# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 1)

## Review Complete

**VERDICT: approve**

Here's my assessment as Staff Security Engineer:

### Summary

The task-level retry implementation is clean and well-scoped. All 6 functional requirements from the PRD are implemented, all 218 tests pass (22 new), and the code follows existing project conventions faithfully.

### Key Security Findings

1. **Error injection into prompts (Low risk)** — Error messages from failed tasks are truncated to `incident_char_cap` (4000 chars) but not run through `sanitize_untrusted_content()` before being injected into the retry prompt. Acceptable for v1 since the error originates from the same execution sandbox, but worth adding sanitization in a follow-up.

2. **No ceiling on `max_task_retries` (Low risk)** — Only validates `>= 0`, no upper bound. A misconfigured value of 100 would burn budget on a genuinely broken task. Per-task budget caps limit blast radius, but recommend adding `min(value, 3)` in a follow-up.

3. **Destructive git commands handled well** — `_clean_working_tree()` runs `git checkout -- .` and `git clean -fd` with proper error handling (catches OSError/TimeoutExpired, logs warnings, doesn't raise). Good defensive design.

4. **Recovery event logging is solid** — Both the exception path and normal failure path log `task_retry` events with consistent structure, providing full audit trail.

Neither finding is blocking. The review has been written to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260402_022155_round1_you_are_a_code_assistant_working_on_behalf_of_the_engineering_team_the_following.md`.
