# MindRoom Security Review Summary

**Date:** September 12, 2025
**Status:** 🟠 HIGH – Staging-ready with constraints (not production-ready)

## Overview

The security review has been refreshed across 12 categories. Most P0/P1 blockers are remediated: admin endpoints are authenticated and rate‑limited, provisioner auth is hardened, core security headers and trusted‑host checks are in place, multi‑tenancy isolation gaps are fixed, and baseline Kubernetes isolation is deployed. Remaining work focuses on secrets lifecycle, alert routing/IR (Prometheus metrics + rules now live), internal TLS, and frontend CSP.

## Current Posture (high level)

- Critical blockers: 0
- High risks: secrets lifecycle; monitoring/alerting; internal TLS/mTLS
- Medium risks: dependency scanning/pinning; ~~CSP~~ (fixed); ~~broader rate‑limit coverage~~ (improved); ~~backup path~~ (fixed)
- Low risks: minor RBAC tightening; policy automation; docs/process

## What's Fixed Since Last Review

- Admin endpoints: verify_admin enforced, resource allowlist, rate limits, audit logging added
- Provisioner: constant‑time API key check, rate limits on start/stop/provision/uninstall
- API hardening: request size limit (1 MiB), CORS restricted, HSTS + basic headers, trusted hosts
- Multi‑tenancy: migrations add account_id + RLS to webhook_events and payments; handlers validate ownership; tests added
- K8s: per‑instance NetworkPolicy; namespaced Role + RoleBinding for backend; ingress TLS protocols/ciphers; HSTS
- Defaults removed: no "changeme" in tracked configs; Helm templates generate strong secrets by default; Compose requires explicit passwords
- **NEW - Frontend CSP**: Comprehensive Content Security Policy headers with proper whitelisting for API, Supabase, and Stripe
- **NEW - User endpoint rate limiting**: Rate limits added to accounts, instances, and subscriptions endpoints (11 endpoints total)
- **NEW - Backup reliability**: Fixed IPv4 resolution for Supabase backups to ensure reliable connections

## Top Remaining Risks (priority order)

1. Secrets lifecycle and rotation
   - ✅ K8s Secrets already implemented with secure file mounts at `/etc/secrets`
   - ✅ Application reads secrets via `_get_secret()` with file fallback
   - ✅ Helper scripts exist (`scripts/rotate-api-keys.sh`, `scripts/apply-rotated-keys.sh`)
   - ⚠️ Need recorded rotation run + confirmation from providers
   - ⚠️ Only need to verify etcd encryption (usually enabled by default)
2. Monitoring and incident response
   - ✅ Prometheus metrics + alert rules for auth/admin events deployed
   - ⚠️ Configure Alertmanager receivers, dashboards, security@ inbox, security.txt, and document IR procedures
3. Internal service encryption
   - Evaluate service mesh or mTLS between internal components; document cipher policy at ingress
4. ~~Frontend protections~~ **PARTIALLY ADDRESSED**
   - ✅ CSP headers implemented with proper whitelisting
   - Remaining: audit 3rd‑party scripts, verify SSO cookie usage end‑to‑end
5. ~~Broader rate‑limit coverage~~ **PARTIALLY ADDRESSED**
   - ✅ User endpoints now rate‑limited (accounts, instances, subscriptions)
   - Remaining: webhook endpoints, maintain per‑route budgets
6. ~~Backup reliability~~ **RESOLVED**
   - ✅ IPv4 resolution fixed in backup script

## Deployment Guidance

- Staging: safe to continue functional testing behind trusted users
- Production: hold until secrets/monitoring/internal‑TLS/CSP are addressed and a final validation pass completes

## Updated References

1. SECURITY_REVIEW_CHECKLIST.md – updated with current pass/fail items
2. SECURITY_REVIEW_FINDINGS.md – reconciled with latest fixes and gaps
3. SECURITY_REVIEW_02_MULTITENANCY.md – reflects applied migrations and tests
4. SECURITY_REVIEW_06_INFRASTRUCTURE.md – updated status for NetworkPolicies, RBAC, TLS/HSTS, CORS
5. SECURITY_REVIEW_10_API_SECURITY.md – notes request‑size limiter and rate‑limit scope
6. SECURITY_REVIEW_03_SECRETS.md – clarified state; added rotation/etcd encryption items

## Risk Assessment

- Previous risk: ~6.8/10 (HIGH)
- **Current risk: ~5.8/10 (MEDIUM-HIGH)** - Reduced by CSP, rate limiting, and backup fixes
- Target risk: ≤3/10 (LOW)
- Estimated effort: 2–3 weeks (2 engineers) to close remaining High items

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Generated: September 12, 2025
Next Review: After secrets/monitoring/internal‑TLS/CSP land
