---
title: Section 1983 Civil Rights Claims
description: An overview of the legal standards, elements, and remedies for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional and federal rights.
keywords: [civil rights, section 1983, constitutional violations, federal rights, damages, injunctive relief]
category: law
---

## Overview of Section 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as "Section 1983," provides a cause of action for individuals whose constitutional or federal rights have been violated by a person acting "under color of state law." This federal statute serves as a mechanism for private parties to seek redress for deprivations of their civil rights by state and local government actors, including state and municipal employees. Section 1983 claims are distinct from and supplementary to any available state law causes of action, offering plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their rights in federal court.

The text of Section 1983 states, in relevant part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress..." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to encompass violations of both constitutional and certain federal statutory rights. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).

## Elements of a Section 1983 Claim

To establish a valid claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the defendant acted "under color of state law," and (2) the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

The "under color of state law" element requires that the defendant have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). This element is typically satisfied when the defendant is a state or local government official, employee, or agent acting in their official capacity. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).

The second element, the deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, encompasses a wide range of potential violations, including, but not limited to, deprivations of due process, equal protection, free speech, freedom of religion, and various other civil liberties. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (procedural due process); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection); Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (First Amendment retaliation). The plaintiff must identify the specific right that was allegedly violated and demonstrate how the defendant's conduct deprived them of that right.

## Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity

Once a plaintiff has established the elements of a Section 1983 claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct did not violate "clearly established" constitutional or federal rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions and that the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of that clearly established law. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

If the defendant fails to establish qualified immunity, the plaintiff must then prove the underlying constitutional or federal violation by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden of proof applies to all elements of the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim, including the nature and extent of the plaintiff's damages. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253.

## Available Remedies

Successful Section 1983 plaintiffs may be entitled to a range of legal and equitable remedies. These include compensatory damages to redress actual injuries suffered, nominal damages for the violation of rights without proof of actual injury, and punitive damages in cases where the defendant's conduct was motivated by evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

In addition to monetary damages, Section 1983 plaintiffs may also seek injunctive relief to prevent ongoing or future violations of their rights. To obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) actual success on the merits; (2) that they have suffered irreparable injury; (3) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (4) that the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant warrants equitable relief; and (5) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010).

## Limitations and Exceptions

While Section 1983 provides a broad mechanism for vindicating constitutional and federal rights, there are certain limitations and exceptions to its application. For instance, the Eleventh Amendment generally bars Section 1983 suits for monetary damages against states and state agencies. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of certain federal statutes that contain their own comprehensive enforcement schemes. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).

Further, the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), may bar Section 1983 claims for damages that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's criminal conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. The Court has also recognized certain other exceptions, such as the bar on Section 1983 claims for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures where the plaintiff has been convicted of the offense for which he was arrested. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.