# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 2)

## Staff Security Engineer — Review Complete

VERDICT: **approve** ✅

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/slack_queue.py]: Passive message flow correctly suppresses all user-visible side effects (👀, queue-full warnings) until triage confirms actionability. No information leakage vectors identified.
- [src/colonyos/slack.py]: `extract_prompt_text()` does not introduce new sanitization gaps. Passive messages take a simpler path (strip only), but downstream `sanitize_slack_content()` applies uniformly.
- [src/colonyos/daemon.py]: Startup warnings are advisory. Hard enforcement of `allowed_user_ids` remains a v2 consideration per PRD consensus.
- [src/colonyos/config.py]: One-line change to add `"all"` to valid trigger modes. No config migration needed.

SYNTHESIS:
From a supply chain and least-privilege perspective, this change is well-contained. The critical security invariant — that `should_process_message()` is the single chokepoint for all access control decisions — is preserved and completely untouched by this diff. All five filters (channel allowlist, bot rejection, edit rejection, thread rejection, sender allowlist) continue to apply uniformly to both mention and passive messages. The expanded input surface increases prompt injection volume reaching the triage LLM, but this is a pre-existing risk properly gated by existing controls. Information leakage is prevented through conditional 👀 reactions and suppressed queue-full warnings for passive messages. The `is_passive` flag provides adequate audit trail differentiation. All 318 tests pass with 0 regressions. Approved.

Review artifact written to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260401_143000_round1_you_are_a_code_assistant_working_on_behalf_of_the_engineering_team_the_following.md`.
