# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 1)

I have enough information to complete my security review. Let me write the output now.

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## Security Review: `colonyos show <run-id>` — Staff Security Engineer

### Assessment

I've reviewed the full implementation diff, PRD, task file, and all tests. 865 tests pass with zero regressions. Here is my assessment from a security perspective:

**Path Traversal Protection (FR-1):** ✅ The `validate_run_id_input()` function properly rejects `/`, `\`, and `..` via a compiled regex (`_UNSAFE_PATTERN`). This is called at the top of `resolve_run_id()` before any filesystem access. The glob pattern is hardcoded to `run-*.json` within the runs directory — an attacker cannot escape the runs directory via the run ID input. Tests cover forward slash, backslash, and `..` rejection.

**Input Validation in CLI Layer:** ✅ The CLI handler catches both `ValueError` (path traversal) and `FileNotFoundError`, prints to stderr, and exits non-zero. No raw exception tracebacks leak to the user.

**No Secrets in Output:** ✅ The `--json` flag outputs the raw run data (which is already on disk as a JSON file the user owns). The prompt is truncated to 120 chars in rich mode as the PRD specified, reducing accidental exposure of sensitive prompt content in screen shares / logs. Full prompt is available only via `--json` (stdout, not rendered to terminal).

**Read-Only Operation:** ✅ This is a pure read-only command — no file writes, no network calls, no subprocess invocations, no database mutations. The principle of least privilege is well-satisfied: it reads only from `.colonyos/runs/run-*.json`.

**No New Dependencies:** ✅ No new packages added for this feature. Uses existing `rich`, `click`, `json`, and `pathlib`.

**Error Message Information Leakage:** Minor note — `FileNotFoundError` messages include the full filesystem path (`Runs directory not found: {runs_dir}`, `Run file not found: {file_path}`). This is acceptable for a local CLI tool but worth noting.

**`all()` on Empty Collection (Decision Gate):** ⚠️ On line 345 of `show.py`, `decision_success = all(p.get("success", True) for p in decision_phases)` will return `True` for an empty list. However, this is guarded by the `has_decision` check, so it's unreachable when `decision_phases` is empty. Not a real bug but a latent footgun if the guard is ever removed.

**Unrelated Changes on Branch:** ⚠️ The branch contains 4 prior commits from a separate `ci-fix` feature (commits `93f941f` through `27dd6cf`). These add significant surface area including: `ci.py` (468 lines, subprocess calls to `gh`, network fetches), `sanitize.py` enhancements, orchestrator changes, and CI log processing. These are **not in scope** for this PRD review, but their presence on this branch increases rollback blast radius. The `show` feature itself is cleanly isolated in commit `9062186`.

**The `show` Command Itself — Audit Surface:** This command is purely an *observation* tool. It doesn't execute code, modify files, or make network requests. From a security standpoint, it's exemplary — it provides auditability into what the agent did (phases, costs, errors, session IDs) without introducing any new attack surface.

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VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/show.py:345]: `all()` on potentially empty `decision_phases` returns True vacuously — guarded by `has_decision` check but is a latent footgun if guard is ever removed
- [src/colonyos/show.py:123-133]: Run ID resolution uses substring matching (`partial_id in run_id`) which is broad — a short input like "1" could match many runs, but this is a usability concern, not a security issue
- [branch]: Branch carries 4 unrelated commits from the ci-fix feature; the show feature itself is cleanly isolated in commit 9062186

SYNTHESIS:
From a security perspective, this is a well-implemented, low-risk feature. The `show` command is read-only, operates exclusively on local files the user already owns, and introduces zero new attack surface. Path traversal is properly mitigated with input validation before any filesystem access. The data/render separation means the `--json` output path avoids Rich rendering entirely, reducing risk of injection into terminal escape sequences. The only minor concern is the branch carrying unrelated ci-fix commits, which increases review scope and rollback risk, but the show feature code itself is clean, well-tested (76 dedicated tests all passing), and follows the principle of least privilege by doing nothing more than reading and formatting existing run log files.