# Security Review — Staff Security Engineer, Round 1

## Branch: `colonyos/colonyos_needs_to_be_fully_autonomous_we_deploy_it_to_a_project_on_a_vm_it_liste`
## PRD: `cOS_prds/20260329_155000_prd_colonyos_needs_to_be_fully_autonomous_we_deploy_it_to_a_project_on_a_vm_it_liste.md`

---

## Summary

**The implementation does not exist.** The branch is at the same commit as `main` (`e717237`). There are zero commits ahead of main. The working tree contains unmerged conflicts from what appears to be a failed merge or rebase of another branch's changes, plus a partial implementation of the `QueueItem.priority` field in `models.py`. None of the core daemon files, security controls, or infrastructure described in the PRD have been created.

---

## Completeness Assessment

| Functional Requirement | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| FR-1: `colonyos daemon` command | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | `daemon.py` does not exist |
| FR-2: GitHub Issue Polling | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No `poll_new_issues()` function |
| FR-3: Priority Queue | ⚠️ ~10% DONE | `priority` field added to `QueueItem`, `compute_priority()` helper written. Queue executor NOT modified for priority ordering. No starvation promotion. |
| FR-4: CEO Idle-Fill Scheduling | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | |
| FR-5: Cleanup Scheduling | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | |
| FR-6: Daily Budget Enforcement | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | **CRITICAL** — this is the primary cost-safety control for unattended operation |
| FR-7: Circuit Breaker | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | |
| FR-8: Crash Recovery on Startup | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | |
| FR-9: Atomic State Persistence | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | `queue.json` still uses non-atomic write |
| FR-10: Health & Observability | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No `/healthz`, no heartbeat, no digest |
| FR-11: Slack Kill Switch | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | **CRITICAL** — no human kill switch for autonomous operation |
| FR-12: DaemonConfig | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No `DaemonConfig` dataclass, no `allowed_control_user_ids` |

**Task file**: All 50+ subtasks across 9 task groups are marked `[ ]` (not done).

**Missing files** (all flagged as NEW in task file):
- `src/colonyos/daemon.py`
- `src/colonyos/daemon_state.py`
- `deploy/colonyos-daemon.service`
- `deploy/README.md`
- `tests/test_daemon.py`
- `tests/test_daemon_state.py`

---

## Security-Critical Findings

### CRITICAL: No implementation means no safety controls

The PRD describes a system that runs **arbitrary code autonomously 24/7 with `bypassPermissions`**. The entire security model depends on controls that have not been built:

1. **No `allowed_control_user_ids` enforcement** — Without this, any Slack user in the workspace can trigger arbitrary code execution on the VM. The existing `watch` command's empty allowlist with `bypassPermissions` is the current state, and nothing has changed.

2. **No daily budget cap** — There is no `daily_budget_usd` enforcement. A runaway loop or adversarial prompt could consume the entire API budget in hours.

3. **No circuit breaker** — Consecutive failures will not halt execution. A poisoned queue item that always fails will retry indefinitely.

4. **No kill switch** — No "pause"/"stop" Slack commands exist. The only way to stop a daemon would be `kill` on the VM or systemd stop.

5. **No PID lock file** — Multiple daemon instances could run against the same repo, causing concurrent git mutations and queue corruption.

6. **No atomic state persistence** — `queue.json` is still written with `Path.write_text(json.dumps(...))`. A crash during write corrupts the queue with no recovery path.

### MEDIUM: Unmerged conflicts in working tree

The branch has 8 files in `UU` (unmerged) state including `config.py` and `pyproject.toml`. This means the branch cannot be built, tested, or merged. The conflicts appear to be from unrelated TUI/memory feature branch changes that leaked into this branch's staging area.

### LOW: `compute_priority()` bug signal detection is keyword-only

The implemented `compute_priority()` uses a frozen set of English keywords (`bug`, `crash`, `broken`, etc.) matched against labels. This is:
- Easily bypassable (attacker labels issue "enhancement" but content is malicious)
- Not a security boundary — priority is a scheduling concern, not a trust boundary

This is acceptable for V1 but worth noting.

---

## What Was Actually Implemented (Staged, Not Committed)

1. `QueueItem.priority: int = 1` field added, schema version bumped to 4 (`models.py`)
2. `compute_priority()` helper function (`models.py`)
3. Tests for priority field and `compute_priority()` (`tests/test_models.py`)
4. Tests for instruction template quality (`tests/test_instructions.py`) — this appears unrelated to the daemon PRD
5. Partial test additions to `tests/test_config.py` — unclear if daemon-related due to merge conflicts

**None of the above are committed** — they exist only in the staging area alongside unmerged conflicts.

---

## Verdict

VERDICT: request-changes

FINDINGS:
- [branch]: Branch has zero commits ahead of main — no implementation exists to review
- [working tree]: 8 files in unmerged conflict state — branch is unbuildable
- [src/colonyos/daemon.py]: File does not exist — core daemon orchestration is entirely missing
- [src/colonyos/daemon_state.py]: File does not exist — no DaemonState, no atomic persistence, no budget tracking
- [src/colonyos/config.py]: DaemonConfig not implemented — no `allowed_control_user_ids`, no `daily_budget_usd`
- [src/colonyos/cli.py]: No `daemon` CLI command added
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: No `/healthz` endpoint
- [deploy/]: No systemd unit file, no deployment guide
- [FR-6 daily budget]: NOT IMPLEMENTED — primary cost-safety control for unattended operation is missing
- [FR-11 kill switch]: NOT IMPLEMENTED — no human override mechanism for autonomous execution
- [FR-7 circuit breaker]: NOT IMPLEMENTED — no protection against runaway failure loops
- [FR-8 crash recovery]: NOT IMPLEMENTED — orphaned RUNNING items will not be cleaned up on restart
- [FR-9 atomic writes]: NOT IMPLEMENTED — queue.json corruption risk remains

SYNTHESIS:
As Staff Security Engineer, I cannot approve a branch that claims to implement a 24/7 autonomous daemon but contains zero committed code. The PRD describes a system with extreme privilege — `bypassPermissions`, unattended execution, access to API tokens and git credentials — and every single safety control (budget caps, circuit breakers, kill switches, allowed user lists, atomic state persistence, crash recovery) is entirely absent. The branch is additionally unbuildable due to 8 unmerged conflict files. This needs to go back to implementation. When it does come back for review, I will be paying particular attention to: (1) `allowed_control_user_ids` being mandatory and non-empty in daemon mode, (2) daily budget enforcement being a hard gate checked before every pipeline run, (3) atomic state writes for both queue and daemon state, (4) the systemd unit file using `ProtectSystem=strict` and `PrivateTmp=yes`, and (5) the Slack kill switch being functional even when the queue executor thread is blocked.
