# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 2)

## Staff Security Engineer Review — Complete

**VERDICT: request-changes**

### Key Findings

1. **CRITICAL — `git add -A` stages secrets** (`orchestrator.py`): The sequential runner uses `git add -A` to stage files after each task, which blindly captures `.env`, `credentials.json`, private keys, and any other sensitive untracked files. This directly contradicts the project's own `preflight_recovery.md` which explicitly says *"Do not use broad staging commands like `git add .` or `git add -A`"* and *"Never commit secret-like files"*. The rest of the codebase carefully avoids this. **Must fix before merge** — replace with selective staging that filters against the existing `SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS` list, or at minimum use `git add -u` (tracked files only).

2. **Missing timeouts on subprocess calls** (`orchestrator.py`): The `git add` and `git commit` subprocess calls lack `timeout=30`, unlike every other subprocess call in the codebase. A hung git process would block the pipeline indefinitely.

3. **No per-task audit trail**: The runner tracks status/cost/duration but doesn't capture *what files* each agent modified. For a system running arbitrary code in user repos, `git diff --stat` before each commit would provide basic forensics.

4. **Minor**: Task descriptions used unsanitized in commit messages; `import time`/`import re` inlined in function body instead of module top-level.

### What's Good

- All 10 functional requirements implemented, 72 tests pass
- Sound architecture: per-task agent sessions with commits between them
- DAG-aware failure handling works correctly (BLOCKED propagation, independent task continuation)
- Parallel mode preserved as opt-in with appropriate warning log
- Clean, well-structured code overall

The review artifact has been saved to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/`.
