# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 3)

## Review Complete — Staff Security Engineer, Round 1

**VERDICT: approve**

### Key Security Findings

The implementation is **well-defended** across all critical security boundaries:

1. **Tool restriction is runtime-enforced** — The verify agent's `allowed_tools=["Read", "Bash", "Glob", "Grep"]` is enforced by the SDK at runtime, not just by instruction text. Defense-in-depth.

2. **Core invariant holds: never open a broken PR** — `_fail_run_log()` + `return log` hard-blocks delivery when tests fail after all fix attempts. Three integration tests verify this.

3. **Two-agent audit separation** — Verify (observe) and fix (modify) produce separate `PhaseResult` entries, enabling clean post-incident forensics.

4. **Structured sentinel parsing** — `VERIFY_RESULT: PASS/FAIL` eliminates the false-positive vulnerability, with 16 unit tests covering edge cases.

5. **Dual budget guards** — Before every verify AND every fix iteration, preventing runaway costs.

6. **No secrets in committed code** — Clean.

7. **All 55 verify-specific tests pass** with zero regressions across the full suite.

### Accepted Risks (non-blocking)

- `_verify_detected_failures()` is fail-open on ambiguous output (sentinel makes this narrow)
- Unsanitized test output in fix prompt (consistent with existing threat model — user's own repo)
- `Phase.FIX` reuse makes verify-fix indistinguishable from review-fix by enum alone (phase ordering disambiguates)

Review artifact written to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260401_231500_round1_when_you_should_run_the_cli_tests_before_deliver_4c1d93388a.md`.
