulative Red Team History

| Round       | Findings Fixed                  | Test Count | Verdict           |
| ----------- | ------------------------------- | ---------- | ----------------- |
| R1-R12      | 50+ progressive hardening fixes | ~1200      | Iterative         |
| R13         | 38+ todos (enterprise features) | 1400+      | CONVERGED         |
| R14 Round 1 | 7 (C-1, C-2, H-1 to H-5)        | 1470       | Continuing        |
| R14 Round 2 | 4 (F4, F6, F10, F12)            | 1473       | 3/4 converged     |
| R14 Round 3 | 5 code + 3 doc fixes            | 1473       | **ALL CONVERGED** |

**Total R14 fixes**: 16 code fixes + 3 documentation fixes = 19 issues resolved
**Final state**: 0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH across all 4 red team agents
