# Decision Gate

Verdict: **GO**

Now I have a complete picture. Let me summarize the decision.

---

## Verdict Tally (Latest Round — Round 3)

| Persona | Verdict |
|---|---|
| Linus Torvalds | **APPROVE** |
| Staff Security Engineer | **APPROVE** |
| Andrej Karpathy | **APPROVE** |
| Principal Systems Engineer (Google/Stripe) | **REQUEST-CHANGES** |

**Score: 3 APPROVE / 1 REQUEST-CHANGES**

---

## Findings Evolution

**Round 1 CRITICAL/HIGH findings (all resolved by Round 2/3):**
- ~~Approval gate was fake (posted message, never waited)~~ → Fixed: `wait_for_approval` with reaction polling
- ~~No concurrency guard (unbounded threads)~~ → Fixed: `pipeline_semaphore` serializes runs
- ~~Thread-unsafe state mutations~~ → Fixed: `state_lock` guards shared state
- ~~`--max-hours`/`--max-budget` dead code~~ → Fixed: enforced in watch loop
- ~~`reaction_added` handler missing~~ → Fixed: registered when trigger_mode is "reaction"
- ~~Duplicated sanitization regex~~ → Fixed: shared `sanitize.py` module
- ~~Prompt preamble elevated untrusted content~~ → Fixed: reworded to "source feature description"

**Remaining findings (Round 3, all MEDIUM or LOW):**
- `"all"` trigger mode in code but not in valid config set (inconsistency)
- `active_threads` list mutated without lock (minor race on shutdown-only data)
- `processed_messages` dict grows unbounded (slow burn over weeks)
- Approval wait blocks the pipeline semaphore (5-min stall risk)
- `ui_factory` typed as `object | None` instead of proper Callable
- No explicit WebSocket reconnection logging
- Reactor identity not checked against `allowed_user_ids` (only message author)

---

```
VERDICT: GO
```

### Rationale
All CRITICAL and HIGH findings from Round 1 have been resolved — the approval gate now genuinely polls for reactions, concurrency is guarded by a semaphore, shared state is protected by a lock, budget/time caps are enforced, and the `reaction_added` handler is implemented. The remaining findings from the sole dissenting reviewer (Principal Systems Engineer Round 3) are all MEDIUM or LOW severity: the `"all"` trigger mode inconsistency, `active_threads` race on a shutdown-only list, and unbounded `processed_messages` growth are real but non-blocking operational concerns. Three of four personas approve, and the security engineer — whose domain is most critical for an untrusted-input-to-agent pipeline — gives a clean approval with minor notes.

### Unresolved Issues
- `"all"` trigger mode referenced in code but rejected by config validation — dead code inconsistency
- `active_threads.append()` called without lock from concurrent event handlers — minor race
- `processed_messages` dict never pruned — will bloat over long-running (weeks+) sessions
- `wait_for_approval` blocks `pipeline_semaphore` — unapproved messages stall queue for up to 5 minutes
- `ui_factory` parameter typed as `object | None` instead of `Callable` — loose typing
- No WebSocket disconnect/reconnect logging for operational visibility
- Reaction trigger checks message author but not reactor against `allowed_user_ids`

### Recommendation
Merge as-is for Phase 1 shipment. Track the following as fast-follow items before production deployment to high-traffic channels: (1) move semaphore acquisition to after approval completes, (2) add `processed_messages` pruning with a 7-day TTL or max-entries cap, (3) fix the `"all"` trigger mode inconsistency, and (4) wrap `active_threads` mutations with the existing `state_lock`. These are all targeted, low-risk patches that don't require architectural changes.