# Decision Gate: ColonyOS Web Dashboard

**Branch**: `colonyos/i_think_we_should_add_some_sort_of_ui_for_managing_all_this_seeing_runs_defining`
**PRD**: `cOS_prds/20260318_173116_prd_i_think_we_should_add_some_sort_of_ui_for_managing_all_this_seeing_runs_defining.md`
**Date**: 2026-03-18

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## Persona Verdicts

| Persona | Verdict | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|---------|---------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| Andrej Karpathy | ✅ APPROVE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Linus Torvalds | ✅ APPROVE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Principal Systems Engineer | ✅ APPROVE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Staff Security Engineer | ✅ APPROVE | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |

**Tally: 4/4 APPROVE — unanimous**

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```
VERDICT: GO
```

### Rationale
All four personas unanimously approve the implementation. There are zero CRITICAL or HIGH findings. The single MEDIUM finding (config redaction using a blocklist instead of allowlist pattern) is a valid future-proofing concern but is acceptable for a localhost-only V1 tool where the config contains no secrets today. The implementation meets every PRD functional requirement (FR1–FR5), stays within scope budgets (176 lines Python, ~893 lines TypeScript), and all 945 tests pass including 31 new ones covering security controls.

### Unresolved Issues
- **[MEDIUM]** `_config_to_dict()` uses blocklist pattern (`asdict` + pop) — new sensitive fields added to `ColonyConfig` will be exposed by default; consider switching to allowlist or adding a maintenance comment
- **[LOW]** `/api/runs/{run_id}` returns unsanitized `asdict(show_result)` while `/api/runs` sanitizes — inconsistent defense-in-depth (mitigated by React's safe JSX rendering)
- **[LOW]** Lazy import of `load_single_run` inside `get_run()` handler lacks explanatory comment
- **[LOW]** Unused `JSONResponse` import in `server.py`
- **[LOW]** `package-lock.json` gitignored — contributors may get non-deterministic dependency versions (mitigated by pre-built committed assets)

### Recommendation
**Merge as-is.** The MEDIUM blocklist concern and the sanitization inconsistency should be tracked as backlog items for V2 — neither poses a real risk in the current localhost-only, read-only threat model. The implementation is clean, well-tested, and properly scoped.
