# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 2)

## Review Complete

Here is my assessment as **Staff Security Engineer**:

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VERDICT: **approve**

FINDINGS:
- **[src/colonyos/orchestrator.py]**: Path traversal guard validates `subdirectory` but not `filename` — defense-in-depth gap. The `path = target_dir / filename` on line 548 is not checked against the reviews root. Not currently exploitable since all callers use `slugify()`-derived filenames, but a one-line fix (`path.resolve().is_relative_to(reviews_root.resolve())`) would close it.
- **[branch-level]**: ~60% of the diff (~1,400 lines) is unrelated changes from a prior feature (CI/CD workflows, install.sh, Homebrew formula, versioning). This inflates the audit surface but doesn't block the PRD-scoped changes.

SYNTHESIS:
The implementation is security-sound. The core requirement — path traversal prevention in `_save_review_artifact()` — was implemented with a proper `.resolve().is_relative_to()` check as recommended in the PRD's Open Question 3. Filename generation is now centralized in `naming.py` with `slugify()` sanitization on all inputs (including persona slugs), eliminating 5+ ad-hoc f-string construction sites that were previously scattered across the orchestrator. The `ReviewArtifactPath` dataclass is frozen, preventing post-construction mutation. All 93 tests pass, including an explicit path traversal rejection test. The one defense-in-depth gap (filename not validated) should be a quick follow-up fix. Approving.