# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 3)

## Review Complete — Staff Security Engineer

**VERDICT: approve**

**FINDINGS:**
- [.github/workflows/release.yml]: Credential helper pattern correctly prevents token leakage in logs — verified post-fix
- [deploy/provision.sh]: API key prompts use `read -rs` (silent mode) — verified post-fix
- [deploy/provision.sh]: Env file created with `chmod 600` and warning about systemd-creds for production — good defense-in-depth
- [scripts/generate-homebrew-formula.sh]: SHA-256 validation is strict (64 lowercase hex, exact-version file path) — no supply chain bypass vector
- [.github/workflows/release.yml]: All GitHub Actions pinned to full commit SHAs — supply chain safe
- [deploy/provision.sh]: No `curl | sh` patterns — uses signed apt repos with GPG verification for Node.js and GitHub CLI
- [src/colonyos/init.py]: Non-git-repo guard prevents `.colonyos/` in overly broad directories — addresses PRD security concern
- [scripts/generate-homebrew-formula.sh]: `setuptools<78` pin will need monitoring — not a security issue but a maintenance tripwire

**SYNTHESIS:**
From a security perspective, this PR is well-hardened after the two fix iterations. The three areas I care most about — credential handling, supply chain integrity, and least privilege — are all properly addressed. The credential helper pattern in the release workflow is the right approach (not just "good enough"), preventing token exposure in logs, process tables, and git traces. The provisioning script avoids the classic `curl | sh` anti-pattern in favor of signed apt repositories with GPG verification, which is exactly what I'd expect for a script that runs as root on production VMs. The `chmod 600` env file with a `systemd-creds` recommendation strikes the right balance between usability and security posture. The SHA-256 validation in the formula generator is strict and uses exact-version file paths rather than globs, closing the door on accidental tarball substitution. No secrets in committed code, no excessive permissions, no unsigned package sources. Ship it.

Review saved to `cOS_reviews/reviews/staff_security_engineer/20260330_182656_round2_add_brew_installation_we_should_be_able_to_have.md`.