# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 3)

## Review Complete

Here is my assessment as **Staff Security Engineer**:

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VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: `_config_to_dict()` uses blocklist pattern (asdict + pop) not allowlist — new sensitive fields added to ColonyConfig will be exposed by default; should either switch to allowlist or add a maintenance comment
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: `/api/runs/{run_id}` endpoint returns `asdict(show_result)` without sanitization, unlike `/api/runs` which sanitizes prompt/error; inconsistent defense-in-depth
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: Unused `JSONResponse` import on line 18
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: No rate limiting on endpoints; acceptable for localhost V1 but `/api/stats` reads all run files on each request

SYNTHESIS:
This implementation is solid from a security standpoint for a localhost-only, read-only dashboard. The critical controls are all correct: 127.0.0.1 binding, GET-only API surface with 405 enforcement tests, path traversal validation on run IDs, SPA catch-all path confinement via `Path.resolve().is_relative_to()`, XSS sanitization on user-facing fields, CORS gated behind a dev-only env var, and no write operations exposed. The round 2 findings were addressed in the latest commit. The one remaining concern worth tracking is the **blocklist pattern for config redaction** — `asdict()` + pop is fragile against future field additions. If `ColonyConfig` ever gains API keys or webhook secrets, this pattern will silently expose them. The unsanitized `/api/runs/{run_id}` detail endpoint is low risk given React's safe JSX rendering but should be addressed for defense-in-depth consistency. All 127 tests pass, no secrets in committed code, no destructive operations. Approving with these noted for the backlog.