# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 2)

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## Review Complete — Staff Security Engineer, Round 2

VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/orchestrator.py:4680]: Decision Gate phase does not call `_inject_repo_map()` — low impact, accepted gap from Round 1
- [src/colonyos/repo_map.py:extract_python_symbols]: No max file size check before `read_text()` — potential OOM on very large tracked files (V1.1 suggestion)
- [src/colonyos/repo_map.py:SENSITIVE_PATTERNS]: Denylist missing `*.p12`, `*.pfx`, `id_rsa*`, `*token*` patterns — minor coverage gap
- [src/colonyos/orchestrator.py:2240]: Redundant local import of `generate_repo_map` inside `run_ceo()` (module-level import exists at line 47)

SYNTHESIS:
From a security perspective, this implementation is well above average for a module that touches arbitrary repository contents. The attack surface is minimal: the module reads files (never executes them), uses `ast.parse()` (not `eval`), avoids `shell=True`, enforces a hardcoded sensitive-file denylist that cannot be overridden by user config, and has no persistent state that could be poisoned. The fail-closed patterns (30s timeout, try/except wrapping in the orchestrator) ensure that malformed repos degrade gracefully rather than crashing the pipeline. The only substantive suggestions — adding a file size cap and expanding the sensitive denylist — are defense-in-depth improvements for V1.1, not blockers. All prior round findings have been resolved. All 655 tests pass. Ship it.