{"legal-claim": "\"A treating physician's opinion does not deserve controlling weight when it is nothing more than a conclusory statement.\" Moreover, checking a box on a form, without more, cannot amount to substantial evidence.", "case": "O\u2019Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir.1983) (\u201cBecause of the interpretive problems inherent in the use of forms such as the physical capacities checklist, our Court has held that while these forms are admissible, they are entitled to little weight and do not constitute \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d on the record as a whole.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Swigert v. Astrue, 226 Fed.Appx. 628 (8th Cir.2007) (\u201cA treating physician\u2019s checkmarks on an MSS form may be discounted if they are contradicted by other objective medical evidence in the record.\u201d) (citations omitted).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"Because of the interpretive problems inherent in the use of forms such as the physical capacities checklist, our Court has held that while these forms are admissible, they are entitled to little weight and do not constitute \"substantial evidence\" on the record as a whole.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"A treating physician's checkmarks on an MSS form may be discounted if they are contradicted by other objective medical evidence in the record.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Moreover, in addition to the officer's testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car.", "case": "Causey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 506, 508 (618 SE2d 127) (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting that it is \u201cnot unusual\u201d for drug dealers to be armed). This evidence, coupled with other evidence at trial, was sufficient to support Smith\u2019s conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt.", "legal_conclusion_a": "loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade", "legal_conclusion_b": "evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \"street level\" drug dealer", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"", "case": "Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"It is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Other courts agree that shareholders who receive notice of a proposed settlement may object regardless of whether they could institute or maintain the action themselves.", "case": "Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention.", "legal_conclusion_a": "treating an objector responding to a trial court's notice of proposed settlement like \"a defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\" and holding dismissal of objector's intervention was \"not decisive\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Even before the Francis decision, the supreme court had held that a settlement agreement adopted in a divorce decree falls within the purview of contract law.", "case": "See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "(Comply 16.) The Tenth Circuit has held that a recording device attached to a home telephone extension, such as that alleged in this case, qualifies for the Extension Phone Exemption because it is the telephone receiver, and not the recording device, that constitutes the intercepting mechanism.", "case": "See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (\u201cThe interception of a family member\u2019s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(1).\u201d); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \u201cintercepting equipment\u201d \u2014 answering machine attached to a home phone extension' \u2014 qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption).", "legal_conclusion_a": "listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in SS 2510(5", "legal_conclusion_b": "addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \"intercepting equipment\" -- answering machine attached to a home phone extension' -- qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "In any event, even had the tip contained information regarding defendant's future plans to visit the Royal Buffet, this lone detail pales in comparison to the predictive information provided by the confidential informants in the cases cited by the state.", "case": "See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. at 309-10, 79 S.Ct. 329 (tip \u2014 given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past \u2014 indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \u201chabitually\u201d walked very quickly); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir.1991) (Powell, J.) (informant\u2019s tip indicated that the defendant \u2014 a picture of whom the informant identified \u2014 would be traveling by bus and arriving on one of two days later that week; informant also accurately described the precise clothing that the defendant would be wearing and a tote bag that she would be carrying); cf. Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (concluding that anonymous tip was \u201csufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant\u2019s] behavior\u201d where \u201c[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "concluding that anonymous tip was \"sufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant's] behavior\" where \"[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "tip -- given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past -- indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \"habitually\" walked very quickly", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Entry No. 6.) As such, Rule 4(k)(l)(C) provides an additional basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, to the extent permitted by due process.", "case": "See In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F.Supp.2d at 806 (exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(l)(C) still requires demonstration that defendant has sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d to satisfy traditional due process inquiry); see also Wultz I, 755 F.Supp.2d at 32 (\u201cNationwide service of process does not dispense with the requirement that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due Process Clause.\u201d)", "legal_conclusion_a": "exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(l)(C) still requires demonstration that defendant has sufficient \"minimum contacts\" to satisfy traditional due process inquiry", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Nationwide service of process does not dispense with the requirement that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due Process Clause.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "As the court's colloquy with counsel at oral argument made quite clear, the Policy challenged here was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal holiday displays of a religious character. The absence of an explicit list of permissible subjects upon which discourse is permissible in this nonpublie forum does not mean that there is no \"otherwise includible subject\" for discussion in the forum.", "case": "See also Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment\u2019s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusion of \u201cpeace activists\u201d from \u201ccareer days\u201d when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination", "legal_conclusion_b": "finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "As an initial matter, there is no question that the dispatch described the motor vehicle with sufficient particularity such that Trooper Dwyer could be certain that the vehicle he stopped was the same one identified by the caller. The dispatch identified the vehicle's color, make, and license plate number, and the address of the registered owner.", "case": "Contrast Commonwealth v. Gomes, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 792, 795 (2009) (caller\u2019s report of a man holding a gun in the air not credited, in part because the caller failed to report own location); Commonwealth v. Mubdi, supra at 396 (caller\u2019s basis of knowledge questioned where the Commonwealth failed to introduce a 911 call showing that the information was \u201cderived from personal observation rather than hearsay or rumor\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "caller's report of a man holding a gun in the air not credited, in part because the caller failed to report own location", "legal_conclusion_b": "basis of the caller's knowledge properly was inferred from the report itself, which indicated firsthand observation of erratic operation", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The district court properly dismissed Acosta's deliberate indifference claims because he failed to allege facts establishing that defendants consciously disregarded his serious medical needs.", "case": "See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm\u2019rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury); see also Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (\u201c[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.", "case": "See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The court generally finds this bifurcation plan appropriate, and concludes that the superiority requirement is met. It notes, however, that plaintiffs have not articulated a workable trial plan for the classes they now propose. The court therefore directs plaintiffs to submit a trial plan that explains in detail (1) the subjects that they propose be addressed in separate phases of the trial; (2) the specific ways in which differences among available remedies will be addressed in special verdict forms during the liability phase of the trial; and (3) the specific mechanisms they suggest for handling the damages phase of the trial.", "case": "See Gartin v. S & M NuTec LLC, 245 F.R.D. 429, 441 (C.D.Cal.2007) (\u201cNeither Plaintiff nor her counsel has provided any suggestions \u2014 much less a plan \u2014 to this Court regarding managing the proposed class action\u201d); see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1189 (\u201c[The] court cannot rely merely on assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[The] court cannot rely merely on assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has provided any suggestions -- much less a plan -- to this Court regarding managing the proposed class action\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The appellant raises a related error that the Court must address so that it will not be repeated by the Board on remand. It is well settled that the Court will not ordinarily consider additional allegations of error that have been rendered moot by the Court's opinion or that would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), however, has recognized the need to address additional arguments, after the court determines that remand is necessary, in order to provide guidance to the lower tribunal.", "case": "See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002).", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion", "legal_conclusion_b": "discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Because Fox does not challenge the district court's dismissal of hostile work environment claims, those claims are abandoned.", "case": "See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a party\u2019s \u201csingle conclusory sentence\u201d in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam\u2019s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that a party's \"single conclusory sentence\" in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"", "case": "Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "She further testified that Clay only conducted drug sales from the cocaine stored in the closet and that Clay left the closet \"[u]nloeked most [of] the time[]\" when Clay and she were in the apartment. R. 85 at 123. The firearm was situated next to the cocaine and was strategically located on the same shelf so it was quickly and easily accessible.", "case": "See United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 809 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29 (6th Cir.2004) (finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm\u2019s reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house); see also Brown, 732 F.3d at 576-77 (\u201c[T]he gun\u2019s location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom\u2019s second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[T]he gun's location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom's second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.", "case": "See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding", "legal_conclusion_b": "concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.", "case": "See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment.", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Moreover, that some additional litigation may later arise to enforce an injunction does not itself justify abstaining from deciding a constitutional claim. Any plaintiff who obtains equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 enforcing his constitutional rights against a state official may need to return to court to ensure compliance with the judgment.", "case": "See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (\u201cA court that invokes equity\u2019s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"A court that invokes equity's power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Having so concluded, we must now turn our attention to whether the warrant's issuance in violation of the nighttime search requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, namely the drugs and other items found in defendant's purse. We recognize that mere ministerial and technical errors in the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate the warrant.", "case": "See, e.g., State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988) (violation of \u201cknock-and-announce\u201d rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock).", "legal_conclusion_a": "violation of \"knock-and-announce\" rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock", "legal_conclusion_b": "suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "As a threshold matter, Hazelbaker may well have waived the second-lease argument by her apparent failure to raise it to the bankruptcy court, despite having known of it since well before the inception of the proceedings.", "case": "See Lane v. Sullivan (In re Lane), 991 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1993) (noting that failure to raise an issue before bankruptcy court waives it on appeal); see also Ginther v. Ginther Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court); Gilchrist v. Westcott (In re Gilchrist), 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1990) (same).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that failure to raise an issue before bankruptcy court waives it on appeal", "legal_conclusion_b": "declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.", "case": "See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Op. at 253 n.4. If discovery reveals that the Greek government knew its revocation would cause losses to investors in this country, then the revocation may constitute \"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere\" that \"causes a direct effect in the United States,\" triggering the third exception.", "case": "See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "Argentina's rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \"engaged in a regular course of business conduct\" with investors \"over a several-year period,\" having \"called them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.", "case": "See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided).", "legal_conclusion_a": "clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided", "legal_conclusion_b": "explaining that \" 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation' \"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Mere possession of a firearm by one who, like the petitioner, routinely carried a gun (Tr. 209) is not, however, evidence of prior calculation and design.", "case": "State v. Johnson, No. 97APA03-315,1998 WL 226441, at *6 (Ohio App. May 5, 1998) (\u201cThat defendant had a gun with him at the Carter residence is not, by itself, evidence of prior calculation and design, given the testimony offered by defendant\u2019s girlfriend that he \u2018sort of frequently carried a weapon.\u201d); see also State v. Williams, No. 1-85-2, 1986 WL 5907, at *2 (Ohio App. May 19,1986)(\u201cThe fact that appellant possessed a gun on the day of the shooting when the witness had never before known the appellant to carry a gun, could have been interpreted by the jury as evidence that appellant had acted purposely with prior calculation and design\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"That defendant had a gun with him at the Carter residence is not, by itself, evidence of prior calculation and design, given the testimony offered by defendant's girlfriend that he 'sort of frequently carried a weapon.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The fact that appellant possessed a gun on the day of the shooting when the witness had never before known the appellant to carry a gun, could have been interpreted by the jury as evidence that appellant had acted purposely with prior calculation and design\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.", "case": "See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642.", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"", "case": "Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary", "legal_conclusion_b": "noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Furthermore, we find that the topic of workplace tobacco usage is unlike those significant core entrepreneurial topics that are more naturally considered to be inherently managerial in nature such as decisions regarding the programs of the employer, standards of service, overall budget, use of technologies, organizational structure, and selection and direction of employees. See 43 P.S. SS 1101.702. Thus, we conclude that collective bargaining over the policy regarding tobacco usage does not unduly infringe upon the employer's inherent managerial decision making. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Borough's ban on tobacco products was not a managerial prerogative, and, thus, was subject to mandatory collective bargaining.", "case": "See Crawford County, 659 A.2d at 1081-82 (finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d at 455 (determining workplace smoking was \u201cat the center of those subjects properly described as \u2018conditions of employment\u2019 and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\u201d); see also Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Serv. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47-8 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101 et seq.).", "legal_conclusion_a": "concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 7101 et seq.", "legal_conclusion_b": "finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": ". Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation.", "case": "See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that even if a detective's statement -- that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty -- made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney's decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "In her opening brief, White fails to challenge the district court's dismissal of her action, and thus she has waived any such challenge.", "case": "See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.\u201d); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (\u201cWe will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... \u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... \"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Rather, materiality under Harrington requires that the evidence in question will materially alter the result on retrial. In many cases, there will be little or no practical difference. But the Harrington test is clearly framed in terms of what will happen on retrial rather than what happened at the original trial.", "case": "See Harrington, 410 F.3d at 601 (\u201c[T]he evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.\u201d); see also Krasny, 607 F.2d at 844 (\u201cYet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would \u2018probably\u2019 result in an acquittal upon a new trial.\u201d); id. at 845 n. 3 (explaining that materiality and probability \u201care really two means of measuring the same thing\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[T]he evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Yet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would 'probably' result in an acquittal upon a new trial.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "This Court \"retains the discretion to seek supplemental submissions from the parties if it decides that more information is necessary to determine whether petitioners, in fact, have standing.\"", "case": "Am. Library Ass\u2019n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.2005); see, e.g., Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C.Cir.2006) (\u201c[W]e raised the issue of standing at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing.\u201d); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 992 (D.C.Cir.1996) (petitioner \u201cfurnished post-argument affidavits at our request\u201d); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C.Cir.2006) (supplemental briefing sought where agency first challenged standing after panel opinion issued).", "legal_conclusion_a": "supplemental briefing sought where agency first challenged standing after panel opinion issued", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"[W]e raised the issue of standing at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing.\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.", "case": "E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The presence of accomplices during the commission of the crime is immaterial so long as the jury makes an express finding that the defendant convicted actually possessed a firearm during the event.", "case": "Johnson v. State, 720 So.2d 232, 237 (Fla.1998) (court may impose mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm where jury makes finding that defendant committed crime while using a firearm either by finding defendant guilty of crime involving firearm or by answering specific question of special verdict form so indicating); and State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla.1984) (same); cf. Redd v. State, 684 So.2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm during armed robbery improper where evidence at trial failed to establish conclusively that defendant actually possessed firearm).", "legal_conclusion_a": "court may impose mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm where jury makes finding that defendant committed crime while using a firearm either by finding defendant guilty of crime involving firearm or by answering specific question of special verdict form so indicating", "legal_conclusion_b": "mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm during armed robbery improper where evidence at trial failed to establish conclusively that defendant actually possessed firearm", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.", "case": "Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt).", "legal_conclusion_a": "an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless", "legal_conclusion_b": "admission of codefendant's confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "We agreed with the referee that this was a selfish motive. We expressly noted that but for the significant mitigation in that case, the sanction would have been disbarment.", "case": "Id. at 561 (citing Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So.2d 980, 981-82 (Fla.1995) (suspending an attorney for three years for tax evasion and other misconduct where the attorney had underre-ported his income due to financial pressures and an inability to pay the full tax owed, but recognizing that the Court will not \u201chesitate[] to disbar attorneys who knowingly and willfully engage in the felonious conduct of filing or assisting in filing fraudulent income tax returns\u201d); Fla. Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law)); see also Fla. Bar v. Weed, 559 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 536 So.2d 188, 188 (Fla.1989) (disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns).", "legal_conclusion_a": "disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law", "legal_conclusion_b": "suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Because the Court is granting the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One, declaratory relief, there was no contract of insurance in place at the time of the accident and therefore the remaining Counts Two and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint fail as a matter of law. There can be no breach of a contract where no contract exists. Likewise, where no- contract exists, there can be no claim for bad faith.", "case": "Id. at 198, 33 P.3d 530 (\u201cwe reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\u201d); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 200 Ariz. 572, 579, 30 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca bad faith claim based solely on a carrier\u2019s denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"we reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"a bad faith claim based solely on a carrier's denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.", "case": "Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"It was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Second, courts have recognized that a court's prior investment of time in preparing a decision is a relevant factor in deciding whether to dismiss. See 16AA Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure SS 3988 (4th ed.2008).", "case": "See Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (denying motion to dismiss \u201c[a]fter a draft of [the] opinion had been written\u201d); see also Suntharalinkam v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir.2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (dissent \u201caware of no case where a motion for voluntary dismissal was granted when it was filed after the case was argued and submitted for decision\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "denying motion to dismiss \"[a]fter a draft of [the] opinion had been written\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "dissent \"aware of no case where a motion for voluntary dismissal was granted when it was filed after the case was argued and submitted for decision\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "[P 10] This Court has also recognized that city police officers have jurisdiction to stop vehicles and arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction when responding to requests from another law enforcement agency for aid and assistance.", "case": "See State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1995) (holding that although officer\u2019s observation and stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle occurred outside of the officer\u2019s geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect\u2019s vehicle).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that although officer's observation and stop of the defendant's vehicle occurred outside of the officer's geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect's vehicle", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding peace officer who responded to a request from another law enforcement agency for assistance had authority to complete the investigation and make an arrest", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Furthermore, the court may consider any added meaning that certain conduct might suggest to experienced officers in the field, trained in the observation of criminal activity.\" Based on the totality of facts discovered by Deputy Sheriff Brown during this consensual encounter, I conclude the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to continue detaining the defendants for a reasonable period of time to investigate the circumstances and determine if the defendants were engaged in criminal activity.", "case": "United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.2000)(holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger\u2019s nervous behavior, passenger\u2019s inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger\u2019s and driver\u2019s statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger's nervous behavior, passenger's inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger's and driver's statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding inconsistent information on travel plans \"casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy\" of defendants' activity", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "25. Nor is the upgrade claim false by necessary implication. Reasonable consumers could read the upgrade claim to be making comparative statements about Gatorade, but they could also read the upgrade claim to be comparing Powerade ION4 to the old Powerade.", "case": "See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 158 (\u201cif the language ... is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false\u201d); see also Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp, 315 F.3d 264, 275 (4th Cir.2002) (rejecting literal falsity argument because the advertisement \u201ccan reasonably be understood as conveying different messages\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"if the language ... is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "rejecting literal falsity argument because the advertisement \"can reasonably be understood as conveying different messages\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.", "case": "See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The administrator alleged in his complaint that Toma had converted Meszaros's property after he had helped move her to Ohio and further converted the property of her Ohio estate following her death. See Winters Natl.", "case": "Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"The title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \"", "legal_conclusion_b": "nonresident defendant's actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.", "case": "Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights).", "legal_conclusion_a": "Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights", "legal_conclusion_b": "Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "It has also shown that it knows how to distinguish between classes of employers and employees based on an express, statutorily defined relationship, or lack thereof, between the relevant employment and the employer's Minnesota business activities. See City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs.", "case": "P\u2019ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.2013) (inclusion of language in one statute may demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did not, include same language); cf. State v. Wenthe, No. A12-0263, 2015 WL 3875366, at *9 (Minn. June 24, 2015) (it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended scope of statute to be coextensive with other statutes that contain different language).", "legal_conclusion_a": "inclusion of language in one statute may demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did not, include same language", "legal_conclusion_b": "it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended scope of statute to be coextensive with other statutes that contain different language", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The definition of \"insured\" is therefore linked to the \"actual use\" of one of the two automobiles covered by the Policy, and the plaintiffs reasoning overlooks the critical fact that neither vehicle had any involvement in the accident in this case. See PL's Mem. at 1-2. Indeed, by the plaintiffs own admission, the only vehicle involved here was driven by Mr. Carr.", "case": "See Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (\u201c[The Court] may not \u2018indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C.2006) (\u201cA court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract ... and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (\u201cThe writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[The Court] may not 'indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.' \" (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Having considered the Guidelines sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a)(4), the Court now turns to the \"other statutory concerns\" it must consider under Booker. The Court may impose a sentence that is within the applicable statutory range yet outside the range suggested by the Guidelines, but it may do so only on the basis of one or more of the factors included in 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a). Moreover, the Court is obligated to construe the factors in section 3553(a) in a manner that is consistent with other relevant statutory provisions, particularly those that define criminal offenses.", "case": "See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1", "legal_conclusion_b": "explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \"the extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\" and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \"seek guidance from legislative history and from the [code's] overall structure\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Northrop Corp., Northrop Elecs. Even though it is an Article I tribunal, this Court applies justiciability principles of Article III, including mootness.", "case": "See, e.g., Schooling v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 204, 209 (2004) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the complaint were moot); CW Gov\u2019t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 554, 558 (2000) (citing Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243 (Fed.Cir.1996)) (granting motion to dismiss for mootness); see also Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cThe Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court ... applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article HI.\u201d)).", "legal_conclusion_a": "dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the complaint were moot", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court ... applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article HI.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Abonce-Barrera also asserts that the magistrate judge erred in failing to require the production of a list of all the cases on which the informant worked. Abonce-Barrera has failed, however, to show how such a list would be material under Brady.", "case": "See also United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that additional detailed information about a previous unrelated investigation involving an informant could be withheld after balancing the government\u2019s interest in insuring the informant\u2019s safety).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that additional detailed information about a previous unrelated investigation involving an informant could be withheld after balancing the government's interest in insuring the informant's safety", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Evidence is material for Brady purposes only if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.", "case": "See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile).", "legal_conclusion_a": "as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile", "legal_conclusion_b": "conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": ". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.", "case": "See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.", "case": "See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.", "case": "See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that \"retaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one's spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.", "case": "See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted)).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.", "case": "See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause).", "legal_conclusion_a": "refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state's exercise of \"its regulatory and licensing power\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Trice.", "case": "See United States v. Franik, 687 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2012) (where defendant does not raise procedural error, court bypasses review and only reviews substantive reasonableness of sentence for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Lazarski 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2009) (where district court varied downward from Guidelines range, it was \u201cnearly inconceivable\u201d that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further).", "legal_conclusion_a": "where defendant does not raise procedural error, court bypasses review and only reviews substantive reasonableness of sentence for abuse of discretion", "legal_conclusion_b": "where district court varied downward from Guidelines range, it was \"nearly inconceivable\" that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": ". Although the parties have not addressed choice-of-law issues, Maryland law properly governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause in this case because jurisdiction here is based in diversity and the dispute concerns the meaning of a contract governed by Maryland law.", "case": "See Silo Point, 578 F.Supp.2d at 810-11 (purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.Md.2000) (in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\u201d); cf. TECH USA, 592 F.Supp.2d at 855 (\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The actual and punitive damages are based on the same conduct. We need not look at the state's standard for awarding punitive damages because the jury already found that Scarborough's, conduct in the underlying malicious prosecution claim, for which the punitive damages were also awarded, was willful and malicious.", "case": "See In re Miera, 926 F.2d at 745 (holding that punitive damages, which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischarge-ability of compensatory damages, are likewise nondischargeable); see also Schoor, 139 B.R. at 468 (applying In re Miera and holding punitive damages nondischargeable where actual damages were nondis-chargeable without looking at specific jury instructions for punitive damages).", "legal_conclusion_a": "applying In re Miera and holding punitive damages nondischargeable where actual damages were nondis-chargeable without looking at specific jury instructions for punitive damages", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding that punitive damages, which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischarge-ability of compensatory damages, are likewise nondischargeable", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.", "case": "See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "A bankruptcy court's determination of foreign law is a conclusion of law and is therefore subject to de novo review.", "case": "See In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547, 565 n. 28 (E.D.Va.2010) (stating that foreign law determinations by bankruptcy courts are treated as questions of law requiring de novo review); see also Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9017 (stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 applies in bankruptcy proceedings); Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 (stating that a court\u2019s determination of foreign law \u201cmust be treated as a ruling on a question of law\u201d). When determining foreign law, a court \u201cmay consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1; see also Faggionato v. Lerner, 500 F.Supp.2d 237, 244 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (\u201cIn acting under Rule 44.1, a court may reject even uncontradict-ed expert testimony and reach its own decisions on the basis of independent examination of foreign legal authorities.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating that foreign law determinations by bankruptcy courts are treated as questions of law requiring de novo review", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"In acting under Rule 44.1, a court may reject even uncontradict-ed expert testimony and reach its own decisions on the basis of independent examination of foreign legal authorities.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.", "case": "See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement).", "legal_conclusion_a": "applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement", "legal_conclusion_b": "\" 'The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____' \"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam's \"wealth\" or \"career prospects.\" And although they might be characterized as \"humiliating\" or \"degrading,\" Adam's allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a \"significant negative alteration in the workplace.\"", "case": "See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \"This is Amy, you probably haven't met her yet because she is never here,\" may have been \"offensive\" to the employee, but was merely a \"petty slight\" that \"does not amount to a materially adverse action\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Here, in determining whether to extend asylum relief to spouses, the BIA reasonably considered the general principles underlying the definition of persecution and concluded that a husband is persecuted \"when the government forces an abortion on a married couple.\" (\"When the government intervenes in the private affairs of a married couple to force an abortion or sterilization, it persecutes the married couple as an entity.\"). I see no reason why the BIA could not reasonably conclude that one has suffered harm or injury sufficiently severe to constitute persecution when one's spouse is forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization. Indeed, this determination finds support in the decisions of a number of courts that have explicitly recognized that non-physical harm may support a finding of past persecution in at least some circumstances.", "case": "See Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001 (rejecting explicitly the \u201cnotion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\u201d and holding that \u201c[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China\u2019s population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\u201d); see also Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that \u201c[u]n-der the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm\u201d (quotation marks omitted)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cPersecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\u201d); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \u201cbased on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\u201d because her \u201cfear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "rejecting explicitly the \"notion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\" and holding that \"[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China's population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.", "case": "See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988).", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "stating that \"the emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\" in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "In light of the specific allegations of Defendants' deliberate indifference to the conditions at BCB, Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim under the second prong of the due process analysis.", "case": "See Walker, 111 F.3d at 130 (plaintiffs allegations that he directly spoke to defendants about conditions and that certain defendants directly witnessed conditions were sufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference on motion to dismiss); see also Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir.2001) (asserting that defendant prison guards \u201cmade daily rounds of SHU\u201d was sufficient to allege that defendants had actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions).", "legal_conclusion_a": "plaintiffs allegations that he directly spoke to defendants about conditions and that certain defendants directly witnessed conditions were sufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference on motion to dismiss", "legal_conclusion_b": "asserting that defendant prison guards \"made daily rounds of SHU\" was sufficient to allege that defendants had actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "In the realm of domestic relations litigation, matters which do not bear on a debtor's economic status, such as the dissolution of the marital relationship, are not stayed by a bankruptcy court.", "case": "In re Schock, 37 B.R. 399, 400 (Bankr: D.N.D.1984) (determining that divorce petitions are not stayed by \u00a7 362 of the Code); see also In re General Oil Distributors, Inc., 33 B.R. 717, 718 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983) (reviewing legislative history of \u00a7 362 indicating that divorce or child custody proceedings involving debtor may bear no relation to bankruptcy case.)", "legal_conclusion_a": "reviewing legislative history of SS 362 indicating that divorce or child custody proceedings involving debtor may bear no relation to bankruptcy case.", "legal_conclusion_b": "determining that divorce petitions are not stayed by SS 362 of the Code", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Consequently, Defendants' First Amendment arguments must fail. The alleged appropriation of Plaintiffs' marks for commercial purposes is not protected by the First Amendment.", "case": "Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1018 (\u201c[T]he Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged infringer\u2019s use.\u201d); see also Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775 (noting that the misleading commercial speech that the Lanham Act deals with is not entitled to First Amendment protection).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[T]he Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged infringer's use.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "noting that the misleading commercial speech that the Lanham Act deals with is not entitled to First Amendment protection", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.", "case": "See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable and applicable to the issue raised in this appeal, based in part on Storm's own statements at his change-of-plea hearing.", "case": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997, 124 S.Ct. 501, 157 L.Ed.2d 398 (2003); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that a defendant\u2019s representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that a defendant's representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true", "legal_conclusion_b": "reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.", "case": "See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983).", "legal_conclusion_a": "court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff's damages claim is time barred", "legal_conclusion_b": "characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.", "case": "See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning).", "legal_conclusion_a": "rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process", "legal_conclusion_b": "requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.", "case": "See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing).", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating that \"the burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "The government responds, inter alia, that the defense of laches may not be invoked against it in this context.", "case": "See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "noting that \"[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\" but reserving the question", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "As to Cignetti's allegation that the defendants suppressed exculpatory material, the sixth act, it has consistently been held that absolute immunity shields a prosecutor from liability as to claims that they knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence.", "case": "See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted) (applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials).", "legal_conclusion_a": "recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials", "legal_conclusion_b": "applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Moreover, we had a difficult time concluding that the reasons for the district court's variance in sentencing Davis, such as age and length of time between the commission of the crime and the sentencing hearing, were compelling enough to support an almost 100% variance. Thus, it is difficult to extract from Davis an idea of how compelling perfectly legitimate reasons must be for a 43% variance or how this court is to review the careful and reasoned decision of the district court.", "case": "See United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740-41 (6th Cir.2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) (\u201cIf the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a) factors in announcing its sentence and adheres to the other procedural requirements of a reasonable sentence, that should suffice.\u201d)- Furthermore, this court in United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.2007), upheld a variance as large as the one in Davis based on the individual circumstances of that case, highlighting the fact that the very nature of individualized sentencing makes it difficult for this court, reviewing a well-reasoned decision by a district court with day-to-day expertise in sentencing, to conclude that a sentence is unreasonable merely by looking at the extent of the variance.", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"If the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a", "legal_conclusion_b": "affirming a sentence of probation where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 24 to 36 months in prison based on the specific facts of the case", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.\"). Moreover, the cost of additional procedures and the details of their implementation are matters peculiarly suited to the experience of the district court and the knowledge of the parties.", "case": "See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 n. 33, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (\u201cLeeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \u201d); cf. United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court has \u201cbroad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\u201d in desegregation cases).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that a district court has \"broad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\" in desegregation cases", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "But, as the Supreme Court has noted, escape from custody is a \"continuing offense.\" McCargo's admission that he acquired the gun for \"protection\" is therefore sufficient to show that he possessed it in connection with the felony -- and that such possession was not merely coincidental.", "case": "See Spurgeon, 117 F.3d at 644 (the \u201cdefendant\u2019s own assertion that he had the weapon for protection\u201d indicated that the possession of the firearm was in connection with a narcotics felony); see also United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that \u201cin light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5), every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being \u2018in connection with\u2019 the escape\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding that \"in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of SS 2K2.1(b", "legal_conclusion_b": "the \"defendant's own assertion that he had the weapon for protection\" indicated that the possession of the firearm was in connection with a narcotics felony", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Defendants argue that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling issues since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court, however, is unwilling to read FIFRA's preemption so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption' provisions.", "case": "Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144, 83 S.Ct. at 1218. Instead, the court finds the reasoning of the Fourth and First Circuits persuasive and holds that \u201cclaims for negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating ... are not preempted by FIFRA.\u201d Worm v. American Cyanamid, 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); Williams v. State of Louisiana, 640 So.2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1st Cir.1994); see also DerGazarian v. Dow Chem., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F.Supp. 503, 507 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study); cf. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices).", "legal_conclusion_a": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices", "legal_conclusion_b": "FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "This evidence is of limited value for two reasons. First, Ms. Simpson provides no information that would allow the Court to determine whether the Program Management Division employs African-Americans at rates significantly below their number in the applicant pool or general population.", "case": "See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 901 (plaintiff \u201cproffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole.\u201d); see also Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1295 n. 11 (\u201cFor instance, if a female plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the general population may well help her case.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"For instance, if a female plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the general population may well help her case.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "plaintiff \"proffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole.\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Swenson's key complaint relates to the arbitrator's ex parte contact with the expert, and the arbitrator's subsequent failure to accurately disclose the substance of his discussions with the expert. Although the arbitrator should not have contacted the expert ex parte, Swenson has failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice.", "case": "See Employers Ins. v. Nat\u2019l Union, 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir.1991) (vacatur inappropriate where party failed to show prejudice from ex parte contacts); cf. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. N. Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir.1979) (award vacated in part because the \u201cex parte receipt of evidence bearing on this matter constituted ... prejudice] to Totem\u2019s rights\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "award vacated in part because the \"ex parte receipt of evidence bearing on this matter constituted ... prejudice] to Totem's rights\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "vacatur inappropriate where party failed to show prejudice from ex parte contacts", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "In the present case, the majority views HRFs quarter of Section 8 as the \"land in question.\" One would therefore expect, if it were following the majority's analysis, that the Venetie Court would have narrowly considered whether just the land on which the school was to be built was a dependent Indian community. But the Court decidedly did not do so. Instead, the Court in Venetie looked at all of the land that previously composed the Venetie Reservation--not just the site of the proposed school--to determine whether that land constituted a dependent Indian community.", "case": "Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cIn this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is \u2018Indian country.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis added); see also id. at 532, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cThe Tribe\u2019s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"In this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is 'Indian country.'\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Other bankruptcy courts have specifically rejected claimed exemptions under that state's trustee process statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.", "case": "See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992).", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding", "legal_conclusion_b": "noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "However, as the Supreme Court observed in Morgan, \"discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.\"", "case": "Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 220 (\u201cThe law is clear that termination and promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period.\u201d); Butts, 2007 WL 259937, at *7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6534, at *22-23; see also Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat\u2019l Lab., 424 F.Supp.2d 545, 560 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (\u201c[T]he exception does not apply to discrete, completed employment actions such as transfers, failures to promote, demotions, or inadequate wages.\u201d) (citations omitted).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"The law is clear that termination and promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period.\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"[T]he exception does not apply to discrete, completed employment actions such as transfers, failures to promote, demotions, or inadequate wages.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Indeed, irreparable harm may be presumed with the finding of a violation of the First Amendment.", "case": "See Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (\u201cThe loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury\u201d) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)); see also Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169 (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (\u201cIt is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights \u2018unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.\u2019 \u201d)) (additional citations omitted).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 'unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.' \"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Having reviewed the parties' prenuptial agreement, we are satisfied that it does not abrogate Ms. Shaffer's right to support. The agreement does not provide that there has been a full and fair disclosure to both parties of the marital property rights waived.", "case": "See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support).", "legal_conclusion_a": "prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support", "legal_conclusion_b": "full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "The court finds that the Terms and Conditions are a \"complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement\" under Iowa Code section 554.2202, and, therefore, the agreement is fully integrated.", "case": "See Iowa Code \u00a7 554.2202 (providing that, if \u201cthe court finds the writing to have been intended ... as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement,\u201d the agreement cannot be supplemented \u201cby evidence of consistent additional terms\u201d); see also Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 291 (noting that, under the parol evidence rule, a party cannot supplement a fully integrated agreement with extrinsic evidence); Levien Leasing Co., 380 N.W.2d at 750 (\u201cA contract with an integration clause typically represents the complete agreement of the parties and .any- extrinsic evidence which varies, adds, or subtracts from its terms is barred by the parol evidence rule.\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that, under the parol evidence rule, a party cannot supplement a fully integrated agreement with extrinsic evidence", "legal_conclusion_b": "finding that the parties intended a subsequent written agreement to be a final expression when the parties acted in compliance with the written terms", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Public officials have been convicted for being influenced in the performance of their duties in return for bribes paid to third parties.", "case": "See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341-42 (4th Cir.2012) (Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman\u2019s wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165\u2014 66 (11th Cir.2011) (Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.); cf. United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201cA participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants\u2019 honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\u201d) (internal citations omitted).", "legal_conclusion_a": "Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman's wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"A participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants' honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.", "case": "See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action).", "legal_conclusion_a": "cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.", "case": "See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008).", "legal_conclusion_a": "denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "This failure to notify third parties would have no bearing on J & R's restitution claim against Mississippi Valley itself. In some cases, however, such an arrangement may prevent the restitution claimant from asserting priority against the claims of the bailee's other creditors.", "case": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (\u201c[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\u201d); see also Matter of Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir.1988) (denying constructive trust where \u201c[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "\"[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "denying constructive trust where \"[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": ". Appellants must establish standing based on future harm, since their previous title insurance purchases do not constitute a continuing injury. As the District Court held, the existing rates do not constitute a cognizable legal injury under the filed rate doctrine.", "case": "Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47 (stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"); see also Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18 (\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate\u2019 ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\u201d). Thus, Appellants must establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair rates.", "legal_conclusion_a": "stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate' ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "Lastly, the argument here that the jury could find sufficient proof on this record of venue by a preponderance of the evidence is particularly cogent because, unlike some of our prior cases, there was no evidence before the jury that Mr. Kelly committed any of the charged criminal conduct in any place other than where he was tried, the District of Utah. Accordingly, there were no competing venue possibilities.", "case": "See Miller, 111 F.3d at 751 (noting that a jury\u2019s guilty verdict signals a proper finding of venue \u201c[wjhere the entirety of the defendant\u2019s illegal activity is alleged to have taken place within the trial jurisdiction, and no trial evidence is proffered that the illegal act was committed in some other place or that the place alleged is not within the jurisdiction\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that a jury's guilty verdict signals a proper finding of venue \"[wjhere the entirety of the defendant's illegal activity is alleged to have taken place within the trial jurisdiction, and no trial evidence is proffered that the illegal act was committed in some other place or that the place alleged is not within the jurisdiction\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "concluding that, where the theft at issue occurred in Kansas -- -where defendant was tried -- \"[tjhere is not a sufficient relationship between the fact of possession [of items from the theft] in Oklahoma and ... receiving and possessing in Kansas\" to support a finding of venue in Kansas", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.", "case": "See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue", "legal_conclusion_b": "\"The courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant's testimony.\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "16. Instead, when an employee who is eligible for FMLA leave notifies his or her employer of the need to take leave for a qualifying reason, the FMLA places the risk of ignorance on the employer.", "case": "See Stoops v. One Call Comm., Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1998) (employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed); Price, 117 F.3d at 1025-26 (employee\u2019s request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected); see also Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F.Supp. 703, 707 (D.N.J. 1997) (employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition).", "legal_conclusion_a": "employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed", "legal_conclusion_b": "employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "We recognize that disclosure may not always be possible. For example, an unclassified summary may not be possible because, in some cases, the subject matter itself may be classified and cannot be revealed without implicating national security. Depending on the circumstances, OFAC might have a legitimate interest in shielding the materials even from someone with the appropriate security clearance.", "case": "See Ott, 827 F.2d at 477 (holding, in a different context, that \u201cCongress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance\u201d); see also Gen. Dynamics, 181 S.Ct. at 1904 (noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to \u201cunauthorized disclosure of military secrets\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to \"unauthorized disclosure of military secrets\"", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding, in a different context, that \"Congress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "Subsequently, the court clerk asked every juror: \"As to the weighing, do you unanimously agree that the aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state of Connecticut outweighs the mitigating factor or factors found to exist, yes or no?\" Every juror responded \"yes,\" signifying that the jury had intended to mark \"yes,\" on the initial verdict form in responding to the question of whether the jury unanimously had agreed that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Furthermore, during an evidentiary hearing before Damiani, J., regarding the propriety of the jury's contact with the trial court after the initial verdict was recorded, all of the jurors testified that when they entered the courtroom to deliver their first verdict, their intended result was that the defendant receive the death penalty. Thus, the record clearly indicates that the jury actually found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the initial verdict form contained a scrivener's error and, therefore, was amenable to correction to indicate the jury's actual intent, was not clearly erroneous.", "case": "See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 158 N.C. App. 699, 705, 582 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict); cf. Martin v. State, 732 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1998) (evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \u201csimply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict", "legal_conclusion_b": "evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \"simply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
{"legal-claim": "When the policy means to refer to defense costs ... it expressly does so, avoiding the confusion that is [the insurer's] downfall here\"). In other words, IICNA's \"plain language\" argument fails.", "case": "See also Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 729 F.Supp. 728, 732-33 (W.D.Wash.1989) (finding policy ambiguous as to whether defense costs were included within liability limit, \u201cin the absence of any clear statement that defense costs are included within the cap,\u201d and commenting \u201c[i]f [the insurer] intended the \u2018limit of liability\u2019 to apply to all losses, rather than only the amounts needed to resolve claims against the insureds, it would have been a simple matter for [the insurer] to have made that clear\u201d); cf. International Ins. Co. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 1992 WL 547721 (C.D.Cal.1992) (finding an insurance policy obligating a primary insurer to indemnify for \u201cdamages\u201d which were defined to include \u201ccosts, charges and expenses\u201d not to be a DWL or \u201cself-reducing\u201d policy).", "legal_conclusion_a": "finding an insurance policy obligating a primary insurer to indemnify for \"damages\" which were defined to include \"costs, charges and expenses\" not to be a DWL or \"self-reducing\" policy", "legal_conclusion_b": "finding policy ambiguous as to whether defense costs were included within liability limit, \"in the absence of any clear statement that defense costs are included within the cap,\" and commenting \"[i]f [the insurer] intended the 'limit of liability' to apply to all losses, rather than only the amounts needed to resolve claims against the insureds, it would have been a simple matter for [the insurer] to have made that clear\"", "correct_choice": "b"}
{"legal-claim": "We conclude Coleman's evidence was insufficient to show constructive discharge, a hostile work environment, or any adverse employment action; rather, the evidence showed her treatment by supervisors was due to her poor performance.", "case": "See Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir.2000) (holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term, condition, or privilege of employment); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156-59 (8th Cir.1999) (holding prima facie case of discrimination includes showing of adverse employment action; constructive discharge could satisfy element of adverse employment action, but there was no constructive discharge where evidence did not support that discrimination, rather than actual performance problems, prompted reprimands and poor evaluations); see also Helfter v. UPS, Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony, \u201cstanding alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly-supported motion for summary judgment\u201d).", "legal_conclusion_a": "holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term, condition, or privilege of employment", "legal_conclusion_b": "holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony, \"standing alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly-supported motion for summary judgment\"", "correct_choice": "a"}
