# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 1)

## Staff Security Engineer — Review Complete

VERDICT: **approve** ✅

FINDINGS:
- **[src/colonyos/slack.py]**: `extract_prompt_text()` passes raw user text to triage — same trust level as existing `extract_prompt_from_mention()`, but broader exposure in "all" mode. Pre-existing concern, not introduced by this change.
- **[src/colonyos/daemon.py]**: Startup warnings are appropriate severity. Hard enforcement of `allowed_user_ids` deferred per PRD consensus — acceptable for v1.
- **[src/colonyos/slack_queue.py]**: All existing security filters in `should_process_message()` remain intact and unchanged. Dedup logic correctly prevents double-processing.

SYNTHESIS:
This is a clean, minimal implementation that correctly activates an existing but unwired configuration path. The key security question — whether expanding the event surface from @mentions to all messages bypasses existing access controls — is answered clearly: **it does not**. The channel allowlist, sender allowlist, bot rejection, thread rejection, and edit rejection filters all remain intact and unchanged in `should_process_message()`. Dedup infrastructure correctly prevents dual-event delivery from doubling budget spend. The conditional 👀 reaction prevents information leakage about the bot's passive monitoring. Startup warnings for missing safety configs are a reasonable v1 compromise. The only amplified risk is prompt injection volume (more untrusted input reaching triage), but this is pre-existing and properly gated. All 316 tests pass. All 8 functional requirements implemented. Approved.

Review artifact written to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260401_140000_round1_you_are_a_code_assistant_working_on_behalf_of_the_engineering_team_the_following.md`.