# Staff Security Engineer — Round 2 Review

**Branch**: `colonyos/recovery-b69f562da7`
**PRD**: `cOS_prds/20260402_022155_prd_you_are_a_code_assistant_working_on_behalf_of_the_engineering_team_the_following.md`

## Checklist

### Completeness
- [x] FR-1: `max_task_retries` field added to `RecoveryConfig` with default 1
- [x] FR-2: `previous_error` parameter added to `_build_single_task_implement_prompt()`, truncated to `incident_char_cap`
- [x] FR-3: `_clean_working_tree()` helper implemented with `git checkout -- .` + `git clean -fd`
- [x] FR-4: Retry loop wraps task failure handling in `_run_sequential_implement()`
- [x] FR-5: `task_retry` recovery events logged with task_id, attempt, error, success
- [x] FR-6: `max_task_retries` parsed and validated in `_parse_recovery_config()`
- [x] All tasks complete, no TODO/placeholder code

### Quality
- [x] All 218 tests pass (22 new + 196 existing, zero regressions)
- [x] Code follows existing project conventions (same patterns as `max_phase_retries`)
- [x] No new dependencies added
- [x] No unrelated changes included
- [x] Dead test stub removed (prior round feedback addressed)

### Safety
- [x] No secrets or credentials in committed code
- [x] Existing `_is_secret_like_path()` filtering preserved for git staging
- [x] Error handling present — `_clean_working_tree` catches OSError/TimeoutExpired, logs warnings, never raises
- [x] Safety-net fallback now populates `task_results` with `setdefault` (prior round feedback addressed)

## Security Assessment

### Prior Round Issues — Resolved

1. **Dead code in tests** — Empty `TestCleanWorkingTree` stub removed. Clean.
2. **Incomplete safety-net** — `task_results.setdefault(task_id, {...})` now populates on the defensive path. Uses `setdefault` correctly to avoid overwriting legitimate entries.

### Remaining Observations (Non-blocking)

1. **Error messages injected into prompts without sanitization** (Low risk) — `previous_error` is truncated to `incident_char_cap` (4000 chars) but not passed through `sanitize_untrusted_content()`. The error originates from the same execution sandbox (either `run_phase_sync` result or a caught exception), so the threat model is self-injection only. The truncation bounds the payload. Recommend adding sanitization in a follow-up for defense-in-depth.

2. **No upper bound on `max_task_retries`** (Low risk) — Validation only checks `>= 0`. A misconfigured value of 50 would burn budget retrying a fundamentally broken task. Per-task budget caps limit financial blast radius, but recommend adding `min(value, 5)` or similar ceiling in a follow-up. The PRD's open question #1 acknowledges this.

3. **`_drain_injected_context()` runs inside the retry loop** (Cosmetic) — If the injection provider is destructive (queue-drain semantics), the retry attempt gets empty injected context. Not a security issue, but worth documenting.

4. **Destructive git commands are appropriately scoped** — `_clean_working_tree()` runs `git checkout -- .` and `git clean -fd` scoped to `repo_root` via `cwd=`. The 30-second timeout prevents hangs. Error handling is correct — logs warnings, never raises, second command runs even if first fails. This is the right defensive design.

5. **Recovery event audit trail is solid** — Both the exception path and normal failure path log `task_retry` events with consistent structure (`task_id`, `attempt`, `error`, `success`). This provides the audit trail needed to detect anomalous retry patterns.

---

VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/orchestrator.py]: `previous_error` injected into retry prompt without `sanitize_untrusted_content()` — low risk since error originates from same sandbox, recommend follow-up
- [src/colonyos/config.py]: No upper bound on `max_task_retries` — per-task budget caps limit blast radius, recommend ceiling in follow-up
- [src/colonyos/orchestrator.py]: `_drain_injected_context()` inside retry loop may yield empty context on retries if provider is destructive — cosmetic

SYNTHESIS:
The two issues from round 1 (dead test code, incomplete safety-net) have been cleanly addressed. The implementation is well-scoped and security-conscious: destructive git commands are properly sandboxed with timeouts and error handling, sensitive file filtering is preserved, error truncation bounds prompt injection surface, and the audit trail provides full observability. The remaining observations are all low-risk, non-blocking items suitable for follow-up. Ship it.
