# Review by Staff Security Engineer (Round 3)

## Security Review: ColonyOS Web Dashboard — Final Assessment

### Round 2 Finding Resolution

The latest commit (`55185ab`) addressed several round 2 findings:
- ✅ `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS` is now wired into `_config_to_dict()` — no longer dead code
- ✅ CORS middleware gated behind `COLONYOS_DEV` env var
- ✅ RunDetail polling stale closure fixed
- ✅ Server.py reduced to 177 lines (within PRD target)

### Completeness

All PRD functional requirements (FR1-FR5) are implemented:
- ✅ `colonyos ui` CLI command with `--port` and `--no-open`
- ✅ 6 GET-only API endpoints
- ✅ Vite + React SPA with Dashboard, RunDetail, Config pages
- ✅ Optional `[ui]` dependency group
- ✅ Built assets committed, package-data updated
- ✅ All 83 task items marked complete
- ✅ 127 tests pass (0 failures)

### Security Controls — Verified

1. **Localhost binding**: `host="127.0.0.1"` hardcoded in `cli.py` L2138. ✅
2. **Read-only API surface**: Only `@app.get` decorators used. Tests verify POST/PUT/DELETE → 405. ✅
3. **Path traversal on run_id**: `validate_run_id_input()` rejects `/`, `\`, `..`. Tests cover URL-encoded and backslash variants. ✅
4. **SPA catch-all path confinement**: `Path.resolve().is_relative_to(_resolved_dist_dir)` check before serving any file. ✅
5. **XSS sanitization**: `sanitize_untrusted_content()` on `prompt` and `error` fields in run list. ✅
6. **No `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`/`innerHTML`/`eval`**: Confirmed via codebase grep — zero instances. ✅
7. **Docs endpoints disabled**: `docs_url=None, redoc_url=None`. ✅
8. **CORS scoped to dev only**: Only active when `COLONYOS_DEV` is set, restricted to `localhost:5173`/`127.0.0.1:5173`, GET-only. ✅
9. **No write operations exposed**: `save_config` never imported or referenced in `server.py`. ✅
10. **Lockfile committed**: `package-lock.json` present for reproducible builds. ✅

### Remaining Findings

**[MEDIUM] Config redaction uses blocklist, not allowlist** — `_config_to_dict()` calls `asdict(config)` which serializes ALL 17 fields of `ColonyConfig`, then pops only `slack` and `ceo_persona`. This is a blocklist pattern. If a new sensitive field is added to `ColonyConfig` in the future (e.g., an API key, a webhook URL, credentials for a new integration), it will be exposed by default unless someone remembers to add it to `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS`. The round 2 review incorrectly stated this was an allowlist. Recommendation: either switch to an explicit allowlist of fields to include, or add a comment documenting the maintenance burden of keeping `_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_FIELDS` in sync.

**[LOW] `/api/runs/{run_id}` response is unsanitized** — The `get_run` endpoint returns `asdict(show_result)` directly, without passing through `_sanitize_run_log()` or any equivalent sanitizer. This means phase-level error messages, prompt text in the ShowResult, and any user-generated strings in the detailed view are returned raw. The `/api/runs` list endpoint correctly sanitizes, but the detail endpoint does not. Risk is low because React's JSX interpolation escapes HTML, but this inconsistency weakens defense-in-depth.

**[LOW] Unused import** — `JSONResponse` is imported on line 18 but never used. Not a security issue, but dead imports in security-sensitive modules create noise during audits.

**[INFO] No rate limiting** — Acceptable for localhost-only V1. `/api/stats` and `/api/runs` read all JSON files from disk on every request, so a malicious browser tab could cause local I/O pressure. Flag for V2 if scope expands.

**[INFO] `auto_approve` field exposed in config API** — The `auto_approve: bool` field in `ColonyConfig` is serialized to the API response. While not a secret, it reveals the user's trust posture. This is borderline — acceptable for a local-only tool but worth noting.

---

VERDICT: approve

FINDINGS:
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: `_config_to_dict()` uses blocklist pattern (asdict + pop) not allowlist — new sensitive fields added to ColonyConfig will be exposed by default; should either switch to allowlist or add a maintenance comment
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: `/api/runs/{run_id}` endpoint returns `asdict(show_result)` without sanitization, unlike `/api/runs` which sanitizes prompt/error; inconsistent defense-in-depth
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: Unused `JSONResponse` import on line 18
- [src/colonyos/server.py]: No rate limiting on endpoints; acceptable for localhost V1 but `/api/stats` reads all run files on each request

SYNTHESIS:
This implementation is solid from a security standpoint for a localhost-only, read-only dashboard. The critical controls are all correct: 127.0.0.1 binding, GET-only API surface with 405 enforcement tests, path traversal validation on run IDs, SPA catch-all path confinement, XSS sanitization on user-facing fields, CORS gated behind a dev flag, and no write operations exposed. The round 2 findings were addressed in the latest commit. The one remaining concern worth tracking is the blocklist pattern for config redaction — `asdict()` + pop is fragile against future field additions. For V1 of a local tool this is acceptable, but if the config ever gains API keys or webhook secrets, this pattern will silently expose them. The unsanitized detail endpoint is low risk given React's safe rendering but should be addressed for consistency. Approving with these noted for the backlog.
