# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 2)

I now have a comprehensive view of the implementation. Let me write my review.

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## Security Review: ColonyOS Web Dashboard

### Completeness Assessment

All PRD functional requirements (FR1-FR5) are implemented:
- ✅ `colonyos ui` CLI command with `--port` and `--no-open` flags
- ✅ FastAPI server with all 6 GET endpoints
- ✅ Vite + React SPA with Dashboard, RunDetail, and Config pages
- ✅ Optional `[ui]` dependency group in `pyproject.toml`
- ✅ Built assets committed to `web_dist/`, package-data updated
- ✅ All 83 task items marked complete
- ✅ 27 tests pass

### Security-Specific Findings

**Positive controls in place:**

1. **Localhost-only binding** — `uvicorn.run(fast_app, host="127.0.0.1", ...)` in `cli.py`. The server never binds to `0.0.0.0`. Good.

2. **Read-only API** — Only GET routes are registered. Tests explicitly verify POST/PUT/DELETE return 405. No `save_config()` is exposed.

3. **Path traversal defense** — `validate_run_id_input()` rejects `/`, `\`, and `..` in run IDs. Tests cover both URL-encoded and backslash traversal variants.

4. **SPA catch-all path traversal defense** — `serve_spa()` uses `Path.resolve().is_relative_to(_resolved_dist_dir)` as a defense-in-depth check before serving static files. Well done.

5. **Input sanitization** — `sanitize_untrusted_content()` strips XML-like tags from `prompt` and `error` fields in run logs before API responses. Tests verify `<script>` tags are stripped.

6. **Config redaction** — `_config_to_dict()` explicitly enumerates safe fields rather than doing a blanket `asdict()`, meaning Slack tokens and any future sensitive config fields are excluded by construction (allowlist pattern, not blocklist). This is the right approach.

7. **No `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`** — Frontend renders all data via React's safe JSX interpolation. No raw HTML injection vectors.

8. **CORS scoped narrowly** — Only `localhost:5173` and `127.0.0.1:5173` (Vite dev server) origins allowed, GET-only methods.

9. **Docs endpoints disabled** — `docs_url=None, redoc_url=None` prevents auto-generated API docs from being served.

### Issues Found

**[MINOR]** `src/colonyos/server.py` — The `/api/runs` endpoint calls `load_run_logs()` which returns dicts, then applies `_sanitize_run_log()` which only sanitizes top-level `prompt` and `error` fields. If any phase-level `error` strings contain injected content, those are passed through unsanitized. The `ShowResult` endpoint (which uses `compute_show_result`) also doesn't sanitize phase-level errors in the timeline entries. This is low severity since the frontend uses React safe rendering, but defense-in-depth would sanitize phase errors too.

**[MINOR]** `src/colonyos/server.py` — The `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS` set is defined (`{"slack"}`) but never actually referenced in the code. The config redaction works via the allowlist pattern in `_config_to_dict()` instead. The dead code is misleading — it implies a blocklist approach that isn't used. Should be removed to avoid confusion.

**[INFO]** `web/package-lock.json` — 2818 lines of committed lockfile. This is fine for reproducibility but any of these npm dependencies could introduce supply chain risk. Since the built assets are committed and end users never run `npm install`, the attack surface is limited to contributors and build environments.

**[INFO]** `src/colonyos/server.py` — No rate limiting on API endpoints. Since this is localhost-only, this is acceptable for V1, but if ever exposed beyond localhost, all endpoints would need rate limiting to prevent local DoS (e.g., a malicious browser tab hammering `/api/stats` which reads and processes all run logs on each request).

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VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS` set is defined but never referenced — dead code that implies a blocklist approach that isn't used; should be removed to avoid security confusion
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: Phase-level `error` strings in run logs and timeline entries are not sanitized through `sanitize_untrusted_content()`, only top-level `prompt` and `error` fields are; low risk since React prevents XSS but weakens defense-in-depth
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: No rate limiting on API endpoints; acceptable for localhost-only V1 but worth noting for any future scope expansion
- [web/package-lock.json]: 2818 lines of committed npm lockfile introduces supply chain surface for contributors; mitigated by committing built assets so end users never run npm install

SYNTHESIS:
From a security perspective, this implementation is well-executed for a localhost-only, read-only dashboard. The key security decisions are all correct: binding to `127.0.0.1` only, using an allowlist (not blocklist) pattern for config serialization to prevent secret leakage, validating run IDs against path traversal, using `Path.resolve().is_relative_to()` for the SPA catch-all route, sanitizing user-generated content before API responses, disabling FastAPI docs endpoints, and restricting CORS to the Vite dev server. The test suite explicitly covers path traversal, read-only enforcement (405 on POST/PUT/DELETE), and XSS sanitization. The two minor findings (dead `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS` variable and incomplete phase-error sanitization) are low-severity cleanup items that don't block approval. The architecture correctly keeps the API as a thin read-only wrapper over existing data-layer functions, minimizing the attack surface. This is a solid V1 that meets the PRD's security requirements.