<1>
IT : FLA
GR : 
TI : Transfers in Kind: Why They Can be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic
FT : 
AU : Bruce, Neil; Waldman, Michael
SO : The American Economic Review
S2 : 
VO : 81
NO : 5
SE : 
DA : Dec., 1991
PP : 1345-1351
EI : http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199112%2981%3A5%3C1345%3ATIKWTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9
IN : 00028282
AB : 
KW : 
PB : American Economic Association
LO : 
LA : 
CR : Copyright 1991 American Economic Association


<2>
IT : FLA
GR : 
TI : The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
FT : 
AU : Murphy, Kevin M.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.
SO : The Quarterly Journal of Economics
S2 : 
VO : 106
NO : 2
SE : 
DA : May, 1991
PP : 503-530
EI : http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199105%29106%3A2%3C503%3ATAOTIF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
IN : 00335533
AB : A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but when they become rent seekers, they only redistribute wealth and reduce growth. Occupational choice depends on returns to ability and to scale in each sector, on market size, and on compensation contracts. In most countries, rent seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does, leading to stagnation. Our evidence shows that countries with a higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster; whereas countries with a higher proportion of law concentrators grow more slowly.
KW : 
PB : The MIT Press
LO : 
LA : 
CR : Copyright 1991 The MIT Press


<3>
IT : FLA
GR : 
TI : Mixed Public and Private Financing of Education: Efficiency and Feasibility
FT : 
AU : Pauly, Mark V.
SO : The American Economic Review
S2 : 
VO : 57
NO : 1
SE : 
DA : Mar., 1967
PP : 120-130
EI : http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28196703%2957%3A1%3C120%3AMPAPFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
IN : 00028282
AB : 
KW : 
PB : The American Economic Association
LO : 
LA : EN
CR : Copyright 1967 American Economic Association
