# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 3)

## Staff Security Engineer Review — Round 3 Complete

**VERDICT: approve**

### Summary

All 5 findings from my Round 2 review have been fixed with test coverage:

| Previous Finding | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `git add -A` stages secrets | **CRITICAL** | ✅ Fixed — selective staging with `_is_secret_like_path()` filter |
| Missing subprocess timeouts | **HIGH** | ✅ Fixed — all 4 calls have `timeout=30` |
| No per-task audit trail | **MEDIUM** | ✅ Fixed — logs modified + excluded files |
| Unsanitized commit messages | **MEDIUM** | ✅ Fixed — `sanitize_untrusted_content()` applied |
| Inlined imports | **LOW** | ✅ Fixed — moved to module level |

### Remaining LOW-severity observations (not blocking):

1. **`_inject_memory_block()` not wired into sequential path** — learnings ARE loaded via `load_learnings_for_injection()`, so this is a feature gap, not a security hole
2. **`_drain_injected_context()` skipped in sequential path** — injection provider is system-controlled, no external attack surface
3. **Completed-tasks context grows linearly** — cosmetic concern for 10+ task chains
4. **Secret filter doesn't cover `.npmrc`/`.pypirc`/`*.keystore`** — matches existing codebase coverage, extend in follow-up

All 27 tests pass. No secrets in committed code. The security architecture is sound — per-task agent sessions with selective staging limits blast radius effectively.

Review artifact saved to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260329_233000_round3_when_we_implement_a_new_functionality_from_the_tasks_it_should_not_happen_in_par.md`.