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DocuSign Signature Appliance
Hardware version 8.0
with Firmware version 9.0.9.10
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
Level 3 Validation
August 2019
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 3
2 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY LEVEL................................................................................................... 4
3 SECURITY RULES....................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 SECURE BY DESIGN ............................................................................................................ 5
3.2 PRODUCT DELIVERY........................................................................................................... 6
3.3 INITIALIZATION .................................................................................................................. 7
3.3.1 Installing the DocuSign Signature Appliance ......................................................... 8
3.3.2 Restoring the DocuSign Signature Appliance from backup .................................... 8
3.3.3 Setting the Appliance to work in FIPS Mode .......................................................... 9
3.4 USERS DIRECTORIES........................................................................................................... 9
3.5 MANAGING THE DOCUSIGN SIGNATURE APPLIANCE........................................................ 10
3.5.1 Cryptographic Officer ........................................................................................... 10
3.5.2 User ....................................................................................................................... 11
3.6 SECURE OPERATION – DOCUSIGN SA CLIENT.................................................................. 11
3.7 ADDITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES......................................................................................... 12
3.8 HIGH AVAILABILITY AND LOAD BALANCING ................................................................... 13
3.9 INTERFACE TO EXTERNAL CA IN AUTOMATED MODE ...................................................... 13
3.10 WELL-DEFINED INTERFACES............................................................................................ 13
3.11 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 15
3.11.1 Supervisor (Crypto Officer) Role .......................................................................... 15
3.11.2 User/Application Role ........................................................................................... 16
3.12 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.......................................................................................... 21
3.13 STRONG CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS AND SECURE KEY MANAGEMENT..................... 21
3.13.1 Power-Up Self Tests .............................................................................................. 29
3.13.2 Conditional Tests................................................................................................... 30
3.14 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS..................................................................................... 30
3.15 MAINTENANCE ................................................................................................................. 30
4 FIPS 140-2 LEVEL 3 COMPLIANT MODE............................................................................ 32
4.1 CONFIGURING THE APPLIANCE TO WORK IN FIPS MODE................................................... 32
5 UPGRADE APPLIANCE FIRMWARE FROM VERSION 8.0 TO VERSION 8.1............. 33
6 UPGRADE APPLIANCE FIRMWARE FROM VERSION 8.0/8.1 TO VERSIONS 8.5,
8.51.9.0 AND 9.0.9.10.......................................................................................................................... 34
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the DocuSign
Signature Appliance. This security policy describes how the DocuSign Signature Appliance meets the
security requirements of FIPS 140-2, and how to operate the DocuSign Signature Appliance in a
secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the level 3 FIPS 140-2 testing of the
DocuSign Signature Appliance.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 -- Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules.
Additional information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the
NIST web site at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
1.2 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the DocuSign Signature Appliance
in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. Additional information
about the DocuSign Signature Appliance and other DocuSign products is available at
www.docusign.com.
1.3 Terminology
In this document, the DocuSign Signature Appliance is referred to as the Appliance.
1.4 Document Organization
This document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the
Submission Package contains the following documents:
• Vendor Evidence
• Finite State Machine
• Module Firmware Listing
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document is organized as follows:
• Section 1: Introduction – Includes an overview of the DocuSign Signature Appliance and
explains the secure configuration and operation of the Appliance.
• Section 2: FIPS 140-2 security level – Details each level of the FIPS 140-2 requirements
section.
• Section 3: Appliance Security Rules – Details the general features and functionality of the
DocuSign Signature Appliance.
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• Section 4: FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Compliant Mode – Addresses the required configuration for the
FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
With the exception of this non-proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation submission
documentation is DocuSign-proprietary and may only be released under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements.
This document may be reproduced and distributed providing such a reproduction is complete and
unmodified.
For access to the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission documents, contact DocuSign.
2 FIPS 140-2 security level
The DocuSign Signature Appliance is validated to meet the FIPS 140-2 security requirements for the
levels shown below. The overall module is validated to FIPS 140-2 security level 3.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Port and Interfaces 3
Role, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security (Multi-Chip Standalone) 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1 - FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Level
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3 Security Rules
The DocuSign Signature Appliance is a digital signature appliance that enables users within an
organization to digitally sign documents and data. Contained within a secure, tamper-responsive
steel case, the Appliance performs the actual digital signature operation using an asymmetric key of
the user. All keys and critical security parameters are protected within the cryptographic boundary
by the physical security mechanisms of the Appliance.
The Appliance provides the basic RSA digital signature operation. Additional cryptographic
algorithms are used in support of this main functionality. These are used to encrypt: the session
between the user’s PC and the Appliance; the asymmetric keys that are kept in the internal
database; and the backup of the Appliance’s database. They are also used to provide data integrity.
The Appliance performs all cryptographic operations internally and, through self-tests, it ensures
that these operations function correctly.
Starting for DocuSign Signature Appliance version 9.0.9.10, it is possible to install the Appliance in an
HSM style where a user of the Appliance can also have Symmetric encryption/decryption keys such
as AES in addition to using RSA keys.
Figure 1 - DocuSign Signature Appliance
3.1 Secure by Design
The DocuSign Signature Appliance is a multi-chip standalone appliance. It has been designed to meet
all of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 requirements. Encased within a tamper-responsive and tamper-evident
steel box, the Appliance both protects against and reacts to attacks. Access to the Appliance is only
permitted through specific, well-defined interfaces detailed in Well-Defined Interfaces section.
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All vents on the module are baffled to meet FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements for opacity
and probing.
The Appliance includes a dual power supply, where the power supply can be removable and
replaceable.
The dual-power supply, containing two power supply units, is an external component of the module
and outside the physical cryptographic boundary of the module.
Tamper Evident cans provide evidence of any attempt to tamper with module cover. The Tamper
Evident cans are placed over a screw that joins the top cover and bottom enclosure.
The Tamper Evident cans are applied at manufacturing stage.
The Tamper Evident cans are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Tamper Evident cans
The units are encased in a solid metal case rigged with micro-switches and only the specified
physical interfaces permit access to the module. Intrusion attempts cause power to be instantly cut
off, preventing access to any useful information by zeroizing all plaintext critical security parameters
including the Appliance Critical keys.
3.2 Product Delivery
The product is wholly manufactured in DocuSign and includes both FIPS 140-2 approved hardware
version and FIPS 140-2 approved firmware version. At manufacturing both tamper device and
tamper seals are assembled. The whole product is fully tested before delivery. The product is
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packaged and directly delivered to the customer. The product is in a Factory state when delivered to
the customer. While in delivery, the product is protected by unique tamper seals and by the casing
of the Appliance. When the Crypto Officer receives the Appliance, the Crypto Officer must check the
Appliance’s case for any evidence of physical tampering. The Crypto Officer should verify that the
Tamper Evident cans are attached to the Appliance and that they are not damaged.
If you think the Appliance has been tampered with during delivery, contact DocuSign.
Firmware Upgrades are sent to customer through DocuSign Support Channels. The firmware
updates are digitally signed by an internal DocuSign Signature key that is controlled by DocuSign
Engineering. For more information about the Firmware Update process refer to chapter 6. When the
Appliance Administrator upload the updated firmware version, the digital signature of the new
firmware version is checked and rejected by the existing Appliance Firmware.
3.3 Initialization
The Appliance is delivered to you in the Factory Settings state. In this state it is not yet a FIPS module
and only the following options are relevant:
• Setting network parameters – The Cryptographic Officer can set the IP address of the
Appliance, define that the IP address is retrieved using a DHCP protocol and set other
networking related parameters. This operation is performed through Appliance’s console.
• Time adjustments – The Cryptographic Officer can define the current time of the Appliance
or retrieve time from an NTP server. This operation is performed through the Appliance’s
console.
• Installation – This critical procedure must be performed in a secure environment. Only after
the Appliance is installed it can begin to provide its digital signature services.
For additional details related to appliance initialization, see Installing the DocuSign Signature
Appliance section.
• Restoration – This critical procedure must be performed in a secure environment.
Restoration is similar to installation. This procedure uses the backup file of the internal
database.
For additional details related to appliance restoration, see Restoring the DocuSign Signature
Appliance from backup on following section.
Remark:
A web based console is used. The web based console is accessed through a dedicated LAN interface
(labeled as LAN0) of the Appliance to IP address 10.0.0.2 on port 8088.
Also, any operation from the web based console requires physical access to the Appliance by
unplugging/plugging the license token as part of approving the operation.
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3.3.1 Installing the DocuSign Signature Appliance
The Appliance installation is performed using the administrative DocuSign SA Client or using the
DocuSign HSM client. The Cryptographic Officer uses the administrative DocuSign SA Client or
DocuSign HSM client to send installation commands to the Appliance. The installation commands are
sent using the regular client/appliance secure protocol (see Secure Operation – DocuSign SA Client
section).
During installation, the following security related issues are handled:
• The first Crypto Officer User ID and password are provided. The Crypto Officer is defined in
the users database with the required permissions to manage users, groups and the
Appliance.
Assigning users to groups is relevant only for when the Appliance is installed in Directory
Independent installation.
• A set of four Server critical AES128 keys and IPSEC shared secret are randomly generated
inside the Appliance and are placed inside the internal tamper device. The keys and shared
secret are also loaded into the two blue USB tokens. These tokens must be stored on the
Crypto Officer’s premises and are only used during the:
• Reset tamper operation performed by the Crypto Officer.
• Restoration of the Appliance.
• Installing an alternate appliance for High Availability purpose.
In the case of HSM installation, the master keys are split to two blue USB tokens that are
duplicated for redundancy purposes.
• In the case that it is configured to use an internal CA, A RSA key pair is generated for the
internal CA (Certificate Authority) of the Appliance. This key is used for generating X.509-
based Certificates for users. The RSA private key is encrypted and stored in the Appliance’s
database.
During normal appliance operation, a USB-based license plug is plugged into the Appliance’s USB
port. The USB token controls the number of possible existing users in the Appliance’s database and
expiration date for the Appliance’s service.
DocuSign manufactures the Appliance based on firmware versions 8.0, 8.1, 8.4, 8.5, 8.51.9.0 or
9.0.9.10.
Also, it is possible to upgrade to Appliance firmware version 8.4 upgrade to Appliance firmware
version 8.5, then upgrade to Appliance firmware 8.51.9.0 and then to Appliance firmware 9.0.
Appliance firmware version 8.4 is not FIPS approved.
For more information of how to perform a firmware upgrade, refer to Chapter 5.
3.3.2 Restoring the DocuSign Signature Appliance from backup
If the Appliance was physically damaged, reset to factory settings, or damaged in some other way, a
backup of the Appliance’s database must be restored to a new or existing appliance. The restore
operation is very similar to the installation of a new appliance and must be performed in a secure
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environment. In addition, the Appliance must be in the Factory Settings state to perform the restore
operation.
A restoration differs from an installation in the following ways:
• A valid backup file of an operational appliance must be available.
• The Crypto Officer must have a valid backup token or two valid tokens in the case of HSM
configuration that includes the critical keys and the IPSEC shared secret of that operational
appliance.
During restoration:
• The Crypto Officer provides the backup file and plugs the backup token or tokens
sequentially into the Appliance’s USB token slot.
• All users and their relevant data, such as their private keys, are restored to the Appliance’s
database.
After restoration, all users can sign their documents and data using the Appliance.
After restoration, the product is a FIPS module and begins serving user requests and Crypto Officer
requests.
3.3.3 Setting the Appliance to work in FIPS Mode
There are several system parameters and an additional configuration that are required to be set in
order for the Appliance to work in FIPS mode. These system parameters must be set right after
initialization or restoration.
For more information refer to section 4.1.
One of these system parameters is named Advanced- Enforce FIPS Approved Algorithm, when this
system parameter is set, only FIPS approved algorithms are used.
3.4 Users Directories
The DocuSign Signature Appliance supports installation in environments where a user directory
already exists. Currently the following Users Directory environments are supported:
• Microsoft Active Directory
• LDAP based environment such as: IBM Tivoli, SUN Directory Server and Oracle Internet
Directory.
The Appliance provides two additional functionalities when using these environments:
• Synchronization with the Users Directory of the environment – The Appliance is
synchronized with the users directory of the environment. Every user in the users directory
who is classified as a signer is also defined in the Appliance and is able to sign documents.
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• Authentication using Kerberos Ticketing mechanism – When a user attempts to securely
connect to the Appliance for any operation, such as signing a document, the login operation
is done using the Kerberos Ticketing mechanism. The Appliance authenticates users from
Active Directory relying on the Kerberos Ticketing mechanism.
• Besides the above directories, the Appliance supports the Directory Independent
environment where users are defined by the administrator of the organization and the login
operation is performed internally by the Appliance.
Note: Only the Directory Independent environment and module interface to Microsoft Active
Directory are submitted for FIPS 140-2 validation.
Also, it is possible to authenticate a user based on a SAML or JWT ticket provided by a trusted
Identity Provider.
The appliance can be configured as a Digital Signature Appliance (DSA) or a HSM. In HSM style, the
appliance can only be installed in Directory Independent (DI) mode. DSA generates digital signatures
on behalf of users. HSM encrypts and decrypts data on behalf of users.
In the case that the Appliance is deployed in an HSM style, it can be installed only in Directory
Independent (DI) mode, and the authentication is based only on a User ID and Password.
3.5 Managing the DocuSign Signature Appliance
3.5.1 Cryptographic Officer
The Crypto Officer performs both appliance and users/groups management of the Appliance.
In the case of Active Directory based environment, users are managed in the directory and all
changes that are made in the directory sync with the list of users in the Appliance.
The Crypto Officer connects securely to the Appliance (see Secure Operation – DocuSign SA Client
section). The following sections describe in detail all operations that can be performed by the Crypto
Officer.
The Crypto Officer creates users and groups according to the organization’s policy. For each user, a
User-ID and a Password is provided. This operation is relevant only when the Appliance is installed in
Directory Independent environment. In Active Directory environment, a user is created in the
Appliance when the Crypto Officer creates the user in Active Directory and defines the user as a
member of the Signers User Group.
By default, after a user is created, the Appliance automatically generates a new RSA key pair and a
Certificate for the user.
The Crypto Officer can delete users. When a user is deleted, all the user’s keys, certificates, and
graphical images are also deleted. This operation is relevant only when the Appliance is installed in
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Directory Independent Environment. In Active Directory Environment users are deleted from the
Appliance when the Crypto Officer deletes the user in Active Directory or removes the user from the
Signers User Group.
3.5.2 User
In the case of Directory Independent environment the user’s password is managed by the Appliance.
The password length must be six Unicode characters or more and less than twenty eight Unicode
characters.
In the case of Active directory environment, the user’s password is managed by the directory.
The user can also direct the Appliance to generate additional RSA keys. It is possible to store several
graphical signature images in the user account in the Appliance. These images are stored in the
Appliance’s database, retrieved by the DocuSign SA (Signature Appliance) Client, and can be
incorporated into the signed document in the user’s PC.
The user can also direct the Appliance to generate AES keys.
A user can only use keys that are owned by that user.
Remark: it is possible to configure the Appliance to use an RSA key pool when the Appliance’s
internal CA is used. The implementation is based on a process which is executed within the
Cryptographic module and writes the newly generated keys to the database, encrypted with
appliance Critical Key 1.
These keys will be assigned to user when it is required to assign a signature key for the user. A
certain key from the key pool can only belong to a certain user.
3.6 Secure Operation – DocuSign SA Client
Any operator who wishes to use the Appliance’s services can connect via a secure protocol using the
DocuSign SA Client. The secure networking protocol is a standard TLS (Transport Layer Security)
protocol with the following parameters:
• The TLS protocol is based on a Server RSA key. The TLS Server RSA key is externally generated
during manufacturing. Each individual appliance includes a different TLS Server RSA key.
• The TLS session is based on AES CBC encryption and HMAC-SHA-256 data integrity.
• Upon session creation, the only operation that can be performed is an authentication
command. The authentication is based on User ID and Password authentication, which are
verified by the Appliance or using a Kerberos ticket when the Appliance is installed in Active
Directory environment.
Also, it is possible to authenticate a user based on validating a SAML or JWT Token that was
created by a trusted Identity provider.
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• Only after the user is authenticated, can the user perform operations such as digitally sign
data. Similarly, the Crypto Officer can connect securely to the Appliance and perform
administrative operations.
• It is possible to configure the Appliance to use extended authentication, where any digital
signature operation requires the end user to authenticate. There are two modes of extended
authentication:
• Radius based – the end user provides an additional password that is validated by an
external Radius Server. Usually the extended password is a one time password.
• Internal Time Based OTP - the end user provides an additional password that is validated
by the Appliance, based on a mutual shared secret that is downloaded once by the user
to a local OTP device that generates time based One Time Passwords. The One Time
Password is validated by the Appliance.
3.7 Additional Security Issues
The four critical keys are used for:
1) Encrypt sensitive data in the database in non-volatile memory and MAC plaintext data in the
database.
2) MAC individual user’s records in the database.
3) Encrypt database for backup
4) MAC database for backup
The four critical keys of the Appliance are stored on a special backup token and in an internal tamper
device. These keys are loaded into the Appliance’s volatile memory during startup from the tamper
device and erased from memory when the Appliance is shut down.
Any attempt to access the device that triggers the tamper response will cause power to be instantly
cut off, preventing access to any useful information by zeroizing all plain text critical security
parameters, including the Appliance’s critical keys. Without these keys, it is not possible to start the
Appliance or access the Appliance’s stored data.
The critical keys will also be deleted from the internal tamper device. Upon next startup of the
device a tamper detected message will be displayed in the touch screen.
Also, if there is an attempt to access the device when the power is off, the tamper response circuit is
still active. If the tamper circuit is activated, the critical keys will be deleted from the internal
tamper device and the tamper detected message will appear in the console upon next startup.
Module zeroization can be done by performing the Factory Restore operation from the console. This
operation will zeroize all plain text critical security parameters, including the Appliance’s critical
keys. Also all users’ information as well as the users’ keys will be deleted from the Appliance’s
database.
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The units are encased in a solid metal case rigged with micro-switches and only the specified
physical interfaces permit access to the Appliance. The boundary of the module is the metal case.
The Appliance meets FCC requirements in 47 CFR Part 15 for personal computers and peripherals
designated for home use (ClassB), and is labeled according to FCC requirements.
The cryptographic boundary is the metal case of the Appliance.
The power supply bays, internal power wires, power connectors, internal power circuit and fan are
excluded components.
3.8 High Availability and Load Balancing
It is possible to deploy two or more appliances in the same organization. The purpose of having
more than one active appliance is to enable the organization’s users to continue and digitally sign in
the event of a hardware or firmware malfunction to the Appliance.
The main appliance is named the Primary appliance, while the other appliances are named the
Alternate appliances.
The whole content of the Appliance’s database is replicated to the alternate appliances, thus
enabling end user to sign data either using the primary appliance or an alternate appliance.
Any record of a replicated sensitive information includes a C-MAC, which is calculated by the
Appliance software upon any change to the record. The C-MAC is also checked upon any use of a
record.
Keys and CSP values that are stored in the database are AES encrypted. Therefore, when such
records are copied from the Primary Appliance to an Alternate Appliance the records are already
encrypted.
3.9 Interface to External CA in Automated mode
The Appliance can be configured to access an external CA in automated mode for the purpose of
certificate enrollment.
Upon a creation of a user, the Appliance will connect to the external CA and the external CA will
issue a certificate for the user. Upon updating user information such as email, a new certificate will
be generated for the user.
If the user is deleted from the Appliance, the certificate of the user will be revoked.
3.10 Well-Defined Interfaces
The Appliance is a steel, rack mountable box, in which only the interfaces provide access to the
Appliance.
The physical interfaces of the Appliance include the power connector, regular network connection
(Ethernet Interface using TCP/IP), administrative network connection (Ethernet Interface using
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TCP/IP), power switches, LEDs, a touch screen and one USB slot for a smartcard-based USB token. All
ports use standard PC pin outs.
Table 2 shows the mapping of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces to the Appliance’s physical interfaces.
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces Appliance’s Physical Interfaces
Data Input Interface Network port (LAN1),
USB slot for smartcard-based token1
Data Output Interface Network port (LAN1),
USB slot for smartcard-based token2
Control Input Interface Network port (LAN0/LAN1),
Touch Screen
Status Output Interface Network ports (LAN0/LAN1),
LEDs,
Touch Screen
Power Interface DC power connector
Table 2 - Interfaces
1.
Used only in the case of restoration or a reset tamper event.
2.
Used only during installation.
When the DocuSign SA Client or DocuSign HSM Client is used, all requests for cryptographic services
are performed through the DocuSign Signature Appliance API. This API, written in C/C++ and based
on RPC (Remote Procedure Calls), provides a high-level interface to the cryptographic services
provided by the Appliance that include RSA key generation and digital signature operations.
The Touch Screen displays the following status information: IP address, version information, and
serial number.
The Front of the module has the following LED’s:
• Power LED
• Hard Disk LED
• Tamper LED
Status information can also be sent via syslog protocol to a syslog server or can be retrieved by
network monitoring systems via SNMPv2 protocol. This status information is sent using the network
ports of the module.
The SNMPv2 protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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3.11 Roles and Services
The Appliance employs password-based, identity-based authentication of users and operators
secured by the TLS protocol. Multiple users and operators can connect and use the Appliance
simultaneously. Each user has a user record that contains the user name, common name, email
address, and administrative authorization mask. The administrative authorization mask controls
whether the user can perform appliance management tasks or user management tasks. There are
two roles that can be assigned to an operator, User and Supervisor (Crypto Officer).
In Active Directory, it is possible to authenticate users and Crypto Officers based on SSPI (Security
Support Provider Interface), which is a Kerberos based ticketing mechanism. The user is
authenticated to the domain and provided with a ticket from the domain. The ticket is sent from the
DocuSign SA client to the Appliance during user authentication. The Appliance authenticates the
user based on the given ticket.
3.11.1 Supervisor (Crypto Officer) Role
The Supervisor role is assigned to the Crypto Officer and is used for user and appliance
management, appliance installation/restoration, and the Appliance’s configuration. The Crypto
Officer possesses the backup tokens necessary for reset tampering and restoring from backup. The
Crypto Officer can log into the Appliance remotely using the standard appliance’s authentication
protocol.
The Crypto Officer can perform the following tasks. These tasks represent special services of the
Appliance:
• Create users – DI (Directory Independent – see section 3.4) Environment
• Update user information – DI Environment
• Permit a user to download TOTP shared secret
• Retrieve user information
• Revoke Users – DI Environment
• Set user password – DI Environment
• Disable/Enable user logon – DI Environment
• Create groups – DI Environment
• Update groups – DI Environment
• Delete groups – DI Environment
• Attach/detach a user from a group – DI Environment
• Disable/enable a group – DI Environment
• Perform shutdown
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• Load Firmware
• Perform backup
• Retrieve log file
• Update system parameters
• Zeroize Module
• Asymmetric cryptography
• Symmetric cryptography
• Authentication
• Graphical image Import/export
• Delete Keys
• Configure backup to a specified IP address
• Change user password – DI Environment
• Show FIPS mode Status
• Self-Tests
Locally, the Crypto Officer has the ability to access certain management operations of the Appliance,
including resetting a tamper condition, which is performed using the backup USB token.
It is possible to set a specific Client IP address as a system parameter.
Only from this IP address, it is possible to perform a backup of the Appliance to a file without
requesting for administrator User ID and a password, thus automate a periodical backup for the
system.
3.11.2 User/Application Role
The User/Application role is used for accessing the cryptographic services provided by the Appliance.
A user logs into the Appliance remotely using a user ID and a password or based on Active Directory
ticket (SSPI). The session is protected using the TLS protocol. A user is not permitted to perform any
user or appliance management operations.
A user can access the following services:
• Asymmetric cryptography
• Symmetric cryptography
• Download TOTP Shared Secret
• Authentication
• Graphical image Import/export
• Delete Keys
• Change user password – DI Environment
• Show FIPS mode Status
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The Crypto Officer and User role can use the Asymmetric cryptography service to generate an RSA
key pair, Generate a digital signature, retrieve a public key and certificate, upload a user certificate,
generate an AES key and use the key to encrypt/decrypt.
An operator assigned a User/Application role must first authenticate to the Appliance using the user
ID and password or based on Active Directory ticket (SSPI). After successful authentication, an
authenticated and encrypted session is created. During this session, the operator may only perform
cryptographic services on RSA keys and/or AES keys that belong to the operator.
Also, the user can change his/her password. The password length must be greater than or equal six
Unicode characters.
In addition, the user can be authenticated based on a SAML or JWT token provided by a trusted
Identity provider.
In Directory Independent environment the module enforces a minimum password length of six
Unicode characters. Each character may be numeric (0-9) or alphanumeric (a-z, A-Z) or even
Unicode. Just considering the alphanumeric set of characters there are 62 possible characters and
the password is at minimum 6 characters long.
Therefore, the probability of a random attempt to succeed is:
One in (62 ^ 6) or 1 in 56,800,235,584. This is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
It takes the module approximately 1msec to process a login attempt, for a maximum of 1,000 login
attempts in 1 second and 60,000 login attempts in 1 minute.
Therefore, the probability of a random attempt to succeed during a minute is:
One in ((62 ^ 6) / 60,000) or 1 in (56,800,235,584 / 60,000) or 1 in 946,670.This is less than 1 in
100,000.
If SAML/JWT authentication is used, since the SAML/JWT token is based on a 2048bit digital
signature, the probability that random access will succeed is far less than one in 1,000,000 attempts
using this authentication mechanism. The authentication provides 1 in 2^112/(3000*60) probability
of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period since the Appliance cannot process
more than 3000 SAML/JWT validations per second.
An operator who has access to the role of Crypto Officer must first authenticate to the Appliance
using the user ID and password of the Crypto Officer or based on an Active Directory ticket (SSPI).
When using Active Directory authentication, the Crypto Officer must be part of an Active Directory
administrative group. During this session, the operator may perform user management and
appliance management services.
In the case of Active Directory environment, the user and Crypto-Officer authenticate by presenting
a ticket over a TLS channel. The Kerberos ticket is encrypted and contains a domain session key with
length of at least 56 bits.
Therefore, the probability of random attempt to succeed is:
One in (2^56) or 1/72,000,000,000,000,000. This is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
- 18 -
It takes the module 1msec to process a login attempt. A maximum of 1,000 login attempts may be
processed in 1 second and 60,000 login attempts in 1 minute. This allows a maximum of: (2^56) /
60,000 ~ 1,200,000,000,000 attempts per minute.
Therefore, the probability of a random attempt to succeed during a minute is:
One in (1,200,000,000,000), this is less than 1 in 100,000.
The Appliance can be configured to use additional authentication for every digital signature
operation.
The additional authentication is defined as the following:
1. Username and Password authentication using a Radius Server.
The user will provide his/her password. Both user ID and password will be authenticated by a
Radius server using the Radius protocol.
2. OATH-TOTP - Time based One Time Password (OTP) validation. The user will provide an OTP that
will be validated for the purpose of creation of a digital signature.
The Radius authentication is based on 32 bytes of authentication data sent from the Appliance to
the Radius Server. 16 bytes are randomly generated by the Appliance.
Therefore the probability of random attempt to succeed is:
One in (2^128), this is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
It takes the module 1msec to process a signature request and 60,000 signature requests in 1 minute.
Therefore, the probability of a random attempt to succeed during a minute is:
One in (2^128/60000), this is less than 1 in 100,000.
Since the Radius authentication is done in addition to the authentication methods above both
method (Active Directory and Directory Independent) probabilities are increased.
In the case of OATH-TOTP validation, the module enforces a minimum One Time Password (OTP)
length of six numeric characters, however this authentication is performed only after the user was
properly authenticated based on the previous method of authentication such as User-ID/Password
or Active Directory based authentication (as described above). This means that the probably of a
success is less in the two mentioned criteria.
Table 3 lists which roles have access to each service.
Services Role Keys and CSPs Access
(R/W/X1)
Create users – DI Environment CO Appliance X
- 19 -
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
Update user information – DI
Environment
CO Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Permit a user to download TOTP
Shared Secret
CO TOTP Shared
Secret,
Appliance
Critical Key 1 –
ENC,
Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
W
X
X
Retrieve user information CO Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Revoke users – DI Environment CO
Set user password – DI
Environment
CO Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Enable/Disable user login – DI
Environment
CO Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Create group – DI Environment CO
Update group – DI Environment CO
Delete group – DI Environment CO
Attach/Detach user from a group –
DI Environment
CO
Enable/Disable group – DI
Environment
CO
Perform shutdown CO
Load Firmware CO DocuSign RSA
public key –
DLM
X
Perform backup CO Appliance
Critical Key 3 –
Appliance
X
- 20 -
Backup
encryption and
Appliance
Critical Key 4 –
MAC of the
Appliance’s
Backup
Retrieve log file CO
Self-Tests CO
Update system parameters CO Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Asymmetric cryptography CO/User User signature
keys
W,X
Symmetric cryptography CO/User User symmetric
keys
W,X
Authentication CO/User Hash of User’s
Password
R
Graphical image Import/export CO/User Appliance
Critical Key 1 –
ENC,
Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
X
Delete Keys CO/User User Signature
Keys, User
Symmetric
Keys and User
Public Key
Certificates
W
Change user password – DI
Environment
CO/User Hash of User’s
Password and
Appliance
Critical Key 2 –
MAC
- W for
hashing new
password
- X for
Critical Key 2
– MAC
Zeroize Module CO All keys and
CSPs
W
- 21 -
Show FIPS mode Status CO/User/Unauthenticated
Download TOTP Shared Secret User TOTP Shared
Secret
R
Setting network parameters CO
Time adjustments CO/Unauthenticated
Shutdown CO/Unauthenticated
Configure backup to a specified IP
address
CO
DRBG Unauthenticated DRBG Seed
and DRBG state
X
Table 3 - Role Access to Services
1
Execute a command on the key without the ability to Read or Write.
3.12 Operational Environment
The module operates in a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 Section 4.6
definitions.
3.13 Strong Cryptographic Algorithms and Secure Key Management
The DocuSign Signature Appliance supports and uses a variety of strong cryptographic algorithms.
The Appliance implements these algorithms based on the following FIPS 140-2-approved algorithms:
- 22 -
CAVP Cert
v9.0.9.10
Algorithm Standard Mode/
Method
Key Lengths or
Moduli
Use
C86 AES FIPS 197 CBC 128 bits and
256 bits
Session data
encryption1
Vendor Affirmed Triple-DES
MAC
SP 800-67 CBC Backup
integrity
Database
Integrity
C86 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-
1 and
HMAC-SHA-
256
128 bits and
192 bits
TLS-based
session
scheme
C86 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1 and
SHA-256
TLS-based
session
scheme
C86 CVL
TLS
1.0/1.1/1.2
SP 800-
135rev1
TLS Key
Derivation
Note: no parts of
this protocol, other
than the KDF, have
been tested or
reviewed by CAVP
and CMVP.
AES Cert. C86 and
HMAC Cert. C86
KTS FIPS 197
SP 800-
38F
AES\HMAC 128 bits and
256 bits
Key Transport
Note: provide 128
or 256 bits of
encryption strength
C86 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-1,
SHA-256
2048 bits RSA Signature
Generation for
TLS
Note: This RSA
PKCS1 v1.5 SigVer
implementation
was tested but not
used by the module
- 23 -
CAVP Cert
v9.0.9.10
Algorithm Standard Mode/
Method
Key Lengths or
Moduli
Use
C85 AES FIPS 197 CBC 128 bits Backup
Encryption
Database
Encryption
128, 192, 256
bits
AES
Cryptography
C85 Triple-DES2 SP 800-67 CBC 192 bits Backup
Decryption
Database
Decryption
C85 AES CMAC SP 800-
38B
CMAC 128 bits Backup
integrity
Database
Integrity
AES Cert. C85 and
AES-CMAC Cert. C85
KTS SP 800-
38B
SP 800-
38F
AES + AES-
CMAC
128 bits Key Wrapping
C85 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1 Authentication
SHA-256,
SHA-384
and SHA-
512
Hash for
Digital
signature
generation
- 24 -
CAVP Cert
v9.0.9.10
Algorithm Standard Mode/
Method
Key Lengths or
Moduli
Use
C85 RSA FIPS 186-4 2048,3072,4096
bits
Key
generation,
Note: 4096bit RSA
Key generation
have not been
tested by CAVP or
CMVP
C85 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512,
PKCS1 v1.5,
PSS
2048,3072,4096
bits Digital
signature
generation
C85 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256,
PKCS1 v1.5
2048 bits Digital
signature
verification
C85 DRBG SP 800-
90A
HMAC-SHA-
256
Random
Number
generation
C85 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-
256
256 bits Within HMAC
DRBG
note: This HMAC-
SHA-1
implementation
was tested but not
used by the module
98 DRBG SP 800-
90A
SHA-256 Random
Number
generation3
1465 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 Within
Hash_Based
DRBG
Vendor Affirmed CKG SP 800-
133
Key
Generation
Vendor Affirmed PBKDF SP 800-
132
Option 2a 192 bits Password-
based Key
Derivation4
Table 4 - FIPS Approved, Allowed and Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
- 25 -
1 Triple-DES under C86 was tested by CAVP but is not used in FIPS mode
2
Triple-DES under C85 was tested by CAVP and is used in FIPS mode for decryption as allowed algorithm for legacy use.
3 Provided by the internal Safenet eToken 5105 (FIPS 140-2 validation #1883)
4 The password length for the PBKDF algorithm is 24 bytes long
The module implements the following Non-FIPS approved, but allowed, algorithms:
1. RSA-TLS (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength). TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
2. MD5 (used in TLS v1.1, used in Extended Authentication mode – Radius and by the TLS1.0
implementation)
3. HW RNG (used in Safenet eToken 5105)
The module implements the following Non-FIPS approved algorithms:
1. Triple-DES (Cert. #C86, non-compliant) – used in TLS in non-FIPS mode
2. SHS (non-compliant) – used in RSA-RESTful-TLS in non-FIPS mode
3. HMAC (non-compliant) – used in RSA-RESTful-TLS in non-FIPS mode
4. Triple-DES (non-compliant) – used in RSA-RESTful-TLS in non-FIPS mode
5. AES (non-compliant) – used in RSA-RESTful-TLS in non-FIPS mode
6. RSA-RESTful-TLS (key wrapping; non-compliant)
7. AES (no security claimed) – implementation used for IPSEC
The Appliance stores private keys in a key database. This database is stored encrypted (with AES
CBC) on the Appliance’s internal hard drive. Within the key database, each key is attached to a
specific user.
Generated keys in the Appliance cannot be read outside the Appliance. User’s public keys,
certificates, and graphical images of the user’s signature are stored in the Appliance’s database and
can be retrieved during a user’s session. The user can retrieve only his/her objects.
Table 5 provides a list of keys, their key types, and access control.
- 26 -
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs
Key Type Generation/
Input/Output
Storage Zeroization
Appliance Critical Key
1 – Key and values
encryption in
database
AES 128 bit key Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
2 – MAC of database
records
AES 128 bit key Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
3 – Appliance Backup
encryption
AES 128 bit key Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
4 – MAC of the
Appliance’s Backup
AES 128 bit key Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
1 – Keys and values
backward
compatibility
decryption in
database
Triple-DES 192
bit key
Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
2 – MAC backward
compatibility
validation in database
records
Triple-DES 192
bit key
Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
3 – Appliance
backward
compatibility
decryption of Backup
Triple-DES 192
bit key
Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance Critical Key
4 – MAC backward
compatibility
validation of backup
Triple-DES 192
bit key
Internal/
NA/NA
Tamper
device
(plaintext)
Tamper
Appliance’s TLS RSA
public/private key pair
RSA 2048s bit
key
External/
NA/NA
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
- 27 -
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs
Key Type Generation/
Input/Output
Storage Zeroization
Triple-DES KEK for the
Appliance’s TLS RSA
public/private key pair
Password-based
key derivation is
implemented in
compliance with
SP 800-132.
Derived/
NA/NA
Memory
(plaintext)
End of
usage
Password for
accessing Triple-DES
KEK for the
Appliance’s TLS RSA
public/private key pair
N/A Internal/
NA/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
PBKDF master key N/A Internal/
NA/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
TLS Master/pre-
master secret
N/A Internal/
NA/Encrypted
memory NA
HMAC-SHA256 of
PBKDF master key (for
integrity of the DPK)3
32 bytes Internal/
NA/NA
Memory
(plaintext)
Power
cycle
PBKDF HMAC key (for
integrity for DPK)3
24 bytes External /
NA/NA
Disk
(plaintext)
Hardcoded
key
zeroized by
special
firmware
The Appliance’s
Internal CA RSA key
RSA 2048 bits
key – defined in
installation
Internal/
NA/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
DocuSign RSA public
key – firmware
validation – hard
coded
RSA 2048 bits
key
External/
NA/NA
Disk
(plaintext)
NA
DocuSign RSA public
key – DLM
(downloadable
module) validation –
hard coded
RSA 2048 bits
key
External/
NA/NA
Disk
(plaintext)
NA
Session
encryption/decryption
AES 128/256
bits keys.
TLS key
establishment
Memory
(plaintext)
End of
session
- 28 -
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs
Key Type Generation/
Input/Output
Storage Zeroization
keys
HMAC key 20 bytes TLS key
establishment
Memory
(plaintext)
End of
session
User public key
certificates
RSA
2048/3072/4096
bits public keys
stored in
certificates
Internal/
Encrypted/Yes
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
User symmetric keys AES 128,192,256
bits
Internal/
Encrypted/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
User signature keys RSA
2048,3072,4096
bits
Internal/
Encrypted/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
Hash of User’s
Password
SHA1 Internal Disk
(hashed)
User
deletion
TOTP Shared Secret 250 bytes Internal/
Encrypted/Encrypted
Disk
(encrypted)
NA
DRBG Key and V HMAC-DRBG
RNG Input
Internal/
NA/NA
RAM
(plaintext)
Power
cycle
Entropy Input String HMAC-DRBG
RNG Input
Internal/
NA/NA
RAM
(plaintext)
Power
cycle
DRBG seed DRBG seed in
Safenet eToken
5105
Internal/
NA/NA
eToken Power
cycle
DRBG state1 DRBG state in
Safenet eToken
5105
Internal/
NA/NA
eToken Power
cycle
Table 5 – Keys and CSPs
1 The DRBG State is associated with the internal DRBG (eToken). The internal DRBG state is not accessible to the
Appliance and is zeroized when the Appliance powers off.
All symmetric keys and generated seeds for asymmetric key generation are unmodified output from the Approved
HMAC_Based DRBG
- 29 -
3
The DPK is DATA Protection Key according to SP 800-132
Remark: The DRBG Key, which is of size 256bit is based on a 256bit random seed that is retrieved
from an internal Safenet eToken 5105 (FIPS 140-2 validation #1883).
The estimated entropy is at least 5.74/8, which means that a random seed of 256bit, will produce
minimum entropy of 184bit.
This assumes a residual security risk results from the incomplete testing of a third-party entropy
source.
Remark: The Triple-DES based mechanism cannot be used in TLS when the Appliance is in FIPS mode.
Self Testing
The DocuSign Signature Appliance monitors firmware operations using a set of self-tests to ensure
proper operation according to the FIPS 140-2 standard. The Appliance includes both the power-up
self tests and conditional tests. These tests are described in the following sections.
3.13.1 Power-Up Self Tests
 Critical Function Test - Low Level Hardware Check
 Firmware Integrity Test (RSA signature verification)
 AES encrypt KAT (for Appliance-internal AES implementation)
 AES decrypt KAT (for Appliance-internal AES implementation)
 Triple-DES decrypt KAT (for Appliance-internal Triple-DES implementation)
 AES encrypt KAT (for Appliance-TLS AES implementation)
 AES decrypt KAT (for Appliance-TLS AES implementation)
 AES CMAC KAT
 Triple-DES MAC KAT (for Triple-DES MAC using underlying Appliance-internal Triple-DES
implementation, for validation purpose as part of restoring old formatted database and backup
files)
 SHA-384 KAT (for Appliance-internal SHA-384 implementation)
 SHA-512 KAT (for Appliance-internal SHA-512 implementation)
 HMAC SHA-1 KAT (for Appliance HMAC implementation)
 HMAC SHA-256 KAT (for Appliance HMAC implementation)
 HMAC SHA-1 KAT (for Appliance-TLS HMAC implementation)
 HMAC SHA-256 KAT (for Appliance-TLS HMAC implementation)
 RSA sign KAT (for Appliance-internal implementation)
 RSA verify KAT (for Appliance-internal implementation)
 RSA decrypt KAT (for Appliance-TLS RSA implementation)
- 30 -
 RSA encrypt KAT (for Appliance-TLS RSA implementation)
 RSA sign KAT (for Appliance-TLS RSA implementation)
 RSA verify KAT (for Appliance-TLS RSA implementation)
 DRBG KAT (Including instantiate/generate/reseed as specified in SP 800-90A Section 11.3)
 Critical Function Test - Database Access
Following to failure of any of the above tests, the following error will be displayed in the Critical
Alerts attribute in the Touch Screen :
On – Critical Error, On – DB Error
Or there will be a General Failure message in the Touch Screen.
The Appliance will not provide any service at this state.
3.13.2 Conditional Tests
 Continuous RNG test for HMAC DRBG output.
The Appliance‘s random is based on a non-deterministic seed that is generated by the approved HASH
DRBG (Cert. #98) of internal Safenet eToken 5105 (FIPS 140-2 validation #1883).
HMAC RBG is reseeded every minute and checked for continuous test based on comparison errors.
The output of the DRBG algorithm is checked for continuous test and statistical errors.
If any of the tests fails, the module enters the error state.
 Continuous RNG test for HASH DRBG output (for DRBG Cert. #98)
 Firmware Load Test 1
 RSA Key Generation pairwise consistency test
3.14 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The DocuSign Signature Appliance does not include any mechanisms for the prevention of special
attacks.
3.15 Maintenance
The Crypto Officer must check the Appliance’s case for any evidence of physical tampering. Special
protective screw cover Tamper Evident cans are attached over two screws on the back of the
Appliance. These Tamper Evident cans would be damaged if the Appliance’s case has been opened.
Verify that the Tamper Evident cans are attached to the Appliance and that they are not damaged.
1
Make sure that the new firmware version is a FIPS 140-2 validated firmware version.
If a non-validated version is uploaded to the Appliance, the Appliance is no longer FIPS 140-2 validated.
RSA 2048bit with SHA-256 digital signature verification is used in this test.
- 31 -
If you think the Appliance has been tampered with, contact DocuSign.
- 32 -
4 FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Compliant Mode
Cryptographic services should only use FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms. A list of these algorithms
can be found in Section 3.13, Strong Cryptographic Algorithms and Secure Key Management.
Only one user can be assigned the role of Crypto Officer. Only the Crypto Officer may possess the
backup USB tokens necessary to restore the Appliance or reset the tamper operation.
Directory Independent and Active Directory environments are FIPS 140-2 level 3 validated. The
Appliance also supports LDAP environment, however, this is not included in the scope of this FIPS
140-2 level 3 validation process.
The Appliance can be interfaced through a SOAP based Web Services protocol or RESTful based Web
Services protocol. Both SOAP based Web Services interface and RESTful based Web Services are not
included in the scope of this FIPS 140-2 level 3 validation process.
To make sure the Appliance is running in FIPS Mode, inspect the value of FIPS Mode in the settings
section in the console. When in FIPS 140-2 level 3 approved mode, the console displayed FIPS Mode
on.
In the case that not all following configurations are set then the Appliance will be operated in non
FIPS mode. In this case the console displays FIPS Mode off.
4.1 Configuring the Appliance to work in FIPS mode
There are several System Parameters that must be set to appropriate values for having the
Appliance work in FIPS mode.
For changing system parameters, open the Appliance Management utility and login as the Appliance
administrator. Go to the System Parameters section and set the values of the following System
Parameters:
1. Advanced- Enforce FIPS Approved Algorithm.
This value must be set to true. When this value is set, it is not allowed to sign using a 1024bit RSA
key. When this value is set, it is not allowed to use SHA-1 as part of the digital signature
operation.
- 33 -
Also, when this value is set The FIPS 186-4 based RSA key generation algorithm is used for
generating RSA keys. This means that only RSA 2048bit, 3072bit and 4096bit keys can be
generated.
2. Advanced – Web Services Support
This value must be set to false, since the SOAP based Web Services interfaces is not included as
part of the FIPS 140-2 level 3 scope.
Note: when the Appliance is installed in HSM style, this option is automatically set to false.
3. Advanced – RESTful Web Services Support
This value must be set to false, since the RESTFul based Web Services interfaces is not included
as part of the FIPS 140-2 level 3 scope.
Note: when the Appliance is installed in HSM style, this option is automatically set to false.
4. Advanced – Disable 3DES in TLS
This value must be set to true to forbid using Triple-DES in TLS.
In Addition, the Primary and Alternate Appliances needs to be configured to use IPSEC configuration.
This is done by activating the administrative option called Set Appliance Communication Mode using
the Appliance Management Utility.
The value of Replication Communication Mode should be set to IPSec (the default configuration is
IPSEC/IKE).
IPSEC is redundant to the cryptographic protection of this module and no security is claimed for it.
Note: The IPSEC protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
5 Upgrade appliance firmware from version 8.0 to version
8.1
Perform the following instructions for upgrading appliance firmware version from version 8.0 to
version 8.1.
1. Contact DocuSign support to get appliance firmware upgrade package from version 8.0 to 8.1.
2. Perform the upgrade in a secure environment.
3. The upgrade procedure can be performed only when the appliance is in factory settings.
- 34 -
4. Invoke the Appliance Management application from the DocuSign SA Client’s control Panel.
5. Locate the relevant appliance according to its IP address and Login as an appliance administrator.
6. Invoke the Upload Software option for each upgrade file. Provide the set of upgrade files
provided you by DocuSign.
7. If the upgrade file is tampered with, the new firmware loading test fails and the module will
reject the upgrade.
In each upgrade, a progress bar will indicate the progress of the upgrade operation. When the whole
operation ends the Appliance is installed with firmware version 8.1.
6 Upgrade appliance firmware from version 8.0/8.1 to
versions 8.5, 8.51.9.0 and 9.0.9.10
Perform the following instructions for upgrading appliance firmware version from version 8.0 or
version 8.1 to version 8.4.
Note: version 8.4 is out of scope of FIPS 140-2 validation. Be minded that any upgrade to version 8.4
should immediately follow by the upgrade to version 8.5.
1. Contact DocuSign support to get appliance firmware upgrade package to 8.4 and upgrade
package to 8.5.
2. Perform the upgrade in a secure environment.
3. Invoke the Appliance Management application from the DocuSign SA Client’s control Panel.
4. Locate the relevant appliance according to its IP address and Login as an appliance administrator.
5. Invoke the Upload Software option for each upgrade file. Provide the set of upgrade files
provided you by DocuSign. There should be an upgrade file to version 8.4 and an upgrade file to
version 8.5.
6. If the upgrade file is tampered with, the new firmware loading test fails and the module will
reject the upgrade.
In each upgrade, a progress bar will indicate the progress of the upgrade operation. When the whole
operation ends the Appliance is installed with firmware version 8.5.
Perform the following instructions for upgrading appliance firmware version from version 8.5 to
8.51.9.0
1. Contact DocuSign support to get appliance firmware upgrade package to 8.51.9.0.
- 35 -
2. Perform the upgrade in a secure environment.
3. Invoke the Appliance Management application from the DocuSign SA Client’s control Panel.
4. Locate the relevant appliance according to its IP address and Login as an appliance administrator.
5. Invoke the Upload Software option for each upgrade file. Provide the set of upgrade files
provided you by DocuSign. There should be an upgrade file to version 8.51.9.0.
6. If the upgrade file is tampered with, the new firmware loading test fails and the module will
reject the upgrade.
A progress bar will indicate the progress of the upgrade operation. When the whole operation ends
the Appliance is installed with firmware version 8.51.9.0.
Perform the following instructions for upgrading appliance firmware version from version 8.51.9.0 to
9.0.9.10
1. Contact DocuSign support to get appliance firmware upgrade package to 9.0.9.10
2. Perform the upgrade in a secure environment.
3. Invoke the Appliance Management application from the DocuSign SA Client’s control Panel.
4. Locate the relevant appliance according to its IP address and Login as an appliance administrator.
5. Invoke the Upload Software option for each upgrade file. Provide the set of upgrade files
provided you by DocuSign. There should be an upgrade file to version 9.0.9.10.
6. If the upgrade file is tampered with, the new firmware loading test fails and the module will
reject the upgrade.
A progress bar will indicate the progress of the upgrade operation. When the whole operation ends
the Appliance is installed with firmware version 9.0.9.10.
