# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 1)

Now I have a complete picture. Here is my review:

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## Staff Security Engineer Review

### Checklist Assessment

**Completeness:**
- ❌ **FR-2 (Reuse Slack Triage Infrastructure)**: `slack.py` was NOT modified. Task 8.0 (refactor shared triage logic) is entirely missing. The router is a standalone implementation, not a refactored extraction from the existing battle-tested `triage_message()`.
- ❌ **FR-4 (REPL integration)**: Task 7.0 is not implemented — routing only exists in the `run` command, not the REPL.
- ❌ **FR-8 (Audit Logging)**: Task 9.0 is not implemented. `_log_router_decision()` is **called in cli.py line 630** but **does not exist** in `router.py`. This is a **runtime crash** — any routed query will fail with `ImportError`.
- ❌ Task file has all items unchecked despite partial implementation.
- ✅ FR-1 (Intent Classification): Four categories implemented correctly.
- ✅ FR-3 (Two-stage design for questions): Implemented.
- ✅ FR-5 (Fallback behavior): Fail-open on low confidence and parse failures.
- ✅ FR-6 (`--no-triage` CLI flag): Implemented.
- ✅ FR-7 (Configuration): `RouterConfig` implemented with validation.

**Quality:**
- ❌ 1 pre-existing test failure in `test_config.py::TestLoadConfig::test_returns_defaults_when_no_config` (model default mismatch).
- ✅ 60 new tests pass across test_router.py, test_config.py, test_models.py.
- ✅ Code follows existing project conventions (dataclass patterns, config parsing style, test structure).
- ✅ No unnecessary dependencies added.

**Safety (Security Engineer Focus):**
- ✅ **Least privilege is excellent**: Router agent has `allowed_tools=[]` (zero tools). Q&A agent has only `["Read", "Glob", "Grep"]`. No Write, Edit, or Bash access. This is the correct security posture.
- ✅ **Input sanitization is consistent**: Both `_build_router_prompt()` and `_build_qa_prompt()` call `sanitize_untrusted_content()` on user input before embedding in prompts. This mitigates prompt injection from user-supplied queries.
- ✅ **Budget caps enforced**: $0.05 for classification, $0.50 (configurable) for Q&A. Limits blast radius of any abuse.
- ✅ **STATUS category `suggested_command` is displayed, not executed**: The router outputs a command string for status queries, but it's only printed to the user via `click.echo()`, never passed to `subprocess` or `os.system()`. This is correct — avoids command injection.
- ✅ **No secrets or credentials in committed code**.
- ✅ **Frozen dataclass for RouterResult**: Immutability prevents post-classification tampering.
- ⚠️ **Missing audit trail is a security gap**: FR-8 (`_log_router_decision`) was supposed to log all routing decisions to `.colonyos/runs/triage_<timestamp>.json`. Without this, there is no forensic record of what the router decided and why. When an agent acts on user input — especially with the fail-open behavior — you need an audit trail to detect misrouting (e.g., a crafted prompt that gets classified as `out_of_scope` when it should have triggered pipeline work, or vice versa).
- ⚠️ **Q&A template loaded from disk at runtime**: `_QA_TEMPLATE_PATH` reads `instructions/qa.md` from the package directory. If someone modifies the installed package on disk, they could alter the Q&A agent's system prompt. This is an acceptable trust boundary for a local dev tool, but worth noting.

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VERDICT: request-changes

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/cli.py:613]: Imports `_log_router_decision` from `colonyos.router` which does not exist — **runtime crash** (`ImportError`) when any routed query is processed. This makes the entire routing feature non-functional.
- [src/colonyos/router.py]: Missing `_log_router_decision()` function (FR-8 / Task 9.0). Audit logging of routing decisions is a security requirement — without it, there is no way to review what the router classified and why.
- [src/colonyos/cli.py]: REPL integration (FR-4 / Task 7.0) is missing — routing only applies to `colonyos run`, not the REPL feature prompt path.
- [src/colonyos/slack.py]: Slack triage refactor (FR-2 / Task 8.0) is entirely missing — no shared logic extracted, `triage_message()` unchanged.
- [cOS_tasks/]: All task checkboxes remain unchecked despite partial implementation being present.
- [tests/test_config.py]: Pre-existing test failure (`test_returns_defaults_when_no_config`) — model default mismatch between test expectation and code.

SYNTHESIS:
From a security perspective, the implemented portions show strong security discipline: zero-tool router, read-only Q&A agent, consistent input sanitization, budget caps, and safe handling of suggested commands. The principle of least privilege is well-applied across both the classification and Q&A stages. However, the implementation cannot ship because it has a **hard runtime crash** — `_log_router_decision` is imported but never defined, meaning every routed query will fail with an ImportError. Beyond the crash, the missing audit logging (FR-8) is a security-critical gap: when an agent system makes autonomous routing decisions about user intent, you need an audit trail to detect misclassification, potential prompt injection bypass, or abuse patterns. The missing REPL and Slack integrations are functional gaps but less urgent from a security standpoint. Fix the import crash and implement audit logging before this can be approved.